CVE-2026-115690 (GCVE-0-2026-115690)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-16 09:54 – Updated: 2026-11-16 09:54
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache WSS4J: Replay protection bypassed by concurrent copies of a message
Summary
Apache WSS4J remembers the UsernameToken Nonce, the Timestamp and signature of a signed message, and the ID of a SAML 2.0 "OneTimeUse" assertion, so that a captured message cannot be accepted twice. It checked whether a value had already been seen, validated the message, and only then remembered the value, as two separate steps. If several copies of the same message were processed at the same time, they could all pass the check before any of them was remembered, and all be accepted. An attacker who obtained a valid message before the recipient first processed it could send several copies at once, so that the same authenticated request was executed more than once. Where a UsernameToken is not bound to the message by a signature, the copies could carry different message bodies. The attacker needs to obtain the message while it is still in transit; a message captured after it has been accepted cannot be replayed. Affects deployments with a replay cache configured, as Apache CXF has by default. The value is now checked and remembered in a single atomic step. Custom ReplayCache implementations should override the new ReplayCache.addIfAbsent method with an operation that is atomic in their underlying store. Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.0.3 or 3.0.7 or 2.4.5, which fix this issue.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-367 - Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/y2gb5of7tbh0… | vendor-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache WSS4J |
Affected:
4.0.0 , < 4.0.3
(semver)
Affected: 3.0.0 , < 3.0.7 (semver) Affected: 0 , < 2.4.5 (semver) |
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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