CVE-2026-112880 (GCVE-0-2026-112880)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 13:48 – Updated: 2026-10-26 15:35
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney
Summary
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.
The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-26 15:00 UTC
CWE
- CWE-113 - Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
Assigner
References
6 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0 | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-112880.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-112880 | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/989 | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5df5a74… | related |
| https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5ee7d7d… | patch |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-10-25 00:00
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-112880",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-26T15:00:47.038622Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:35:50.632Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_http_connect"
],
"packageName": "hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_http_connect.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:connect/4"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.9.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_http_connect"
],
"packageName": "benoitc/hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_http_connect.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:connect/4"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy\u0027s 407 challenge headers. Deployments without \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "The client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the `proxy_auth_fun` option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy\u0027s 407 challenge headers. Deployments without `proxy_auth_fun`, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected."
}
],
"value": "The client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the proxy_auth_fun option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy\u0027s 407 challenge headers. Deployments without proxy_auth_fun, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.9.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Coles"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Daniel Coles"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Benoit Chesneau"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-10-26T10:18:44.000Z",
"datePublic": "2026-10-25T00:00:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eImproper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027) vulnerability in \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect\u003c/code\u003e in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11\u003c/code\u003e calls the caller\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the \u003ccode\u003eProxy-Authorization\u003c/code\u003e line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy\u0027s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027) vulnerability in `hackney_http_connect` in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a `proxy_auth_fun` callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller\u0027s `proxy_auth_fun` with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the `Proxy-Authorization` line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\n\nThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy\u0027s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"value": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027) vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller\u0027s proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\n\nThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy\u0027s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-105",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eA party who controls what the application\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "A party who controls what the application\u0027s `proxy_auth_fun` returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy."
}
],
"value": "A party who controls what the application\u0027s proxy_auth_fun returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-113",
"description": "CWE-113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T13:48:46.589Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "hackney 4.9.0 release notes",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-112880",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-112880.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-112880",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-112880"
},
{
"name": "Refuse CR/LF/NUL in the proxy_auth_fun result (benoitc/hackney#989)",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/989"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 5df5a74 in benoitc/hackney",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 5ee7d7d in benoitc/hackney",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eCheck the value your \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return \u003ccode\u003e{error, Reason}\u003c/code\u003e instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Check the value your `proxy_auth_fun` is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return `{error, Reason}` instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there."
}
],
"value": "Check the value your proxy_auth_fun is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return {error, Reason} instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there."
}
],
"x_technicalAnalysis": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Challenge.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003esrc/hackney_http_connect.erl\u003c/code\u003e sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Callback result.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehandle_proxy_auth/11\u003c/code\u003e calls the caller\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e with those two values. On \u003ccode\u003e{ok, AuthHeader}\u003c/code\u003e it removes any existing \u003ccode\u003eProxy-Authorization\u003c/code\u003e header and appends the binary \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026lt;\"Proxy-Authorization: \", AuthHeader/binary\u0026gt;\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e to the header list, then retries the handshake with it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Splitting.\u003c/strong\u003e The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside \u003ccode\u003eAuthHeader\u003c/code\u003e therefore ends the \u003ccode\u003eProxy-Authorization\u003c/code\u003e line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same \u003ccode\u003ehas_ctl_bytes/1\u003c/code\u003e check to it and returns \u003ccode\u003e{error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "**1. Challenge.** `hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9` in `src/hackney_http_connect.erl` sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the `proxy_auth_fun` option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11`.\n\n**2. Callback result.** `handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller\u0027s `proxy_auth_fun` with those two values. On `{ok, AuthHeader}` it removes any existing `Proxy-Authorization` header and appends the binary `\u003c\u003c\"Proxy-Authorization: \", AuthHeader/binary\u003e\u003e` to the header list, then retries the handshake with it.\n\n**3. Splitting.** The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside `AuthHeader` therefore ends the `Proxy-Authorization` line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same `has_ctl_bytes/1` check to it and returns `{error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}`."
}
],
"value": "1. Challenge. hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9 in src/hackney_http_connect.erl sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the proxy_auth_fun option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11.\n\n2. Callback result. handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller\u0027s proxy_auth_fun with those two values. On {ok, AuthHeader} it removes any existing Proxy-Authorization header and appends the binary \u003c\u003c\"Proxy-Authorization: \", AuthHeader/binary\u003e\u003e to the header list, then retries the handshake with it.\n\n3. Splitting. The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside AuthHeader therefore ends the Proxy-Authorization line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same has_ctl_bytes/1 check to it and returns {error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-112880",
"datePublished": "2026-10-26T13:48:46.589Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-26T10:15:01.166Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:35:50.632Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-112880",
"date": "2026-11-16",
"epss": "0.00188",
"percentile": "0.08503"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_http_connect"
],
"packageName": "hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_http_connect.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:connect/4"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.9.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_http_connect"
],
"packageName": "benoitc/hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_http_connect.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:connect/4"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027) vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller\u0027s proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\n\nThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy\u0027s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-112880",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T16:59:16.113",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-112880",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-26T15:00:47.038622Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-26T14:16:28.440",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-112880.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/989"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-112880"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-113"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"suse_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "important",
"current_release_date": "2026-10-27T17:48:33Z",
"cve": "CVE-2026-112880",
"id": "CVE-2026-112880",
"initial_release_date": "2026-10-27T17:48:33Z",
"product_status:known_affected": "20",
"source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
"status": "interim",
"title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-112880",
"url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/2026/cve-2026-112880.json",
"version": "2"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-112880",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-26T15:00:47.038622Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:32:18.053Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_http_connect"
],
"packageName": "hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_http_connect.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:connect/4"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.9.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_http_connect"
],
"packageName": "benoitc/hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_http_connect.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:connect/4"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9"
},
{
"name": "hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy\u0027s 407 challenge headers. Deployments without \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "The client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the `proxy_auth_fun` option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy\u0027s 407 challenge headers. Deployments without `proxy_auth_fun`, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected."
}
],
"value": "The client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the proxy_auth_fun option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy\u0027s 407 challenge headers. Deployments without proxy_auth_fun, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.9.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Coles"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Daniel Coles"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Benoit Chesneau"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-10-26T10:18:44.000Z",
"datePublic": "2026-10-25T00:00:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eImproper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027) vulnerability in \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect\u003c/code\u003e in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11\u003c/code\u003e calls the caller\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the \u003ccode\u003eProxy-Authorization\u003c/code\u003e line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy\u0027s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027) vulnerability in `hackney_http_connect` in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a `proxy_auth_fun` callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller\u0027s `proxy_auth_fun` with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the `Proxy-Authorization` line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\n\nThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy\u0027s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"value": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027) vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller\u0027s proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\n\nThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy\u0027s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-105",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eA party who controls what the application\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "A party who controls what the application\u0027s `proxy_auth_fun` returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy."
}
],
"value": "A party who controls what the application\u0027s proxy_auth_fun returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-113",
"description": "CWE-113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Splitting\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T13:48:46.589Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "hackney 4.9.0 release notes",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-112880",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-112880.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-112880",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-112880"
},
{
"name": "Refuse CR/LF/NUL in the proxy_auth_fun result (benoitc/hackney#989)",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/989"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 5df5a74 in benoitc/hackney",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 5ee7d7d in benoitc/hackney",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eCheck the value your \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return \u003ccode\u003e{error, Reason}\u003c/code\u003e instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Check the value your `proxy_auth_fun` is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return `{error, Reason}` instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there."
}
],
"value": "Check the value your proxy_auth_fun is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return {error, Reason} instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there."
}
],
"x_technicalAnalysis": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Challenge.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003esrc/hackney_http_connect.erl\u003c/code\u003e sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to \u003ccode\u003ehackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Callback result.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehandle_proxy_auth/11\u003c/code\u003e calls the caller\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eproxy_auth_fun\u003c/code\u003e with those two values. On \u003ccode\u003e{ok, AuthHeader}\u003c/code\u003e it removes any existing \u003ccode\u003eProxy-Authorization\u003c/code\u003e header and appends the binary \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;\u0026lt;\"Proxy-Authorization: \", AuthHeader/binary\u0026gt;\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e to the header list, then retries the handshake with it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Splitting.\u003c/strong\u003e The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside \u003ccode\u003eAuthHeader\u003c/code\u003e therefore ends the \u003ccode\u003eProxy-Authorization\u003c/code\u003e line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same \u003ccode\u003ehas_ctl_bytes/1\u003c/code\u003e check to it and returns \u003ccode\u003e{error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "**1. Challenge.** `hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9` in `src/hackney_http_connect.erl` sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the `proxy_auth_fun` option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11`.\n\n**2. Callback result.** `handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller\u0027s `proxy_auth_fun` with those two values. On `{ok, AuthHeader}` it removes any existing `Proxy-Authorization` header and appends the binary `\u003c\u003c\"Proxy-Authorization: \", AuthHeader/binary\u003e\u003e` to the header list, then retries the handshake with it.\n\n**3. Splitting.** The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside `AuthHeader` therefore ends the `Proxy-Authorization` line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same `has_ctl_bytes/1` check to it and returns `{error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}`."
}
],
"value": "1. Challenge. hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9 in src/hackney_http_connect.erl sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the proxy_auth_fun option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11.\n\n2. Callback result. handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller\u0027s proxy_auth_fun with those two values. On {ok, AuthHeader} it removes any existing Proxy-Authorization header and appends the binary \u003c\u003c\"Proxy-Authorization: \", AuthHeader/binary\u003e\u003e to the header list, then retries the handshake with it.\n\n3. Splitting. The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside AuthHeader therefore ends the Proxy-Authorization line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same has_ctl_bytes/1 check to it and returns {error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-112880",
"datePublished": "2026-10-26T13:48:46.589Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-26T10:15:01.166Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T15:35:50.632Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…