CERTFR-2026-ALE-012
Vulnerability from certfr_alerte - Published: 2026-10-12 - Updated: 2026-10-12
Le CERT-FR a connaissance de nombreuses compromissions de Danfoss série AK-SM et AK-SC.
L'exposition d'une interface de gestion sur Internet est contraire aux bonnes pratiques. Dans le cas où l’administration à distance est impérative, une première mesure temporaire peut consister à restreindre l'accès à des adresses ip de confiance. Il est cependant conseillé de suivre les durcissements et recommandations du CERT-FR [1].
Solutions
Déconnecter ou filtrer les accès aux instances AK-SM et AK-SC.
Remédiation
En cas de suspicion de compromission : 1. filtrer les accès réseaux uniquement aux prestataires aux instances AK-SM et AK-SC ; 2. réaliser une remise en état d'usine (Factory Reset) ; 3. appliquer tous les correctifs de sécurité disponible ; 4. réaliser une rotation des secrets ; 5. vérifier les comptes existants ; 6. reconfigurer globalement l'équipement.
| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Danfoss | série AK-SC | série AK-SC | ||
| Danfoss | série AK-SM | série AK-SM |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "s\u00e9rie AK-SC",
"product": {
"name": "s\u00e9rie AK-SC",
"vendor": {
"name": "Danfoss",
"scada": true
}
}
},
{
"description": "s\u00e9rie AK-SM",
"product": {
"name": "s\u00e9rie AK-SM",
"vendor": {
"name": "Danfoss",
"scada": true
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": "",
"closed_at": null,
"content": "## Solutions\n\nD\u00e9connecter ou filtrer les acc\u00e8s aux instances AK-SM et AK-SC.\n\n## Rem\u00e9diation\n\nEn cas de suspicion de compromission :\n1. filtrer les acc\u00e8s r\u00e9seaux uniquement aux prestataires aux instances AK-SM et AK-SC ;\n2. r\u00e9aliser une remise en \u00e9tat d\u0027usine (*Factory Reset*) ;\n3. appliquer tous les correctifs de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 disponible ;\n4. r\u00e9aliser une rotation des secrets ;\n5. v\u00e9rifier les comptes existants ;\n6. reconfigurer globalement l\u0027\u00e9quipement.\n\n",
"cves": [],
"initial_release_date": "2026-10-12T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2026-10-12T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "[1] Recommandations \u00e0 destination des acteurs du secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie et de l\u2019eau",
"url": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/dur/CERTFR-2025-DUR-003/"
}
],
"reference": "CERTFR-2026-ALE-012",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "Version initiale",
"revision_date": "2026-10-12T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Non sp\u00e9cifi\u00e9 par l\u0027\u00e9diteur"
}
],
"summary": "Le CERT-FR a connaissance de nombreuses compromissions de Danfoss s\u00e9rie AK-SM et AK-SC.\n\nL\u0027exposition d\u0027une interface de gestion sur Internet est contraire aux bonnes pratiques. Dans le cas o\u00f9 l\u2019administration \u00e0 distance est imp\u00e9rative, une premi\u00e8re mesure temporaire peut consister \u00e0 restreindre l\u0027acc\u00e8s \u00e0 des adresses ip de confiance. Il est cependant conseill\u00e9 de suivre les durcissements et recommandations du CERT-FR [1].",
"title": "Incident de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ciblant les Danfoss s\u00e9rie AK-SM et AK-SC",
"vendor_advisories": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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