CVE-2026-92241 (GCVE-0-2026-92241)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 14:03 – Updated: 2026-11-13 14:03
VLAI
Title
Bluetooth Classic AVRCP browsing channel can deadlock the Bluetooth receive thread, hanging the host
Summary
The AVRCP browsing channel's L2CAP receive-buffer callback, browsing_avrcp_l2cap_alloc_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c, allocated from the shared avctp_browsing_rx_pool with K_FOREVER. L2CAP invokes that callback from the Bluetooth RX work queue thread (bt_workq, "BT RX WQ"), both for the head buffer of a new SDU and — through l2cap_br_alloc_frag() and net_buf_append_bytes() — for every further fragment of a reassembled SDU. That same thread is the only context that ever releases these buffers, after bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() delivers a completed SDU and calls net_buf_unref(), so a wait taken there can never be satisfied. The pool holds CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN + 1 buffers of CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING_L2CAP_MTU bytes (two buffers of 339 bytes in the default configuration). A connected browsing peer can drain it because bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c accepts the SDU length declared in an SAR_START segment without bounding it by br_chan->rx.mtu: a peer that announces a large SDU and then streams continuation segments forces one pool buffer per segment-worth of data. Once the pool is empty the next allocation blocks forever inside the callback. Triggering the flaw requires a build with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and the experimental CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING option, an application that registers AVRCP callbacks, and a BR/EDR peer that has established the AVRCP control channel and then the browsing channel, which requires an encrypted (paired) link. No malformed packet is needed — a few hundred bytes of ordinary segmented L2CAP traffic suffice. The consequence is a permanent hang of the whole Bluetooth host, not just of AVRCP: the blocked thread drains bt_dev.rx_queue for all HCI ACL data and low-priority events and also runs the host's internal work items, so all connections stop being serviced and the state is unrecoverable without a reboot. There is no memory-corruption or information-disclosure component. The fix allocates with K_NO_WAIT, so an empty pool now yields a local-busy indication or a channel disconnect that the application can recover from.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
zephyrproject zephyr Affected: 4.4.0 , < 4.5.0 (semver)
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          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "browsing_avrcp_l2cap_alloc_buf"
            }
          ],
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          "versions": [
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              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "semver"
            }
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          "value": "The AVRCP browsing channel\u0027s L2CAP receive-buffer callback, browsing_avrcp_l2cap_alloc_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c, allocated from the shared avctp_browsing_rx_pool with K_FOREVER. L2CAP invokes that callback from the Bluetooth RX work queue thread (bt_workq, \"BT RX WQ\"), both for the head buffer of a new SDU and \u2014 through l2cap_br_alloc_frag() and net_buf_append_bytes() \u2014 for every further fragment of a reassembled SDU. That same thread is the only context that ever releases these buffers, after bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() delivers a completed SDU and calls net_buf_unref(), so a wait taken there can never be satisfied.\n\nThe pool holds CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN + 1 buffers of CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING_L2CAP_MTU bytes (two buffers of 339 bytes in the default configuration). A connected browsing peer can drain it because bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c accepts the SDU length declared in an SAR_START segment without bounding it by br_chan-\u003erx.mtu: a peer that announces a large SDU and then streams continuation segments forces one pool buffer per segment-worth of data. Once the pool is empty the next allocation blocks forever inside the callback.\n\nTriggering the flaw requires a build with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and the experimental CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING option, an application that registers AVRCP callbacks, and a BR/EDR peer that has established the AVRCP control channel and then the browsing channel, which requires an encrypted (paired) link. No malformed packet is needed \u2014 a few hundred bytes of ordinary segmented L2CAP traffic suffice.\n\nThe consequence is a permanent hang of the whole Bluetooth host, not just of AVRCP: the blocked thread drains bt_dev.rx_queue for all HCI ACL data and low-priority events and also runs the host\u0027s internal work items, so all connections stop being serviced and the state is unrecoverable without a reboot. There is no memory-corruption or information-disclosure component. The fix allocates with K_NO_WAIT, so an empty pool now yields a local-busy indication or a channel disconnect that the application can recover from."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T14:03:47.349Z",
        "orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
        "shortName": "zephyr"
      },
      "references": [
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          "name": "Fix commit",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/c8c2438f05165397347613b44dd8e9eaa1243139"
        },
        {
          "name": "GHSA-8vpg-4235-9qjj",
          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-8vpg-4235-9qjj"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Bluetooth Classic AVRCP browsing channel can deadlock the Bluetooth receive thread, hanging the host",
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "assignerShortName": "zephyr",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-92241",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-13T14:03:47.349Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-15T19:52:34.955Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T14:03:47.349Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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      "date": "2026-11-16",
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                "programFiles": [
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                "programRoutines": [
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            "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
          }
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        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "The AVRCP browsing channel\u0027s L2CAP receive-buffer callback, browsing_avrcp_l2cap_alloc_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c, allocated from the shared avctp_browsing_rx_pool with K_FOREVER. L2CAP invokes that callback from the Bluetooth RX work queue thread (bt_workq, \"BT RX WQ\"), both for the head buffer of a new SDU and \u2014 through l2cap_br_alloc_frag() and net_buf_append_bytes() \u2014 for every further fragment of a reassembled SDU. That same thread is the only context that ever releases these buffers, after bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() delivers a completed SDU and calls net_buf_unref(), so a wait taken there can never be satisfied.\n\nThe pool holds CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN + 1 buffers of CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING_L2CAP_MTU bytes (two buffers of 339 bytes in the default configuration). A connected browsing peer can drain it because bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c accepts the SDU length declared in an SAR_START segment without bounding it by br_chan-\u003erx.mtu: a peer that announces a large SDU and then streams continuation segments forces one pool buffer per segment-worth of data. Once the pool is empty the next allocation blocks forever inside the callback.\n\nTriggering the flaw requires a build with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and the experimental CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING option, an application that registers AVRCP callbacks, and a BR/EDR peer that has established the AVRCP control channel and then the browsing channel, which requires an encrypted (paired) link. No malformed packet is needed \u2014 a few hundred bytes of ordinary segmented L2CAP traffic suffice.\n\nThe consequence is a permanent hang of the whole Bluetooth host, not just of AVRCP: the blocked thread drains bt_dev.rx_queue for all HCI ACL data and low-priority events and also runs the host\u0027s internal work items, so all connections stop being serviced and the state is unrecoverable without a reboot. There is no memory-corruption or information-disclosure component. The fix allocates with K_NO_WAIT, so an empty pool now yields a local-busy indication or a channel disconnect that the application can recover from."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-92241",
        "lastModified": "2026-11-13T14:18:03.763",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV31": [
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                "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
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                "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
                "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "integrityImpact": "NONE",
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                "userInteraction": "NONE",
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            "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-8vpg-4235-9qjj"
          }
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        "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
        "weaknesses": [
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                "value": "CWE-833"
              }
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            "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
            "type": "Secondary"
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        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



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