CVE-2025-13353 (GCVE-0-2025-13353)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-02 11:03 – Updated: 2025-12-02 16:54
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password
Summary
In gokey versions <0.2.0,
a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly
being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM
authentication tag of the key seed.
This issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.
Impact
This vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s
option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is
also not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself).
Specific impact includes:
* keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it
was expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240
bytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was
used
* a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated
from a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without
the knowledge of the seed master password
Patches
The code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0
and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions
will produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed
entropy will be used now.
System secret rotation guidance
It is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0
and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems
in place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is
system-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.
Systems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation
Such systems usually have a "Forgot password" facility or a
similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by
sending a unique "magic" link to the user's email or phone. In such
cases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly
generated password secret, when prompted by the system.
Systems that require the old password/secret for rotation
Such systems usually have a modal password rotation window
usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the
old and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To
generate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:
* temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password
* use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password
* populate the system provided password rotation form
Systems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned
Such systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic
key as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the
same time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several
authorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such
systems users are advised to:
* generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above
* provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system
* verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential
* revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system
Credit
This vulnerability was found by Théo Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare's bug bounty program.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-12-02 16:50 UTC
CWE
- CWE-330 - Use of Insufficiently Random Values
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare | gokey |
Affected:
0.1.0 , < 0.2.0
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-12-02T16:50:27.674442Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:54:23.544Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"product": "gokey",
"repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"vendor": "Cloudflare",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.2.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn gokey versions \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e gokey will generate different secrets.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ekeys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ea malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePatches\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSystem secret rotation guidance\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (\u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003etemporarily download \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3\"\u003egokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.1.3\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/a\u003e for their respective operating system to recover the old password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003euse gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above to generate the new password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003epopulate the system provided password rotation form\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003egenerate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eprovision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003everify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003erevoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir (\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://hackerone.com/mister_mime?type=user\"\u003e@mister_mime\u003c/a\u003e) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In gokey versions \u003c0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n\nImpact\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\n\n\n\n * keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\n\n * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\n\n\n\n\nPatches\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\n\n\nSystem secret rotation guidance\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n\nSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n\nSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password\n\n * use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\n\n * populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n\n\n\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\n\n * provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\n\n * verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\n\n * revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n\n\n\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-330",
"description": "CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"orgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"shortName": "cloudflare"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/security/advisories/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.5.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"assignerShortName": "cloudflare",
"cveId": "CVE-2025-13353",
"datePublished": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"dateReserved": "2025-11-18T11:21:27.669Z",
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:54:23.544Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2025-13353",
"date": "2026-11-16",
"epss": "0.00172",
"percentile": "0.0666"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"product": "gokey",
"repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"vendor": "Cloudflare",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.2.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:cloudflare:gokey:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A8FEAB32-4588-4479-BCCA-5253FE85DB69",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.2.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In gokey versions \u003c0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n\nImpact\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\n\n\n\n * keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\n\n * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\n\n\n\n\nPatches\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\n\n\nSystem secret rotation guidance\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n\nSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n\nSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password\n\n * use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\n\n * populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n\n\n\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\n\n * provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\n\n * verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\n\n * revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n\n\n\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En versiones de gokey anteriores a la 0.2.0, un fallo en la l\u00f3gica de descifrado de la semilla result\u00f3 en que las contrase\u00f1as se derivaran incorrectamente \u00fanicamente del vector inicial y la etiqueta de autenticaci\u00f3n AES-GCM de la semilla de clave.\n\nEste problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 0.2.0 de gokey. Este es un cambio disruptivo. La soluci\u00f3n ha invalidado cualquier contrase\u00f1a o secreto que se haya derivado del archivo de semilla (usando la opci\u00f3n -s). Incluso si el archivo de semilla de entrada permanece igual, gokey versi\u00f3n 0.2.0 generar\u00e1 secretos diferentes.\n\nImpacto\nEsta vulnerabilidad impacta las claves y secretos generados usando un archivo de semilla como entrada de entrop\u00eda (usando la opci\u00f3n -s). Las claves y secretos generados solo a partir de la contrase\u00f1a maestra (sin la opci\u00f3n -s) no se ven impactados. La confidencialidad de la semilla en s\u00ed tampoco se ve impactada (no es necesario regenerar la semilla). El impacto espec\u00edfico incluye:\n\n* las claves y secretos generados a partir de un archivo de semilla pueden tener menor entrop\u00eda: se esperaba que toda la semilla se utilizara para generar claves (240 bytes de entrada de entrop\u00eda), mientras que en las versiones vulnerables solo se utilizaron 28 bytes\n* una entidad maliciosa podr\u00eda haber recuperado todas las contrase\u00f1as generadas a partir de una semilla particular teniendo solo el archivo de semilla en su posesi\u00f3n sin conocer la contrase\u00f1a maestra de la semilla\n\nParches\nEl error de l\u00f3gica del c\u00f3digo ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 0.2.0 de gokey y superiores. Debido a la naturaleza determinista de gokey, las versiones corregidas producir\u00e1n contrase\u00f1as y secretos diferentes usando archivos de semilla, ya que ahora se utilizar\u00e1 toda la entrop\u00eda de la semilla.\n\nGu\u00eda de rotaci\u00f3n de secretos del sistema\nSe aconseja a los usuarios regenerar contrase\u00f1as y secretos usando la versi\u00f3n parcheada de gokey (0.2.0 y superiores), y aprovisionar o rotar estos secretos en los sistemas respectivos en lugar del secreto antiguo. Un procedimiento de rotaci\u00f3n espec\u00edfico depende del sistema, pero los patrones m\u00e1s comunes se describen a continuaci\u00f3n.\n\nSistemas que no requieren la contrase\u00f1a o secreto antiguo para la rotaci\u00f3n\nDichos sistemas suelen tener una funci\u00f3n de recuperaci\u00f3n de contrase\u00f1a o similar que permite a los usuarios rotar sus contrase\u00f1as o secretos enviando un enlace \u00fanico al correo electr\u00f3nico o tel\u00e9fono del usuario. En tales casos, se aconseja a los usuarios utilizar esta funci\u00f3n e introducir el secreto de contrase\u00f1a reci\u00e9n generado cuando el sistema lo solicite.\n\nSistemas que requieren la contrase\u00f1a o secreto antiguo para la rotaci\u00f3n\nDichos sistemas suelen tener una ventana modal de rotaci\u00f3n de contrase\u00f1as en la secci\u00f3n de configuraci\u00f3n del usuario que requiere introducir la contrase\u00f1a antigua y la nueva. Para generar o recuperar la contrase\u00f1a antigua en tales casos, se aconseja a los usuarios:\n\n* descargar temporalmente gokey versi\u00f3n 0.1.3 (https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3) para su sistema operativo respectivo para recuperar la contrase\u00f1a antigua\n* usar gokey versi\u00f3n 0.2.0 o superior para generar la nueva contrase\u00f1a\n* rellenar el formulario de rotaci\u00f3n de contrase\u00f1as proporcionado por el sistema\n\nSistemas que permiten aprovisionar m\u00faltiples credenciales para la misma cuenta\nDichos sistemas suelen requerir un secreto o una clave criptogr\u00e1fica como credencial para el acceso, pero permiten varias credenciales al mismo tiempo. Un ejemplo es SSH: un usuario particular puede tener varias claves p\u00fablicas autorizadas configuradas en el servidor SSH para el acceso. Para tales sistemas, se aconseja a los usuarios:\n\n* generar un nuevo secreto, clave o credencial usando gokey versi\u00f3n 0.2.0 o superior\n* aprovisionar el nuevo secreto, clave o credencial adem\u00e1s de la credencial existente en el sistema\n* verificar que el acceso o la operaci\u00f3n del sistema requerida sigue siendo posible con el nuevo secreto, clave o credencial\n* revocar la autorizaci\u00f3n para la credencial existente o antigua del sistema\n\nCr\u00e9ditos\nEsta --TRUNCADO--"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"lastModified": "2026-11-13T23:10:00.153",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-12-02T16:50:27.674442Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-12-02T11:15:47.437",
"references": [
{
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/security/advisories/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-330"
}
],
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"suse_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "important",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-04T01:56:07Z",
"cve": "CVE-2025-13353",
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-04T01:56:07Z",
"product_status:recommended": "2",
"source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
"status": "interim",
"title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2025-13353",
"url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/2026/cve-2025-13353.json",
"version": "2"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-12-02T16:50:27.674442Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:50:26.636Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"product": "gokey",
"repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"vendor": "Cloudflare",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.2.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn gokey versions \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e gokey will generate different secrets.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ekeys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ea malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePatches\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSystem secret rotation guidance\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (\u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003etemporarily download \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3\"\u003egokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.1.3\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/a\u003e for their respective operating system to recover the old password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003euse gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above to generate the new password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003epopulate the system provided password rotation form\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003egenerate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eprovision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003everify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003erevoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir (\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://hackerone.com/mister_mime?type=user\"\u003e@mister_mime\u003c/a\u003e) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In gokey versions \u003c0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n\nImpact\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\n\n\n\n * keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\n\n * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\n\n\n\n\nPatches\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\n\n\nSystem secret rotation guidance\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n\nSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n\nSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password\n\n * use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\n\n * populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n\n\n\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\n\n * provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\n\n * verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\n\n * revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n\n\n\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-330",
"description": "CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"orgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"shortName": "cloudflare"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/security/advisories/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.5.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"assignerShortName": "cloudflare",
"cveId": "CVE-2025-13353",
"datePublished": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"dateReserved": "2025-11-18T11:21:27.669Z",
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:54:23.544Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…