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EUVD-2026-345903
European Vulnerability Database identifier assigned by ENISAReserved
2026-10-02 08:05
Assigner
ENISA
Alias of
a CVE record, shown under related vulnerabilities.
This identifier carries no description, severity or references of its own:
they belong to that CVE.
{
"assigner": "ENISA",
"date_reserved": "2026-10-02T08:05:48.470120+00:00",
"id": "EUVD-2026-345903"
}
CVE-2024-41009 (GCVE-0-2024-41009)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-07-17 06:10 – Updated: 2026-08-05 11:34
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf
The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular
buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the
consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the
data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of
data reserved by all producers.
Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will
successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is
read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished
processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user
space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.
One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both
producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously
back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures
for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data
area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page
again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual
memory.
Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for
book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.
Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`
for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however
possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first
chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's
header.
For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size
of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to
bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in
[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets
allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos
was edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask`
check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able
to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned
earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data
pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A's header.
bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header's pg_off to then
locate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk
B modified chunk A's header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong
page and could cause a crash.
Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range
from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring
buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We've tested with
the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)
before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it
is still not significantly enough to matter.
Severity
7.8 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2024-09-10 16:25 UTC
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
457f44363a8894135c85b7a9afd2bd8196db24ab , < be35504b959f2749bab280f4671e8df96dcf836f
(git)
Affected: 457f44363a8894135c85b7a9afd2bd8196db24ab , < 0f98f40eb1ed52af8b81f61901b6c0289ff59de4 (git) Affected: 457f44363a8894135c85b7a9afd2bd8196db24ab , < d1b9df0435bc61e0b44f578846516df8ef476686 (git) Affected: 457f44363a8894135c85b7a9afd2bd8196db24ab , < 511804ab701c0503b72eac08217eabfd366ba069 (git) Affected: 457f44363a8894135c85b7a9afd2bd8196db24ab , < 47416c852f2a04d348ea66ee451cbdcf8119f225 (git) Affected: 457f44363a8894135c85b7a9afd2bd8196db24ab , < cfa1a2329a691ffd991fcf7248a57d752e712881 (git) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
5.8
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.8 (semver) Unaffected: 5.10.223 , ≤ 5.10.* (semver) Unaffected: 5.15.164 , ≤ 5.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.97 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.37 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.9.8 , ≤ 6.9.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.10 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
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Trend slope:
-
(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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