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EUVD-2026-367601
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISAReserved
2026-10-02 08:36
Assigner
ENISA
Alias of
a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities.
This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own:
they belong to that CVE.
{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-10-02T08:36:28.186596+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-367601"
}
CVE-2026-89493 (GCVE-0-2026-89493)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-11 19:43 – Updated: 2026-09-14 12:00
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator
ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array
with:
for (; i < le16_to_cpu(rb->rf_records.rl_used); i++) {
rec = &rb->rf_records.rl_recs[i];
...
rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common
configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by
ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the
16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly
off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against
that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW
operation walks the array.
A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the
loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i]
for i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling
ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does:
if (index < le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used))
memmove(&rf_list->rl_recs[index + 1],
&rf_list->rl_recs[index],
(le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used) - index) *
sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec));
i.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an
offset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink
(FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent
whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to
run off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model
is local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a
raw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem.
ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block's ECC,
signature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used
against the block's actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of
gap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes
for the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity
and the "used" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]:
if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_next_free_rec) >
le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}
Add the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block():
reject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block
capacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used >
rl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set,
because in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list
(rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is
already validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the
referenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing
"!(rb->rf_flags & OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)" guard used elsewhere in this
file (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or
rf_list is the live member of the union.
With this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block
validation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption
check in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in
ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove()
in ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec().
Verified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build:
replaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in
__ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch,
and triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the
forged rl_used/rl_count.
Severity
8.8 (High)
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < f882e9e32d017a6569b2996c63ba3864717788e6
(git)
Affected: f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < 5593b63028cb43a6cda75a65ce1db95f00ea6857 (git) Affected: f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < c8b02f4ee91e757b3fff556c7168b24b7ae55132 (git) Affected: f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < 97584e93fc49a2d59252ac60467e9279f11b1b5b (git) Affected: f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < af56e90cb546cb0c47bef059335365283f61d6a4 (git) Affected: f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < 0761d2c9494424469a0d30a9da3496ca010b0b2d (git) Affected: f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < 04ead708e13ddcb9c39319cbe02a18cef99cb823 (git) Affected: f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4 , < 4ca62df6bc0708947b48da3f6a712ecb8e73929c (git) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
2.6.32
Unaffected: 0 , < 2.6.32 (semver) Unaffected: 5.10.270 , ≤ 5.10.* (semver) Unaffected: 5.15.221 , ≤ 5.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.188 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.157 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.109 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.50 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.4 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f882e9e32d017a6569b2996c63ba3864717788e6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5593b63028cb43a6cda75a65ce1db95f00ea6857",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c8b02f4ee91e757b3fff556c7168b24b7ae55132",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "97584e93fc49a2d59252ac60467e9279f11b1b5b",
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"version": "f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "af56e90cb546cb0c47bef059335365283f61d6a4",
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"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0761d2c9494424469a0d30a9da3496ca010b0b2d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "04ead708e13ddcb9c39319cbe02a18cef99cb823",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4ca62df6bc0708947b48da3f6a712ecb8e73929c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f2c870e3b12e38da6d9b5b17c4c8ae56a0ed68e4",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
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],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.32"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.32",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.270",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.221",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.270",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.221",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.188",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.157",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.109",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.50",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc1",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.32",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator\n\nocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array\nwith:\n\n\tfor (; i \u003c le16_to_cpu(rb-\u003erf_records.rl_used); i++) {\n\t\trec = \u0026rb-\u003erf_records.rl_recs[i];\n\t\t...\n\nrl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common\nconfiguration), so its real capacity is fixed by\nocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the\n16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly\noff disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against\nthat capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW\noperation walks the array.\n\nA crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the\nloop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i]\nfor i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling\nocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does:\n\n\tif (index \u003c le16_to_cpu(rf_list-\u003erl_used))\n\t\tmemmove(\u0026rf_list-\u003erl_recs[index + 1],\n\t\t\t\u0026rf_list-\u003erl_recs[index],\n\t\t\t(le16_to_cpu(rf_list-\u003erl_used) - index) *\n\t\t\t sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec));\n\ni.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an\noffset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink\n(FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent\nwhose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to\nrun off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model\nis local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a\nraw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem.\n\nocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block\u0027s ECC,\nsignature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used\nagainst the block\u0027s actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of\ngap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes\nfor the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity\nand the \"used\" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]:\n\n\tif (le16_to_cpu(eb-\u003eh_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) {\n\t\trc = ocfs2_error(...);\n\t\tgoto bail;\n\t}\n\n\tif (le16_to_cpu(eb-\u003eh_list.l_next_free_rec) \u003e\n\t le16_to_cpu(eb-\u003eh_list.l_count)) {\n\t\trc = ocfs2_error(...);\n\t\tgoto bail;\n\t}\n\nAdd the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block():\nreject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block\ncapacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used \u003e\nrl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set,\nbecause in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list\n(rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is\nalready validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the\nreferenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing\n\"!(rb-\u003erf_flags \u0026 OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)\" guard used elsewhere in this\nfile (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or\nrf_list is the live member of the union.\n\nWith this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block\nvalidation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption\ncheck in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in\nocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove()\nin ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec().\n\nVerified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build:\nreplaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in\n__ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch,\nand triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the\nforged rl_used/rl_count."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - OCFS2 registers export_operations and is commonly NFS-exported or ksmbd-shared on cluster storage; remote NFSv4.2 CLONE or ksmbd FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS reaches vfs_clone_file_range\u2192ocfs2_remap_file_range, and NFS WRITE/truncate on refcounted files reaches ocfs2_get_refcount_rec() and the OOB walk/memmove.\nAC:L - A crafted refcount block with rl_used=0xffff plus FICLONE/clone or write/CoW whose cpos sorts past the real leaf records deterministically drives the OOB loop and memmove; the fix commit reproduced this under KASAN with no race or uncontrollable layout.\nPR:L - Triggering needs only write/clone permission on a file whose inode points at the forged refcount block (unprivileged local user or authenticated NFS/SMB client); ocfs2_remap_file_range and ocfs2_reflink_ioctl have no capability check, and planting on-disk metadata does not require init-namespace root.\nUI:N - Once the malformed refcount block is on an already-mounted or NFS/SMB-exported OCFS2 volume, the attacker issues clone, write, or truncate themselves; no separate victim mount, click, or administrator action is required at exploit time.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and write corrupt kernel memory in the host parsing the OCFS2 refcount block; impact stays within that kernel\u0027s security authority and does not cross a VM, container, or IOMMU boundary.\nC:H - ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() indexes rl_recs[i] for i up to 65534 past a single 4K metadata block, performing an approximately 1 MiB out-of-bounds read of adjacent kernel memory and enabling high-bandwidth disclosure.\nI:H - ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() memmove()s up to (0xffff-index)*16 bytes (~1 MiB) from and to offsets already past the block and writes rl_recs[index] out of bounds, which is an arbitrary kernel out-of-bounds write exploitable for control-flow hijacking.\nA:H - The same OOB access was reproduced as a KASAN fault in __ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() and causes a kernel oops or panic, fully denying availability on the affected node."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-14T12:00:27.844Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f882e9e32d017a6569b2996c63ba3864717788e6"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5593b63028cb43a6cda75a65ce1db95f00ea6857"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8b02f4ee91e757b3fff556c7168b24b7ae55132"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97584e93fc49a2d59252ac60467e9279f11b1b5b"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af56e90cb546cb0c47bef059335365283f61d6a4"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0761d2c9494424469a0d30a9da3496ca010b0b2d"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04ead708e13ddcb9c39319cbe02a18cef99cb823"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ca62df6bc0708947b48da3f6a712ecb8e73929c"
}
],
"title": "ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-89493",
"datePublished": "2026-09-11T19:43:44.803Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.714Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-14T12:00:27.844Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Trend slope:
-
(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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