CVE-2026-127915 (GCVE-0-2026-127915)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 00:23 – Updated: 2026-11-13 00:23
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
TLV iterator does not bound each entry against the declared TLV area in MCUboot bootutil
Summary
The MCUboot TLV iterator bootutil_tlv_iter_next() in boot/bootutil/src/tlv.c walks image trailer TLVs with a single loop guard (it->tlv_off < it->tlv_end) and advances by sizeof(struct image_tlv) + tlv.it_len using the attacker-controlled it_len field, without validating that the entry's header or payload stays within it->tlv_end. As a result the 4-byte header read can extend up to 3 bytes past the declared TLV area, and the returned (off, len) can describe a payload that runs past it.
The path is pre-authentication: TLVs are parsed during bootutil_img_validate() before the signature is verified, and a crafted image can be presented through DFU / serial-recovery / OTA. However the impact is contained by surrounding guards: bootutil_img_validate() first rejects a TLV area larger than bootutil_max_image_size(), the default LOAD_IMAGE_DATA sink is flash_area_read() which bounds-checks against the flash partition and fails an out-of-partition read, and every payload consumer (EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, EXPECTED_KEY_TLV, EXPECTED_SIG_TLV, IMAGE_TLV_SEC_CNT) clamps len against a fixed buffer before copying.
The residual effect in a default flash build is therefore an out-of-region read confined to the attacker's own slot partition whose result is never observable, yielding at worst a clean validation failure rather than memory corruption or information disclosure. A genuine (though still bounded) out-of-bounds read remains under the non-default MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD configuration, where LOAD_IMAGE_DATA is an unchecked memcpy. The fix is to validate each entry's header and payload against it->tlv_end inside the iterator.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-125 - bounds
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
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}
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{
"name": "GHSA-4fp3-3qw2-25jv",
"url": "https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/security/advisories/GHSA-4fp3-3qw2-25jv"
}
],
"title": "TLV iterator does not bound each entry against the declared TLV area in MCUboot bootutil",
"x_generator": {
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"datePublished": "2026-11-13T00:23:07.449Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-12T18:50:53.746Z",
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}
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"lastModified": "2026-11-13T15:48:52.237",
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"url": "https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/90f4e7c3ebe4cf9a5eb7d981220388ffdefd6d19"
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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