CVE-2026-65626 (GCVE-0-2026-65626)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 19:53 – Updated: 2026-11-02 19:43
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose
Summary
The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.
An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.
This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-02 18:37 UTC
CWE
- CWE-203 - Observable Discrepancy
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/securi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626 | related |
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit… | related |
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| potatosalad | jose |
Affected:
1.3.0 , < 1.11.13
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| potatosalad | jose |
Affected:
853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8 , < 0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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]
},
"published": "2026-10-26T20:17:58.103",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-203"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"current_release_date": "2026-11-07T10:35:18+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-65626",
"id": "CVE-2026-65626",
"initial_release_date": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620000+00:00",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "1",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "jose: jose: Information disclosure via padding oracle in RSA decryption",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-65626.json",
"version": "3"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-65626",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-02T18:37:15.733304Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T19:35:06.091Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"jose_jwa_pkcs1"
],
"packageName": "jose",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/jose",
"product": "jose",
"programFiles": [
"src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"vendor": "potatosalad",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.11.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.3.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"jose_jwa_pkcs1"
],
"packageName": "potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"product": "jose",
"programFiles": [
"src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"vendor": "potatosalad",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_pkcs1\u003c/code\u003e module) instead of the native OTP \u003ccode\u003epublic_key\u003c/code\u003e implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (\u003ccode\u003eapplication:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)\u003c/code\u003e, or \u003ccode\u003eJOSE.crypto_fallback(true)\u003c/code\u003e in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_pkcs1\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module) instead of the native OTP `public_key` implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (`application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)`, or `JOSE.crypto_fallback(true)` in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through `jose_jwa_pkcs1`."
}
],
"value": "The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module) instead of the native OTP public_key implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true), or JOSE.crypto_fallback(true) in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through jose_jwa_pkcs1."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.11.13",
"versionStartIncluding": "1.3.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Andrew Bennett"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_pkcs1\u003c/code\u003e module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. \u003ccode\u003eeme_pkcs1_decode/2\u003c/code\u003e returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid \u003ccode\u003ePKCS#1\u003c/code\u003e v1.5 padding (a leading \u003ccode\u003e0x00 0x02\u003c/code\u003e, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a \u003ccode\u003e0x00\u003c/code\u003e separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and \u003ccode\u003ersaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2\u003c/code\u003e additionally returns \u003ccode\u003e{error, {badsize, _}}\u003c/code\u003e when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in \u003ccode\u003edp/2\u003c/code\u003e is a raw, non-blinded \u003ccode\u003ecrypto:mod_pow/3\u003c/code\u003e, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls \u003ccode\u003edecrypt_private/3\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003ersa_pkcs1_padding\u003c/code\u003e) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. `eme_pkcs1_decode/2` returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid `PKCS#1` v1.5 padding (a leading `0x00 0x02`, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a `0x00` separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and `rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2` additionally returns `{error, {badsize, _}}` when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in `dp/2` is a raw, non-blinded `crypto:mod_pow/3`, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls `decrypt_private/3` with `rsa_pkcs1_padding`) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."
}
],
"value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-463",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-463 Padding Oracle Crypto Attack"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-203",
"description": "CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-65626",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-65626",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 853c5d4 in potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 0eac8ce in potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-65626",
"datePublished": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-22T13:55:59.401Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T19:43:05.115Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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