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EUVD-2026-376118
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISAReserved
2026-10-02 08:40
Assigner
ENISA
Alias of
a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities.
This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own:
they belong to that CVE.
{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-10-02T08:40:05.885277+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-376118"
}
CVE-2026-98069 (GCVE-0-2026-98069)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-25 10:24 – Updated: 2026-10-03 11:01
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()
rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by
waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and
then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling
the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the
wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or
rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run
concurrently with the teardown.
The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock,
but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes
the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads
the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on
weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write,
and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings
(e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the
transmit state under it.
Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of
BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL
dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing -
by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead
of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection
tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is
decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.
Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport
shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them
explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with
clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the
transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by
rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by
the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().
The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and
rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown
owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them.
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it
acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now
spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter
runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue
and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so
a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks
accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded
by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB
path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no
blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking
acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the
fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB
drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The
window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the
teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.
Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued
there - accept processing for other connections and network
namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop()
during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for
that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each
other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and
the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes
without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on
the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by
the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel
without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now
noted next to those cancels (on
---truncated---
Severity
8.1 (High)
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729
(git)
Affected: 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456 (git) Affected: 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace (git) Affected: 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456 (git) Affected: 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201 (git) Affected: 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c (git) Affected: 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955 (git) Affected: 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72 , < 813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d (git) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
2.6.37
Unaffected: 0 , < 2.6.37 (semver) Unaffected: 5.10.271 , ≤ 5.10.* (semver) Unaffected: 5.15.222 , ≤ 5.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.189 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.158 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.111 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.53 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.7 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3-rc2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c",
"net/rds/ib_recv.c",
"net/rds/send.c",
"net/rds/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c",
"net/rds/ib_recv.c",
"net/rds/send.c",
"net/rds/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.37"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.37",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.271",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.222",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.271",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.37",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.222",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.37",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.189",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.37",
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},
{
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},
{
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{
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},
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.7",
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},
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"versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc2",
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"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()\n\nrds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by\nwaiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and\nthen runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling\nthe bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the\nwait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or\nrds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run\nconcurrently with the teardown.\n\nThe sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock,\nbut that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes\nthe state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads\nthe state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on\nweakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other\u0027s write,\nand the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings\n(e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the\ntransmit state under it.\n\nOracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of\nBUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL\ndereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing -\nby making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead\nof testing them (\"rds: Make sure transmit path and connection\ntear-down does not run concurrently\"). Ownership of a single word is\ndecided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.\n\nDo the same here: take both locks before calling the transport\nshutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them\nexplicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with\nclear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the\ntransport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by\nrds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by\nthe next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().\n\nThe fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and\nrds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown\nowns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them.\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it\nacquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now\nspans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter\nruns from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue\nand holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so\na duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks\naccept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded\nby the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB\npath\u0027s drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no\nblocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking\nacquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the\nfastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB\ndrain lengthens only that path\u0027s own quiesce. The\nwindow is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the\nteardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.\n\nBecause krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued\nthere - accept processing for other connections and network\nnamespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop()\nduring namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for\nthat time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each\nother: the teardown blocks until the bit\u0027s holder releases it, and\nthe holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes\nwithout needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on\nthe path\u0027s ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by\nthe blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel\nwithout flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now\nnoted next to those cancels (on \n---truncated---"
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - A remote RDS/TCP peer on port 16385 drives both sides of the race: RDS ping messages make rds_recv_incoming() call rds_send_pong() and so rds_send_xmit(), and the peer\u0027s own FIN/RST reaches rds_tcp_state_change() and then rds_conn_path_drop(), which queues rds_conn_shutdown(). The damaged state is that connection\u0027s transmit state and TCP socket.\nAC:H - The attacker can start sends and teardowns at will, but the sender only overlaps the teardown if the test_bit() wait in rds_conn_shutdown() and the state recheck in rds_send_xmit() both miss each other\u0027s store. That needs a weakly ordered CPU and a narrow reordering window the attacker cannot control.\nPR:N - rds_tcp_accept_one() accepts RDS/TCP connections from any peer address with no authentication, so pings and connection drops need no credentials. A local user can also reach it without privilege, since AF_RDS socket creation has no capability check and SO_RDS_TRANSPORT autoloads rds_tcp.\nUI:N - No victim action is needed. The attacker sends the pings and resets the connection themselves.\nS:U - The race and its memory corruption stay inside the kernel\u0027s own security authority. No guest/host or other boundary is crossed.\nC:H - rds_send_xmit()/rds_tcp_xmit() can keep using tc-\u003et_sock after rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown() has called sock_release() on it, and can keep using cp_xmit_rm while rds_send_path_reset() rewrites it. Both are use-after-free on socket and message objects, which could be groomed into kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - The transmit path writes through a freed struct socket/sock, and through transmit and ring state (IB rings zeroed by rds_ib_ring_init()) that the teardown is rewriting at the same time. That is a heap memory-corruption primitive.\nA:H - Losing the race crashes the kernel: the commit cites BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled() and NULL dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler(), and the TCP path can dereference a released socket."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-03T11:01:59.453Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d"
}
],
"title": "net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-98069",
"datePublished": "2026-09-25T10:24:10.887Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:19:56.074Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-03T11:01:59.453Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Trend slope:
-
(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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