BREW-ANSIBLE@10-CVE-2026-49272 (GHSA-3JP2-3MRG-2VXC)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-28 08:58 – Updated: 2026-11-09 09:48 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OAuthLib: Bearer token can be retrieved as long as client knows a valid client ID for device workflow
Details

Summary

A call to the token endpoint with a grant type of "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code" and a bogus device_code is able to get a bearer token as long as they know a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow.

Details

Section 3.4 of the RFC 8628 spec says that the token endpoint should take in device_code as a required parameter.DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request does not perform any validation of device_code. DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request should be validating that device_code was passed in as a parameter and that it is valid, similar to how AuthorizationCodeGrant.validate_token_request does the checks here and here.

I would like to propose a new method be added to RequestValidator called validate_device_code that is similar to the validate_code method and is called inside of DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request.

PoC

Create an implementation of RequestValidation.authenticate_client that returns True if the client's client_type is "public". You would find yourself in this scenario because there's another issue with DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request where it doesn't properly handle public clients (see https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/issues/919).

Create a client that has a client_type of "public" and set it's grant_type to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code".

With this implementation of RequestValidation.authenticate_client done, use that validator for your token endpoint. Call the token endpoint with a body of

{
  "client_id": <ID of the public client you made>,
  "grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code",
  "device_code": <anything you want since it's not validated>
}

You now have a bearer token for the client without a valid device_code.

Impact

Anyone using the RFC 8628 device workflow in oauthlib that doesn't realize the device_code parameter is not being validated.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "oauthlib",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/oauthlib@3.3.1",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "4.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "ansible@10",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/ansible%4010"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.7.0_3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/oauthlib@3.3.1",
        "name": "oauthlib",
        "resource": "oauthlib",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "3.3.1"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA call to the token endpoint with a grant type of `\"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code\"` and a bogus `device_code` is able to get a bearer token as long as they know a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow.\n\n### Details\n\n[Section 3.4 of the RFC 8628 spec](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628#section-3.4) says that the token endpoint should take in `device_code` as a required parameter.`DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does not perform any validation of `device_code`. `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` should be validating that `device_code` was passed in as a parameter and that it is valid, similar to how `AuthorizationCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does the checks [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L446) and [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L483).\n\nI would like to propose a new method be added to `RequestValidator` called `validate_device_code` that is similar to the `validate_code` method and is called inside of `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request`.\n\n### PoC\nCreate an implementation of `RequestValidation.authenticate_client` that returns `True` if the client\u0027s `client_type` is `\"public\"`. You would find yourself in this scenario because there\u0027s another issue with `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` where it doesn\u0027t properly handle public clients (see https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/issues/919).\n\nCreate a client that has a `client_type` of `\"public\"` and set it\u0027s `grant_type` to `\"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code\"`.\n\nWith this implementation of `RequestValidation.authenticate_client` done, use that validator for your token endpoint. Call the token endpoint with a body of \n```\n{\n  \"client_id\": \u003cID of the public client you made\u003e,\n  \"grant_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code\",\n  \"device_code\": \u003canything you want since it\u0027s not validated\u003e\n}\n```\n\nYou now have a bearer token for the client without a valid `device_code`.\n\n\n### Impact\nAnyone using the RFC 8628 device workflow in oauthlib that doesn\u0027t realize the `device_code` parameter is not being validated.",
  "id": "BREW-ansible@10-CVE-2026-49272",
  "modified": "2026-11-09T09:48:26Z",
  "published": "2026-10-28T08:58:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/security/advisories/GHSA-3jp2-3mrg-2vxc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/pull/954"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/commit/77a5f1c8ce00da2b0b8c5f6e9cc129920085f114"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/releases/tag/v4.0.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OAuthLib: Bearer token can be retrieved as long as client knows a valid client ID for device workflow",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-3jp2-3mrg-2vxc",
    "CVE-2026-49272"
  ]
}



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