CVE-2026-118991 (GCVE-0-2026-118991)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-30 13:12 – Updated: 2026-11-06 16:50
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl encrypt configuration backups with the padded password as the AES key
Summary
CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl encrypt configuration backups with the padded password as the AES key.
getCrypt() pads the backup password with "x" characters and cuts it to 32 bytes to form the AES key, with no salt and no key derivation. The first block of a backup holds a 16 hex digit length field, so decrypting one block confirms a password guess at raw AES speed.
An attacker who obtains a backup can recover its password by fast offline guessing, and with it every credential the backup holds.
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-06 16:49 UTC
CWE
- CWE-916 - Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://metacpan.org/release/OETIKER/CallBackery-… | release-notes |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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