OSEC-2026-28
Vulnerability from osv_ocaml – Published: 2026-11-06 13:30 – Updated: 2026-11-06 13:30 – Source websiteGET /conferences/ocaml/<path> on ocaml.org concatenates the raw request target onto OCAMLORG_V2_PATH (/v2) and serves it with Dream.from_filesystem, bypassing the path validation that Dream.static performs. An unauthenticated request containing .. segments escapes /v2 and reads arbitrary files as the server process, which runs as root in the container.
Please note that the live deployment of https://ocaml.org is in a dedicated Docker container which does not contain any secrets. Thus the vulnerability is in the ocaml.org source code, but there has been no impact for the live deployment.
Affected code
src/ocamlorg_web/lib/handler.ml:1544 (commit ocaml/ocaml.org@31249f2d69fcb243284d3a6a2b91c0a4963f25b5):
let v2_asset req =
let</>? path =
try Some (Config.v2_path ^ Dream.target req) with _ -> None
in
let</>? () = if Sys.file_exists path then Some () else None in
Filename.(Dream.from_filesystem (dirname path) (basename path) req)
The route is public (src/ocamlorg_web/lib/router.ml:186):
Dream.get "/conferences/ocaml/**" Handler.v2_asset;
Config.v2_path is OCAMLORG_V2_PATH, set to /v2 in the production image (Dockerfile:68). Dream.target is the request target as received; nothing rejects . or .. components.
Timeline
- 2026-10-31 report via https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories
- 2026-11-02 fixed via https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml.org/pull/3942 and deployed ocaml.org
{
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6b08ea625214fddcdd03cf990c004bc2dd77c17a"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml.org",
"type": "GIT"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"name": "Sahil Kushwaha",
"type": "REPORTER"
},
{
"name": "Hannes Mehnert",
"type": "COORDINATOR"
},
{
"name": "Cuihtlauac Alvarado",
"type": "REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe": [
"CWE-22"
],
"human_link": "https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/OSEC-2026-28.md",
"osv": "https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories/tree/generated-osv/2026/OSEC-2026-28.json"
},
"details": "`GET /conferences/ocaml/\u003cpath\u003e` on ocaml.org concatenates the raw request target onto `OCAMLORG_V2_PATH` (`/v2`) and serves it with `Dream.from_filesystem`, bypassing the path validation that `Dream.static` performs. An unauthenticated request containing `..` segments escapes `/v2` and reads arbitrary files as the server process, which runs as `root` in the container.\n\nPlease note that the live deployment of https://ocaml.org is in a dedicated Docker container which does not contain any secrets. Thus the vulnerability is in the ocaml.org source code, but there has been no impact for the live deployment.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`src/ocamlorg_web/lib/handler.ml:1544 (commit ocaml/ocaml.org@31249f2d69fcb243284d3a6a2b91c0a4963f25b5)`:\n\n```ocaml\nlet v2_asset req =\n let\u003c/\u003e? path =\n try Some (Config.v2_path ^ Dream.target req) with _ -\u003e None\n in\n let\u003c/\u003e? () = if Sys.file_exists path then Some () else None in\n Filename.(Dream.from_filesystem (dirname path) (basename path) req)\n```\n\nThe route is public (`src/ocamlorg_web/lib/router.ml:186`):\n\n```ocaml\nDream.get \"/conferences/ocaml/**\" Handler.v2_asset;\n```\n\n`Config.v2_path` is `OCAMLORG_V2_PATH`, set to `/v2` in the production image (`Dockerfile:68`). `Dream.target` is the request target as received; nothing rejects `.` or `..` components.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- 2026-10-31 report via https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories\n- 2026-11-02 fixed via https://github.com/ocaml/ocaml.org/pull/3942 and deployed ocaml.org",
"id": "OSEC-2026-28",
"modified": "2026-11-06T13:30:00Z",
"published": "2026-11-06T13:30:00Z",
"references": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via path traversal in `/conferences/ocaml/**`"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.