CVE-2026-19809 (GCVE-0-2026-19809)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-12 15:19 – Updated: 2026-11-12 15:19
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Kernel stack information disclosure in the charger_get_prop() system call handler
Summary
The user-mode system call verifier z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c declares an uninitialized union charger_propval k_val on the kernel (privileged) stack, passes it to the charger driver back end via z_impl_charger_get_prop(), and then copies the full sizeof(union charger_propval) back into the calling user thread's buffer with k_usermode_to_copy(). That discloses kernel stack contents on two paths:
On error. The copy-out ignores the driver's return code. In-tree back ends return an error without writing through the value pointer for properties they do not implement: charger_gpio_get_prop() returns -ENOTSUP unconditionally, and bq24190_get_prop() has a default: return -ENOTSUP; arm that never touches val. The whole union is then stack residue.
On success. A back end writes only the one union member the requested property selects (for example sbs_charger.c writes the one-byte val->present for CHARGER_PROP_PRESENT and returns 0), yet the handler still copies the whole union, so every byte beyond that member is uninitialized.
The handler is compiled only when CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and is reachable by any user-mode thread that has been granted access to a charger device object. K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_CHARGER() validates only the device object and its API pointer, not the property identifier, so an unprivileged thread can choose prop freely: an unimplemented property forces the error path, a narrow one the success path, and the call can be repeated at will.
Each call discloses up to the size of the union (12 bytes on a 32-bit target, 16 bytes on 64-bit targets where the function-pointer members widen it) of supervisor-stack memory. The bytes are residue of earlier kernel-side frames on the thread's privileged stack and can contain kernel object addresses and saved return addresses, which an unprivileged thread cannot otherwise observe and which help defeat address-layout assumptions when exploiting a separate memory-safety defect. There is no integrity or availability impact.
Two commits fix it, and both are needed. 5054384e983c skips the copy-out when the back end reports an error. c31cac727d02 zeroes the union before the driver call, so the bytes copied out on success are driver-written data or zeros. A tree carrying only the first still leaks on every successful call.
Severity
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Affected:
3.5.0 , < 4.3.2
(semver)
Affected: 4.4.0 , < 4.5.0 (semver) |
{
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"value": "The user-mode system call verifier z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c declares an uninitialized union charger_propval k_val on the kernel (privileged) stack, passes it to the charger driver back end via z_impl_charger_get_prop(), and then copies the full sizeof(union charger_propval) back into the calling user thread\u0027s buffer with k_usermode_to_copy(). That discloses kernel stack contents on two paths:\n\nOn error. The copy-out ignores the driver\u0027s return code. In-tree back ends return an error without writing through the value pointer for properties they do not implement: charger_gpio_get_prop() returns -ENOTSUP unconditionally, and bq24190_get_prop() has a default: return -ENOTSUP; arm that never touches val. The whole union is then stack residue.\nOn success. A back end writes only the one union member the requested property selects (for example sbs_charger.c writes the one-byte val-\u003epresent for CHARGER_PROP_PRESENT and returns 0), yet the handler still copies the whole union, so every byte beyond that member is uninitialized.\n\nThe handler is compiled only when CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and is reachable by any user-mode thread that has been granted access to a charger device object. K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_CHARGER() validates only the device object and its API pointer, not the property identifier, so an unprivileged thread can choose prop freely: an unimplemented property forces the error path, a narrow one the success path, and the call can be repeated at will.\n\nEach call discloses up to the size of the union (12 bytes on a 32-bit target, 16 bytes on 64-bit targets where the function-pointer members widen it) of supervisor-stack memory. The bytes are residue of earlier kernel-side frames on the thread\u0027s privileged stack and can contain kernel object addresses and saved return addresses, which an unprivileged thread cannot otherwise observe and which help defeat address-layout assumptions when exploiting a separate memory-safety defect. There is no integrity or availability impact.\n\nTwo commits fix it, and both are needed. 5054384e983c skips the copy-out when the back end reports an error. c31cac727d02 zeroes the union before the driver call, so the bytes copied out on success are driver-written data or zeros. A tree carrying only the first still leaks on every successful call."
}
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"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-12T15:19:22.205Z",
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/c31cac727d029f273a67f65941985696f1882867"
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"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-rghm-r3c9-92qc"
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],
"title": "Kernel stack information disclosure in the charger_get_prop() system call handler",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-19809",
"datePublished": "2026-11-12T15:19:22.205Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-13T23:10:06.796Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-12T15:19:22.205Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"date": "2026-11-16",
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"percentile": "0.01285"
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],
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}
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"value": "The user-mode system call verifier z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c declares an uninitialized union charger_propval k_val on the kernel (privileged) stack, passes it to the charger driver back end via z_impl_charger_get_prop(), and then copies the full sizeof(union charger_propval) back into the calling user thread\u0027s buffer with k_usermode_to_copy(). That discloses kernel stack contents on two paths:\n\nOn error. The copy-out ignores the driver\u0027s return code. In-tree back ends return an error without writing through the value pointer for properties they do not implement: charger_gpio_get_prop() returns -ENOTSUP unconditionally, and bq24190_get_prop() has a default: return -ENOTSUP; arm that never touches val. The whole union is then stack residue.\nOn success. A back end writes only the one union member the requested property selects (for example sbs_charger.c writes the one-byte val-\u003epresent for CHARGER_PROP_PRESENT and returns 0), yet the handler still copies the whole union, so every byte beyond that member is uninitialized.\n\nThe handler is compiled only when CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and is reachable by any user-mode thread that has been granted access to a charger device object. K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_CHARGER() validates only the device object and its API pointer, not the property identifier, so an unprivileged thread can choose prop freely: an unimplemented property forces the error path, a narrow one the success path, and the call can be repeated at will.\n\nEach call discloses up to the size of the union (12 bytes on a 32-bit target, 16 bytes on 64-bit targets where the function-pointer members widen it) of supervisor-stack memory. The bytes are residue of earlier kernel-side frames on the thread\u0027s privileged stack and can contain kernel object addresses and saved return addresses, which an unprivileged thread cannot otherwise observe and which help defeat address-layout assumptions when exploiting a separate memory-safety defect. There is no integrity or availability impact.\n\nTwo commits fix it, and both are needed. 5054384e983c skips the copy-out when the back end reports an error. c31cac727d02 zeroes the union before the driver call, so the bytes copied out on success are driver-written data or zeros. A tree carrying only the first still leaks on every successful call."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-19809",
"lastModified": "2026-11-12T16:19:09.000",
"metrics": {
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"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
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"published": "2026-11-12T16:19:08.810",
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"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/5054384e983c105b90d704272abcd479486ae3a2"
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}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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