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EUVD-2026-399120
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISAReserved
2026-11-02 16:53
Assigner
ENISA
Alias of
a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities.
This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own:
they belong to that CVE.
{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-11-02T16:53:29.848323+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-399120"
}
CVE-2026-99239 (GCVE-0-2026-99239)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-02 16:06 – Updated: 2026-11-03 19:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in
several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.
There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind
l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock
l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN)
chan->state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND
lock_sock <------------------ release_sock
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state
is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second
__l2cap_chan_add.
Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with
WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is
l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on
chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so
there can be other TOCTOUC problems.
Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
Severity
7.8 (High)
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
8f90405a4a6f1f1880dc07996b47bf57c712bd8a , < 85cc289eb08afa975375f838187369e68b429ee0
(git)
Affected: 32d783cafb46ff3ca58e6f9fd62c9c5f35eaf26b , < 820579652b24ce277e0097cd65b42bd9b7b8bf07 (git) Affected: 8922c7940bae9ce4b1736dddb6362370793835c2 , < e618d928ec7f88cbeadfa3542adcac40f474e629 (git) Affected: 91047a4396a8b1857a6f712a90cf33ec0012b189 , < fabaff1c59ff2cc89cb7e5bd0186a5e15f0c73b2 (git) Affected: 0b0e2bf39cf99e458d991b9df253727e036a7d7d , < 52fe88e4ef87311eee32b45c65603e7c69e75e7d (git) Affected: d3b739db5dc6f688a60d56da872fabaf65246032 , < 10c705dd706aa93164ba41f2566f15206d6c178e (git) Affected: b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b , < 73820561d8cbfd3364a29b8fa77f1707f26029da (git) Affected: b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b , < d3afd7803f9bc2a8c4270199497b60158b2fc647 (git) Affected: b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b , < 86b55991d3cd690e73c5ef8d20b75ae4905b357a (git) Affected: 50c38d9f42a529691e4e67ea9cedf4f0bfc8d277 (git) Affected: 5.10.265 , < 5.10.273 (semver) Affected: 5.15.216 , < 5.15.224 (semver) Affected: 6.1.183 , < 6.1.191 (semver) Affected: 6.6.145 , < 6.6.161 (semver) Affected: 6.12.97 , < 6.12.115 (semver) Affected: 6.18.39 , < 6.18.60 (semver) Affected: 7.1.4 , < 7.2 (semver) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
7.2
Unaffected: 0 , < 7.2 (semver) Unaffected: 5.10.273 , ≤ 5.10.* (semver) Unaffected: 5.15.224 , ≤ 5.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.191 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.161 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.115 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.60 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.14 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3.1 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.4-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c",
"net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "85cc289eb08afa975375f838187369e68b429ee0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8f90405a4a6f1f1880dc07996b47bf57c712bd8a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "820579652b24ce277e0097cd65b42bd9b7b8bf07",
"status": "affected",
"version": "32d783cafb46ff3ca58e6f9fd62c9c5f35eaf26b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e618d928ec7f88cbeadfa3542adcac40f474e629",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8922c7940bae9ce4b1736dddb6362370793835c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fabaff1c59ff2cc89cb7e5bd0186a5e15f0c73b2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "91047a4396a8b1857a6f712a90cf33ec0012b189",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "52fe88e4ef87311eee32b45c65603e7c69e75e7d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0b0e2bf39cf99e458d991b9df253727e036a7d7d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "10c705dd706aa93164ba41f2566f15206d6c178e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d3b739db5dc6f688a60d56da872fabaf65246032",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "73820561d8cbfd3364a29b8fa77f1707f26029da",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d3afd7803f9bc2a8c4270199497b60158b2fc647",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "86b55991d3cd690e73c5ef8d20b75ae4905b357a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "50c38d9f42a529691e4e67ea9cedf4f0bfc8d277",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.10.273",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.10.265",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15.224",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15.216",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.1.191",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6.161",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12.115",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.60",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.39",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1.4",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c",
"net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.273",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.224",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.161",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.115",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.60",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.14",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.273",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.10.265",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.224",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15.216",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.191",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.1.183",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.161",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.6.145",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.115",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.12.97",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.60",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.18.39",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.14",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3.1",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.4-rc1",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1.4",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn\n\nl2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in\nseveral places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.\n\nThere is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:\n\n [Task 1] [Task 2]\n l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind\n l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock\n l2cap_state_change if (sk-\u003esk_state != BT_OPEN)\n chan-\u003estate = BT_CONNECT\n l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan-\u003estate = BT_BOUND\n sk-\u003esk_state = BT_BOUND\n lock_sock \u003c------------------ release_sock\n sk-\u003esk_state = BT_CONNECT\n\nl2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk-\u003esk_state, so since chan-\u003estate\nis now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second\n__l2cap_chan_add.\n\nExplicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with\nWARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is\nl2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on\nchan-\u003estate. chan-\u003estate read/write is not properly guarded currently so\nthere can be other TOCTOUC problems.\n\nAdd l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan-\u003estate write."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The double add is a local TOCTOU: l2cap_sock_connect()\u2192l2cap_chan_connect()\u2192__l2cap_chan_add() races l2cap_sock_bind(), which overwrites chan-\u003estate to BT_BOUND so a later connect() links the same l2cap_chan again. No received L2CAP/HCI PDU carries that state; a radio peer cannot issue those syscalls.\nAC:L - The attacker owns both threads. bind() holds lock_sock while l2cap_state_change() blocks in l2cap_sock_state_change_cb(); bind() then sets chan-\u003estate=BT_BOUND. l2cap_sock_connect() never checks sk-\u003esk_state, so a later connect() observes BT_BOUND and calls __l2cap_chan_add() again. The race is attacker-driven and retryable.\nPR:L - l2cap_sock_create() requires capable(CAP_NET_RAW) only for SOCK_RAW; SOCK_SEQPACKET/STREAM used here have no capability gate. l2cap_add_psm() auto-picks a dynamic PSM (BR/EDR \u003e=0x1001) without CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE. bt_sock_create() is init_net-only, so this is an ordinary unprivileged local user.\nUI:N - The attacker opens their own AF_BLUETOOTH/BTPROTO_L2CAP socket and issues bind()/connect(). hci_connect_acl() creates the hci_conn, l2cap_conn_add() publishes l2cap_data, and __l2cap_chan_add() runs before any remote Connection Complete or pairing prompt.\nS:U - __l2cap_chan_add() corrupts the host kernel l2cap_chan.list linked into l2cap_conn.chan_l, which l2cap_chan_del() and l2cap_conn_del() then walk; the impact stays in the kernel L2CAP/HCI authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\nC:H - A second __l2cap_chan_add() to another l2cap_conn list_add_tail()s the same chan-\u003elist without unlinking it from the first conn-\u003echan_l. l2cap_conn_del()\u0027s list_for_each_entry_safe then follows those stale pointers and treats the other conn\u0027s list head as an l2cap_chan, an adjacent-slab type confusion that can be sprayed for a kernel read.\nI:H - l2cap_chan_del() list_del()s the twice-inserted chan-\u003elist, writing next/prev of the other connection\u0027s nodes, and l2cap_conn_del() calls chan-\u003eops-\u003eteardown/close on the type-confused object. That unlink write plus ops-pointer invocation is a write/control-flow primitive.\nA:H - Inserting chan-\u003elist into the same conn-\u003echan_l twice makes a self-loop, so __l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(), l2cap_conn_start(), and l2cap_conn_del() hang in list_for_each_entry; after list_del() the leftover head still points at the poisoned node and oopses."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-03T19:13:06.554Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85cc289eb08afa975375f838187369e68b429ee0"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/820579652b24ce277e0097cd65b42bd9b7b8bf07"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e618d928ec7f88cbeadfa3542adcac40f474e629"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fabaff1c59ff2cc89cb7e5bd0186a5e15f0c73b2"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52fe88e4ef87311eee32b45c65603e7c69e75e7d"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10c705dd706aa93164ba41f2566f15206d6c178e"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73820561d8cbfd3364a29b8fa77f1707f26029da"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3afd7803f9bc2a8c4270199497b60158b2fc647"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86b55991d3cd690e73c5ef8d20b75ae4905b357a"
}
],
"title": "Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99239",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T16:06:43.262Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.403Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-03T19:13:06.554Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Trend slope:
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(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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