BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-9P38-94JF-HGJJ)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-25 08:57 – Source websiteSummary
In OpenClaw's macOS node-host path, system.run allowlist parsing in security=allowlist mode failed to reject command substitution tokens when they appeared inside double-quoted shell text.
Because of that gap, payloads like echo "ok $(id)" could be treated as allowlist hits (first executable token echo) while still executing non-allowlisted subcommands through shell substitution.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: npm
openclaw - Latest published affected version:
2026.2.21-2 - Affected range:
<= 2026.2.21-2 - Patched version (planned next release):
2026.2.22
Notes:
- Default installs are not affected (security=deny by default).
- The issue requires opting into security=allowlist on the macOS node-host path.
Impact
Approval/authorization bypass in allowlist mode that can lead to unintended command execution on the node host.
Preconditions
- Target uses macOS node-host / companion-app execution path.
- Exec approvals set to
security=allowlist. - Ask mode is
on-missoroff. - Allowlist contains a benign executable used in a shell wrapper flow (for example
/bin/echo).
Reproduction (example)
Use a shell-wrapper command where the visible executable is allowlisted but the quoted payload contains substitution:
- command argv:
/bin/sh -lc 'echo "ok $(/usr/bin/id > /tmp/openclaw-poc-rce)"' - allowlist pattern includes
/bin/echo
Before the fix, allowlist analysis could resolve this as allowlisted while shell substitution still executed.
Remediation
- Upgrade to
2026.2.22(or newer) when released. - Temporary mitigation: set ask mode to
alwaysor set security mode todeny.
Fix Commit(s)
90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to planned next release 2026.2.22. After npm release is out, advisory can be published directly.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.6",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.6"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn OpenClaw\u0027s macOS node-host path, `system.run` allowlist parsing in `security=allowlist` mode failed to reject command substitution tokens when they appeared inside double-quoted shell text.\n\nBecause of that gap, payloads like `echo \"ok $(id)\"` could be treated as allowlist hits (first executable token `echo`) while still executing non-allowlisted subcommands through shell substitution.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: npm `openclaw`\n- Latest published affected version: `2026.2.21-2`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Patched version (planned next release): `2026.2.22`\n\nNotes:\n- Default installs are not affected (`security=deny` by default).\n- The issue requires opting into `security=allowlist` on the macOS node-host path.\n\n### Impact\nApproval/authorization bypass in allowlist mode that can lead to unintended command execution on the node host.\n\n### Preconditions\n- Target uses macOS node-host / companion-app execution path.\n- Exec approvals set to `security=allowlist`.\n- Ask mode is `on-miss` or `off`.\n- Allowlist contains a benign executable used in a shell wrapper flow (for example `/bin/echo`).\n\n### Reproduction (example)\nUse a shell-wrapper command where the visible executable is allowlisted but the quoted payload contains substitution:\n\n- command argv: `/bin/sh -lc \u0027echo \"ok $(/usr/bin/id \u003e /tmp/openclaw-poc-rce)\"\u0027`\n- allowlist pattern includes `/bin/echo`\n\nBefore the fix, allowlist analysis could resolve this as allowlisted while shell substitution still executed.\n\n### Remediation\n- Upgrade to `2026.2.22` (or newer) when released.\n- Temporary mitigation: set ask mode to `always` or set security mode to `deny`.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to planned next release `2026.2.22`. After npm release is out, advisory can be published directly.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-22179",
"modified": "2026-09-25T08:57:16Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-9p38-94jf-hgjj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-allowlist-bypass-via-command-substitution-in-system-run"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has macOS `system.run` allowlist bypass via quoted command substitution",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-9p38-94jf-hgjj",
"CVE-2026-22179"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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