BREW-TRAVIS-CVE-2026-125110 (GHSA-WVG4-6P58-3GH3)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-11-11 10:06 – Updated: 2026-11-11 10:06 – Source websiteSummary
Rack::Static normalizes the request path with Utils.clean_path_info when deciding which file to serve, but matches header_rules against a path that is only URL-decoded. A request containing dot segments, raw or percent-encoded, is served the normalized target file while the header rules for that file's location are not applied.
This allows an attacker to receive a protected static file without the security headers configured for it.
Details
Rack::Static#call computes the served path as Utils.clean_path_info(Utils.unescape_path(path)). Rack::Static#applicable_rules applies only Utils.unescape_path before testing string and regular expression rules. A request for /assets/../uploads/file.html or /assets/..%2fuploads/file.html is served as uploads/file.html, but the decoded path /assets/../uploads/file.html does not start with uploads, so a rule scoped to that directory never matches.
The fix for CVE-2026-34786 (GHSA-q4qf-9j86-f5mh) added URL decoding to rule matching but did not add dot segment normalization, so versions that include that fix remain affected.
Impact
Applications that use Rack::Static header_rules to attach security-relevant headers to particular paths or file types are affected. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the path of a protected file can request it through a dot segment path and receive it without those headers, for example without Content-Disposition: attachment or a restrictive Content-Security-Policy that prevents uploaded HTML from rendering inline. The file itself is served unchanged. Applications that do not use path-specific header_rules are not affected.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of Rack in which
header_rulesare matched against the same normalized path used to serve the file. - Reject requests containing dot segments at a reverse proxy or application boundary.
- Do not rely solely on
Rack::Staticheader_rulesto prevent inline rendering of untrusted uploads; serve them from a separate origin.
Credit
- Reporter and Remediation developer
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "rack",
"resource_purl": "pkg:gem/rack@3.0.11",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "travis",
"purl": "pkg:brew/travis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.14.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"key": "pkg:gem/rack@3.0.11",
"name": "rack",
"resource": "rack",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.0.11"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`Rack::Static` normalizes the request path with `Utils.clean_path_info` when deciding which file to serve, but matches `header_rules` against a path that is only URL-decoded. A request containing dot segments, raw or percent-encoded, is served the normalized target file while the header rules for that file\u0027s location are not applied.\n\nThis allows an attacker to receive a protected static file without the security headers configured for it.\n\n## Details\n\n`Rack::Static#call` computes the served path as `Utils.clean_path_info(Utils.unescape_path(path))`. `Rack::Static#applicable_rules` applies only `Utils.unescape_path` before testing string and regular expression rules. A request for `/assets/../uploads/file.html` or `/assets/..%2fuploads/file.html` is served as `uploads/file.html`, but the decoded path `/assets/../uploads/file.html` does not start with `uploads`, so a rule scoped to that directory never matches.\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-34786 (GHSA-q4qf-9j86-f5mh) added URL decoding to rule matching but did not add dot segment normalization, so versions that include that fix remain affected.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that use `Rack::Static` `header_rules` to attach security-relevant headers to particular paths or file types are affected. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the path of a protected file can request it through a dot segment path and receive it without those headers, for example without `Content-Disposition: attachment` or a restrictive `Content-Security-Policy` that prevents uploaded HTML from rendering inline. The file itself is served unchanged. Applications that do not use path-specific `header_rules` are not affected.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of Rack in which `header_rules` are matched against the same normalized path used to serve the file.\n* Reject requests containing dot segments at a reverse proxy or application boundary.\n* Do not rely solely on `Rack::Static` `header_rules` to prevent inline rendering of untrusted uploads; serve them from a separate origin.\n\n## Credit\n* Reporter and Remediation developer",
"id": "BREW-travis-CVE-2026-125110",
"modified": "2026-11-11T10:06:00Z",
"published": "2026-11-11T10:06:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-wvg4-6p58-3gh3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125110"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/18a07fe553afb4d8a678d6a948cd6ba1e11e28be"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/9d7f19484ffd5ed5e032678c26ee6eff96d3a0a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/e88097ccb88be44d06d47b42daffe04929516ee4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/GHSA-wvg4-6p58-3gh3.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rack: Rack::Static header_rules bypass via dot-segment normalization mismatch",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-wvg4-6p58-3gh3",
"CVE-2026-125110"
]
}
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