BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-JF6W-M8JW-JFXC)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-25 08:57 – Source websiteSummary
In affected versions of openclaw, a gateway caller with operator.write could issue agent requests containing /new or /reset and reach the same reset path used by the admin-only sessions.reset RPC.
Impact
On gateways where a caller is intentionally granted operator.write but not operator.admin, that caller could reset targeted conversation state through agent slash commands. This crosses the documented method-scope boundary between write-scoped messaging and admin-only session mutation.
Affected Packages and Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.3.8 - Fixed in:
2026.3.11
Technical Details
Scope checks were enforced only on the outer RPC method. The agent slash-command path reused admin-only reset logic internally, so a write-scoped caller could reach session-reset mutation without holding operator.admin.
Fix
OpenClaw no longer routes conversation /new and /reset through the admin-only sessions.reset entry point. Reset logic now lives in a shared service, while sessions.reset remains admin-only. The fix shipped in openclaw@2026.3.11.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2026.3.11 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.3.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.6",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.6"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\nIn affected versions of `openclaw`, a gateway caller with `operator.write` could issue `agent` requests containing `/new` or `/reset` and reach the same reset path used by the admin-only `sessions.reset` RPC.\n\n## Impact\nOn gateways where a caller is intentionally granted `operator.write` but not `operator.admin`, that caller could reset targeted conversation state through `agent` slash commands. This crosses the documented method-scope boundary between write-scoped messaging and admin-only session mutation.\n\n## Affected Packages and Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.8`\n- Fixed in: `2026.3.11`\n\n## Technical Details\nScope checks were enforced only on the outer RPC method. The `agent` slash-command path reused admin-only reset logic internally, so a write-scoped caller could reach session-reset mutation without holding `operator.admin`.\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw no longer routes conversation `/new` and `/reset` through the admin-only `sessions.reset` entry point. Reset logic now lives in a shared service, while `sessions.reset` remains admin-only. The fix shipped in `openclaw@2026.3.11`.\n\n## Workarounds\nUpgrade to `2026.3.11` or later.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-32919",
"modified": "2026-09-25T08:57:16Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-jf6w-m8jw-jfxc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Write-scoped callers could reach admin-only session reset logic through `agent`",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-jf6w-m8jw-jfxc",
"CVE-2026-32919"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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