RUSTSEC-2026-0529 (GHSA-MJ2M-JXGV-R446)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-13 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-13 12:33 – Source websiteKVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy(&PushDrop, &PublicKey), public
and deprecated since 0.2.0 (the crate's first release), read neither argument
and answered true. A KVStore token signed by nobody, a signed token checked
against a key other than its controller's, and a PushDrop with no fields each
passed. Its documentation said it delegated to the KVStoreFields-based
verifier; it did not.
An application that checks, with this function, a KVStore token it did not
write (an overlay lookup's answer, or a transaction output a peer hands it) and
acts on true accepts a value no controller signed, attributed to whatever
controller the token names. No caller in the crate itself uses the function.
This was run on 0.2.0, 0.5.0, 0.8.0, 0.8.7, 0.8.8, 0.9.0-beta.1 and
0.9.0-beta.7 as crates.io serves them, and the source of all 63 published
versions carries the same constant body (the yanked 0.3.21 included).
0.8.9 answers true only for a token whose controller field is the
given key and whose last field is that key's signature over the others (the
0.9 line's next prerelease carries the same fix). There is no workaround:
upgrade to 0.8.9, or, on the 0.9 line, to its next prerelease.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"bsv_rs::kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "bsv-rs",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.9"
},
{
"introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-mj2m-jxgv-r446"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy(\u0026PushDrop, \u0026PublicKey)`, public\nand deprecated since 0.2.0 (the crate\u0027s first release), read neither argument\nand answered `true`. A KVStore token signed by nobody, a signed token checked\nagainst a key other than its controller\u0027s, and a PushDrop with no fields each\npassed. Its documentation said it delegated to the `KVStoreFields`-based\nverifier; it did not.\n\nAn application that checks, with this function, a KVStore token it did not\nwrite (an overlay lookup\u0027s answer, or a transaction output a peer hands it) and\nacts on `true` accepts a value no controller signed, attributed to whatever\ncontroller the token names. No caller in the crate itself uses the function.\nThis was run on 0.2.0, 0.5.0, 0.8.0, 0.8.7, 0.8.8, 0.9.0-beta.1 and\n0.9.0-beta.7 as crates.io serves them, and the source of all 63 published\nversions carries the same constant body (the yanked 0.3.21 included).\n\n0.8.9 answers `true` only for a token whose controller field is the\ngiven key and whose last field is that key\u0027s signature over the others (the\n0.9 line\u0027s next prerelease carries the same fix). There is no workaround:\nupgrade to 0.8.9, or, on the 0.9 line, to its next prerelease.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0529",
"modified": "2026-11-13T12:33:03Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0529.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.9/CHANGELOG.md"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature_legacy answers true for every token and every key"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.