CVE-2026-126621 (GCVE-0-2026-126621)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-11 08:36 – Updated: 2026-11-11 08:36
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Improper Certificate Validation in hMailServer
Summary
Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0-B1 through 6.3.7 on Windows hands OpenSSL the names of its own TLS files - the listeners' certificates, chains, private keys and Diffie-Hellman parameters, a port's client-certificate CA file (from 6.2.19), the object store's CA file (from 6.3.4) and the ACME client's keys and certificates - as Latin-1 bytes, which on code page 1252 are the code page's own for U+00A0 to U+00FF, and OpenSSL's file opening on Windows reads a name as UTF-8 first and opens the file at that reading when it is there, or creates it there when its folder is. When every byte of a configured name outside ASCII also reads as UTF-8 - for example U+00C3 U+00A9, the bytes C3 A9, which are U+00E9 in UTF-8 - the server used the file at that other name whenever one was there, which allows a local attacker who can create that file or its folder but cannot change the configured one, as any user can by default beside a file an administrator keeps under ProgramData, to have a port that logs on by client certificate (from 6.2.25) accept certificates from a certificate authority of the attacker's own and so sign in over the network as any mailbox without its password; to have the server trust such an authority for its object store and, intercepting that connection, read and modify the messages it stores; to receive the private keys the ACME client writes, the key of a certificate issued for the server's names among them; or to keep TLS ports from starting. The configuration is not the default: by default these files have names in ASCII, client certificates are off on every port, and the object store and ACME are off. The Linux builds are not affected.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CWE
- CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Progressive Robot Ltd | hMailServer |
Affected:
6.0.0-B1 , ≤ 6.3.7
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "hMailServer",
"repo": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver",
"vendor": "Progressive Robot Ltd",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.0.0-B1",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Found by the hMailServer project (Progressive Robot Ltd)"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0-B1 through 6.3.7 on Windows hands OpenSSL the names of its own TLS files - the listeners\u0027 certificates, chains, private keys and Diffie-Hellman parameters, a port\u0027s client-certificate CA file (from 6.2.19), the object store\u0027s CA file (from 6.3.4) and the ACME client\u0027s keys and certificates - as Latin-1 bytes, which on code page 1252 are the code page\u0027s own for U+00A0 to U+00FF, and OpenSSL\u0027s file opening on Windows reads a name as UTF-8 first and opens the file at that reading when it is there, or creates it there when its folder is. When every byte of a configured name outside ASCII also reads as UTF-8 - for example U+00C3 U+00A9, the bytes C3 A9, which are U+00E9 in UTF-8 - the server used the file at that other name whenever one was there, which allows a local attacker who can create that file or its folder but cannot change the configured one, as any user can by default beside a file an administrator keeps under ProgramData, to have a port that logs on by client certificate (from 6.2.25) accept certificates from a certificate authority of the attacker\u0027s own and so sign in over the network as any mailbox without its password; to have the server trust such an authority for its object store and, intercepting that connection, read and modify the messages it stores; to receive the private keys the ACME client writes, the key of a certificate issued for the server\u0027s names among them; or to keep TLS ports from starting. The configuration is not the default: by default these files have names in ASCII, client certificates are off on every port, and the object store and ACME are off. The Linux builds are not affected."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-295",
"description": "CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-11T08:36:26.283Z",
"orgId": "ceab7361-8a18-47b1-92ba-4d7d25f6715a",
"shortName": "GitLab"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/115"
},
{
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.8"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Upgrade to hMailServer 6.3.8, which on Windows hands OpenSSL the name of each of these files in the code page and refuses, with HM7536 in the error log, a name with a character the code page does not have or whose bytes outside ASCII also read as UTF-8, so that nothing is read from or written to a refused file: a listener whose certificate or key file is refused does not start, a refused client-certificate CA file verifies no certificate, the object store\u0027s refused CA file allows no request, and the ACME client orders no certificate. Until then, name every TLS file, the ACME directory and the program and data folders by paths in ASCII alone, which read as the same name in the code page and in UTF-8 and which every affected version hands over unchanged; where a name outside ASCII must stay, keep each of its characters at or below U+00FF and one the system code page writes as its Latin-1 byte (on code page 1252, U+00A0 to U+00FF; none under a UTF-8 code page) - change any other name to ASCII - and make sure no one else can create the file or folder that the name\u0027s UTF-8 reading names."
}
],
"title": "Improper Certificate Validation in hMailServer"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "ceab7361-8a18-47b1-92ba-4d7d25f6715a",
"assignerShortName": "GitLab",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-126621",
"datePublished": "2026-11-11T08:36:26.283Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-11T08:30:22.140Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-11T08:36:26.283Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-126621",
"date": "2026-11-16",
"epss": "0.00172",
"percentile": "0.06677"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "hMailServer",
"repo": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver",
"vendor": "Progressive Robot Ltd",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.0.0-B1",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@gitlab.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0-B1 through 6.3.7 on Windows hands OpenSSL the names of its own TLS files - the listeners\u0027 certificates, chains, private keys and Diffie-Hellman parameters, a port\u0027s client-certificate CA file (from 6.2.19), the object store\u0027s CA file (from 6.3.4) and the ACME client\u0027s keys and certificates - as Latin-1 bytes, which on code page 1252 are the code page\u0027s own for U+00A0 to U+00FF, and OpenSSL\u0027s file opening on Windows reads a name as UTF-8 first and opens the file at that reading when it is there, or creates it there when its folder is. When every byte of a configured name outside ASCII also reads as UTF-8 - for example U+00C3 U+00A9, the bytes C3 A9, which are U+00E9 in UTF-8 - the server used the file at that other name whenever one was there, which allows a local attacker who can create that file or its folder but cannot change the configured one, as any user can by default beside a file an administrator keeps under ProgramData, to have a port that logs on by client certificate (from 6.2.25) accept certificates from a certificate authority of the attacker\u0027s own and so sign in over the network as any mailbox without its password; to have the server trust such an authority for its object store and, intercepting that connection, read and modify the messages it stores; to receive the private keys the ACME client writes, the key of a certificate issued for the server\u0027s names among them; or to keep TLS ports from starting. The configuration is not the default: by default these files have names in ASCII, client certificates are off on every port, and the object store and ACME are off. The Linux builds are not affected."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-126621",
"lastModified": "2026-11-12T19:05:35.013",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-11T09:17:14.277",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.8"
},
{
"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/115"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@gitlab.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-295"
}
],
"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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