BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-GHSA-J… (GHSA-J26J-7QC4-3MRF)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-10-20 08:59 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: MS Teams fileConsent/invoke missing conversation binding allowed cross-conversation pending-upload consumption
Details

Summary

In openclaw MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by uploadId alone. fileConsent/invoke did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.

Impact

An attacker who obtained a valid uploadId within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).

Technical Details

  • Pending uploads stored conversationId, but invoke handling consumed by uploadId only.
  • The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before uploadToConsentUrl(...) and pending-upload removal.
  • Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): 2026.2.24
  • Vulnerable range: <= 2026.2.24
  • Patched in release: 2026.2.25

Remediation

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.2.25 (or later) once published.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.25"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.10.5",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.10.5"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone. `fileConsent/invoke` did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who obtained a valid `uploadId` within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).\n\n### Technical Details\n- Pending uploads stored `conversationId`, but invoke handling consumed by `uploadId` only.\n- The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before `uploadToConsentUrl(...)` and pending-upload removal.\n- Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): `2026.2.24`\n- Vulnerable range: `\u003c= 2026.2.24`\n- Patched in release: `2026.2.25`\n\n### Remediation\nUpgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.25` (or later) once published.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf",
  "modified": "2026-10-20T08:59:43Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: MS Teams fileConsent/invoke missing conversation binding allowed cross-conversation pending-upload consumption",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf"
  ]
}



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