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EUVD-2026-372085
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISAReserved
2026-10-02 08:39
Assigner
ENISA
Alias of
a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities.
This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own:
they belong to that CVE.
{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-10-02T08:39:00.505186+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-372085"
}
CVE-2026-90174 (GCVE-0-2026-90174)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 16:07 – Updated: 2026-10-30 12:34
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC
login response with
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is
only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login
response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()
reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not
bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack
hash[] buffer before allocating and copying.
[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611
[ 2030.242296]
[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:
[ 2030.242769] <TASK>
[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0
[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200
[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70
[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150
[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0
[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70
[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120
[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00
[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0
[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140
[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0
[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300
[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0
[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280
[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490
[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300
[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110
[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20
[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470
[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910
[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0
[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 2030.243564] </TASK>
[ 2030.243570]
[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:
[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0
[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750
[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340
[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0
[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0
[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930
[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00
[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140
[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470
[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100
[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460
[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 2030.305594]
[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640
[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 2030.309595] The buggy address
---truncated---
Severity
7.1 (High)
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 , < 792dd35013427995e742c7928ef5b564434a4321
(git)
Affected: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 , < 67223b1150a9edea52350d8cd085ea9081beaa45 (git) Affected: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 , < 863f74ad158fef2987b9146f29d4b3149bb95953 (git) Affected: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 , < 272c05a51285fe3495ab2f7eb77a48ad831b929f (git) Affected: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 , < 497c221bf6b2f659511719a6acfae84cc1be1caf (git) Affected: e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 , < 7405d0ba294306721843bc551611775e6edef516 (git) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
5.15
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.15 (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.191 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.160 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.114 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.57 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.6 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_config.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "792dd35013427995e742c7928ef5b564434a4321",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "67223b1150a9edea52350d8cd085ea9081beaa45",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "863f74ad158fef2987b9146f29d4b3149bb95953",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "272c05a51285fe3495ab2f7eb77a48ad831b929f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "497c221bf6b2f659511719a6acfae84cc1be1caf",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7405d0ba294306721843bc551611775e6edef516",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_config.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.114",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.191",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.160",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.114",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.57",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.6",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()\n\nksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp-\u003ehash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC\nlogin response with\n\n\tuser-\u003epasskey_sz = resp-\u003ehash_sz;\n\tuser-\u003epasskey = kmalloc(resp-\u003ehash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);\n\tif (user-\u003epasskey)\n\t\tmemcpy(user-\u003epasskey, resp-\u003ehash, resp-\u003ehash_sz);\n\nresp-\u003ehash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp-\u003ehash[] is\nonly KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login\nresponse can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()\nreads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not\nbound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack\nhash[] buffer before allocating and copying.\n\n[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611\n[ 2030.242296]\n[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)\n[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014\n[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work\n[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:\n[ 2030.242769] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0\n[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200\n[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70\n[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150\n[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0\n[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70\n[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120\n[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00\n[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0\n[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140\n[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0\n[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300\n[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0\n[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280\n[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490\n[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490\n[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490\n[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300\n[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110\n[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20\n[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470\n[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910\n[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0\n[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[ 2030.243564] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n[ 2030.243570]\n[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:\n[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80\n[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90\n[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0\n[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750\n[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340\n[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0\n[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0\n[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40\n[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930\n[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00\n[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140\n[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470\n[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100\n[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460\n[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n[ 2030.305594]\n[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640\n[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192\n[ 2030.309595] The buggy address \n---truncated---"
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - ksmbd_alloc_user() memcpy()s resp-\u003ehash_sz bytes from resp-\u003ehash, and that __u16 is a field of the KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_RESPONSE copied in handle_generic_event() from a local SMBD_GENL netlink message. SMB2 SESSION_SETUP (smb2_sess_setup \u2192 ntlm_authenticate \u2192 ksmbd_login_user) only supplies the account name that queues ksmbd_ipc_login_request(); it does not carry hash_sz.\nAC:L - The sender sets hash_sz to any __u16 (up to 65535) in a sizeof(ksmbd_login_response) LOGIN_RESPONSE; ipc_validate_msg() has no KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST case so it never bounds hash_sz. A matching ipc_ida handle is obtained by sending SESSION_SETUP and answering within the 2s IPC wait, with no uncontrolled race.\nPR:L - handle_generic_event() for KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_RESPONSE checks netlink_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) only when CONFIG_SMB_SERVER_CHECK_CAP_NET_ADMIN is set; ksmbd_genl_family is netnsok, the ops lack GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and LOGIN_RESPONSE is not bound to ksmbd_tools_pid. CAP_NET_ADMIN is Low, and builds that disable the check let any local user send it.\nUI:N - The attacker can connect to the local ksmbd TCP listener, send SMB2 SESSION_SETUP so ksmbd_ipc_login_request() waits on the handle, and inject the crafted LOGIN_RESPONSE themselves. No other user must log in or otherwise act once ksmbd is running.\nS:U - The slab over-read in ksmbd_alloc_user() and any oops of the ksmbd-io worker stay inside the host kernel that runs the SMB server. This is not a VM escape, IOMMU/DMA bypass, or other cross-authority impact.\nC:H - memcpy(user-\u003epasskey, resp-\u003ehash, resp-\u003ehash_sz) copies up to 65535 bytes from the 18-byte hash[] (KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ) of a packed ksmbd_login_response into kmalloc(hash_sz), which is an unbounded kernel-heap over-read rather than a few bounded bytes.\nI:N - kmalloc(resp-\u003ehash_sz) sizes the destination to the copy length, so the memcpy is a slab-out-of-bounds read with no OOB write. The LOGIN_RESPONSE sender already supplies uid/gid/account/status without this bug, and NTLM (calc_ntlmv2_hash) only consumes CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE of passkey.\nA:H - A 65535-byte read from a kmalloc-192 LOGIN_RESPONSE object walks off the slab into unmapped memory and oopses the ksmbd-io worker, matching the KASAN report in ksmbd_alloc_user(). The attacker can repeat SESSION_SETUP plus a crafted LOGIN_RESPONSE to crash the kernel at will."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-30T12:34:36.698Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/792dd35013427995e742c7928ef5b564434a4321"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67223b1150a9edea52350d8cd085ea9081beaa45"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/863f74ad158fef2987b9146f29d4b3149bb95953"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/272c05a51285fe3495ab2f7eb77a48ad831b929f"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/497c221bf6b2f659511719a6acfae84cc1be1caf"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7405d0ba294306721843bc551611775e6edef516"
}
],
"title": "ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-90174",
"datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:07:01.106Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.791Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-30T12:34:36.698Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Loading…
Trend slope:
-
(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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