CVE-2026-125275 (GCVE-0-2026-125275)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-17 02:54 – Updated: 2026-11-17 02:54
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever
Summary
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.
The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.
This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-835 - Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/secu… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-125275.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-125275 | related |
| https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/comm… | related |
| https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/comm… | patch |
Impacted products
3 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| nerves-hub | nerves_hub_web |
Affected:
1.0.0 , < 2.5.4
(other)
cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| nerves-hub | nerves_hub_web |
Affected:
1.0.0 , < 2.5.4
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| nerves-hub | nerves_hub_web |
Affected:
a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9 , < 064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eLoop with Unreachable Exit Condition (\u0027Infinite Loop\u0027) vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint\u0027s trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, \u003ccode\u003eNervesHub.SSL.decide/2\u003c/code\u003e refuses it with the reason \u003ccode\u003e:unknown_ca\u003c/code\u003e. Erlang/OTP \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless \u003ccode\u003eDEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE\u003c/code\u003e is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (\u0027Infinite Loop\u0027) vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint\u0027s trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, `NervesHub.SSL.decide/2` refuses it with the reason `:unknown_ca`. Erlang/OTP `ssl` reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.\n\nThe device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.\n\nThis issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4."
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"title": "A device certificate whose CA isn\u0027t registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eSet \u003ccode\u003eDEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE\u003c/code\u003e to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRestarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "Set `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.\n\nRestarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it."
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"value": "Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.\n\nRestarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it."
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"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMake a self-signed root and a client certificate signed by it, directly or through an intermediate that the client sends. Do not register either CA in NervesHub.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRun a device endpoint whose trust store holds that root, by adding it to the \u003ccode\u003eDEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE\u003c/code\u003e bundle. Against the default trust store, a client certificate from a public CA replaces steps 1 and 2.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eOpen one TLS connection to the device endpoint with that certificate, then disconnect.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe handshake process on the server keeps running. The \u003ccode\u003enerves_hub.ssl.fail\u003c/code\u003e telemetry event with reason \u003ccode\u003eunknown_ca\u003c/code\u003e and the database queries repeat until the node restarts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
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"value": "1. Make a self-signed root and a client certificate signed by it, directly or through an intermediate that the client sends. Do not register either CA in NervesHub.\n2. Run a device endpoint whose trust store holds that root, by adding it to the `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` bundle. Against the default trust store, a client certificate from a public CA replaces steps 1 and 2.\n3. Open one TLS connection to the device endpoint with that certificate, then disconnect.\n4. The handshake process on the server keeps running. The `nerves_hub.ssl.fail` telemetry event with reason `unknown_ca` and the database queries repeat until the node restarts."
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"value": "* Make a self-signed root and a client certificate signed by it, directly or through an intermediate that the client sends. Do not register either CA in NervesHub.\n* Run a device endpoint whose trust store holds that root, by adding it to the DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE bundle. Against the default trust store, a client certificate from a public CA replaces steps 1 and 2.\n* Open one TLS connection to the device endpoint with that certificate, then disconnect.\n* The handshake process on the server keeps running. The nerves_hub.ssl.fail telemetry event with reason unknown_ca and the database queries repeat until the node restarts."
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Refusal reason.\u003c/strong\u003e The device endpoint gives \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e the verify function \u003ccode\u003eNervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification.verify_fun/3\u003c/code\u003e, which asks \u003ccode\u003eNervesHub.SSL.decide/2\u003c/code\u003e. For a \u003ccode\u003e:valid_peer\u003c/code\u003e event on a certificate that is not on file, \u003ccode\u003edecide/2\u003c/code\u003e tries to register the certificate. \u003ccode\u003echeck_known_ca/1\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex\u003c/code\u003e looks for the signer among the registered CAs and returns \u003ccode\u003e:unknown_ca\u003c/code\u003e when it finds none. \u003ccode\u003edo_verify/2\u003c/code\u003e passes that to \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e as \u003ccode\u003e{:fail, :unknown_ca}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Retry in \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003eunknown_ca\u003c/code\u003e is also the reason Erlang/OTP uses for a path with no trust anchor. In \u003ccode\u003essl_handshake:path_validate/11\u003c/code\u003e, a \u003ccode\u003e{bad_cert, unknown_ca}\u003c/code\u003e result makes \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e look for a cross-signed alternative root and validate again. Unlike the \u003ccode\u003eroot_cert_expired\u003c/code\u003e branch, this branch does not add the root it tried to the list of roots to skip.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Loop.\u003c/strong\u003e When the chain ends at a self-signed root in the trust store, \u003ccode\u003essl\u003c/code\u003e finds the same root, calls the verify function again, and receives \u003ccode\u003eunknown_ca\u003c/code\u003e again. The recursion is a tail call, so the process does not grow or crash. It does not return to its mailbox, so it sees neither the handshake timeout nor the closed socket. Each pass runs the database queries of the registration checks.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "**1. Refusal reason.** The device endpoint gives `ssl` the verify function `NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification.verify_fun/3`, which asks `NervesHub.SSL.decide/2`. For a `:valid_peer` event on a certificate that is not on file, `decide/2` tries to register the certificate. `check_known_ca/1` in `lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex` looks for the signer among the registered CAs and returns `:unknown_ca` when it finds none. `do_verify/2` passes that to `ssl` as `{:fail, :unknown_ca}`.\n\n**2. Retry in `ssl`.** `unknown_ca` is also the reason Erlang/OTP uses for a path with no trust anchor. In `ssl_handshake:path_validate/11`, a `{bad_cert, unknown_ca}` result makes `ssl` look for a cross-signed alternative root and validate again. Unlike the `root_cert_expired` branch, this branch does not add the root it tried to the list of roots to skip.\n\n**3. Loop.** When the chain ends at a self-signed root in the trust store, `ssl` finds the same root, calls the verify function again, and receives `unknown_ca` again. The recursion is a tail call, so the process does not grow or crash. It does not return to its mailbox, so it sees neither the handshake timeout nor the closed socket. Each pass runs the database queries of the registration checks."
}
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"value": "1. Refusal reason. The device endpoint gives ssl the verify function NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification.verify_fun/3, which asks NervesHub.SSL.decide/2. For a :valid_peer event on a certificate that is not on file, decide/2 tries to register the certificate. check_known_ca/1 in lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex looks for the signer among the registered CAs and returns :unknown_ca when it finds none. do_verify/2 passes that to ssl as {:fail, :unknown_ca}.\n\n2. Retry in ssl. unknown_ca is also the reason Erlang/OTP uses for a path with no trust anchor. In ssl_handshake:path_validate/11, a {bad_cert, unknown_ca} result makes ssl look for a cross-signed alternative root and validate again. Unlike the root_cert_expired branch, this branch does not add the root it tried to the list of roots to skip.\n\n3. Loop. When the chain ends at a self-signed root in the trust store, ssl finds the same root, calls the verify function again, and receives unknown_ca again. The recursion is a tail call, so the process does not grow or crash. It does not return to its mailbox, so it sees neither the handshake timeout nor the closed socket. Each pass runs the database queries of the registration checks."
}
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-125275",
"datePublished": "2026-11-17T02:54:23.810Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-11T12:24:30.285Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:54:23.810Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://ghcr.io",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification\u0027"
],
"packageName": "nerves-hub",
"packageURL": "pkg:oci/nerves-hub?repository_url=ghcr.io%2Fnerves-hub",
"product": "nerves_hub_web",
"programFiles": [
"lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex",
"lib/nerves_hub/device_link/peer_verification.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027:decide/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027:verify_fun/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification\u0027:verify_fun/3"
}
],
"vendor": "nerves-hub",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.5.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.0.0",
"versionType": "other"
}
]
},
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification\u0027"
],
"packageName": "nerves_hub",
"packageURL": "pkg:otp/nerves_hub?repository_url=https:%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fnerves-hub%2Fnerves_hub_web\u0026vcs_url=git%20https:%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fnerves-hub%2Fnerves_hub_web.git",
"product": "nerves_hub_web",
"programFiles": [
"lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex",
"lib/nerves_hub/device_link/peer_verification.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027:decide/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027:verify_fun/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification\u0027:verify_fun/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web",
"vendor": "nerves-hub",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.5.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification\u0027"
],
"packageName": "nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web",
"product": "nerves_hub_web",
"programFiles": [
"lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex",
"lib/nerves_hub/device_link/peer_verification.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027:decide/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.SSL\u0027:verify_fun/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification\u0027:verify_fun/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web",
"vendor": "nerves-hub",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (\u0027Infinite Loop\u0027) vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint\u0027s trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.\n\nThe device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.\n\nThis issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-125275",
"lastModified": "2026-11-17T03:17:00.513",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-17T03:17:00.513",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-125275.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-8j48-4mg5-7v6v"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-125275"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-835"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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