MAL-2026-19952
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (b1ae99636d7eb86ee7c8000ddb08003dd3f5613af27581e668fe12d783b0d665)
The package is a dependency-confusion lure targeting internal USDm/Utila minting tooling. setup.py defines an _exfil() routine that runs both at module import time and inside a custom install cmdclass, so it fires on pip install as well as any sdist build. _exfil() reads wallet and cloud secrets from environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_SA_PRIVATE_KEY and similar), reads.env files from the current working directory and $HOME, and recursively collects.pem/.key/.json/.yaml files under ~/.utila and ~/.config/utila. The collected material is JSON-encoded and POSTed via urllib.request.urlopen to a hardcoded destination, https://webhook.site/ec3e3cb9-4cc1-4cb8-a273-4811768a631d (overridable via COLLECTOR_URL). The top-level usdm_minting_client/init.py repeats the exfiltration on every import usdm_minting_client, sending USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_RPC_URL and the contents of ~/.env and ~/.usdm.env to the same collector endpoint. A header comment in setup.py self-describes the package as a dependency-confusion PoC impersonating an internal usdm-minting-client, and the metadata uses a placeholder homepage (example.com) with a free-mail author address, consistent with a lure rather than a legitimate release.
Source: kam193 (78ca43ab87b214f4da683e6b9f171e762e4956e6db3210796b6ed8bc92e92e72)
During installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-11-usdm-minting-client
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
-
exfiltration-env-variables
-
crypto-related
-
exfiltration-crypto
-
exfiltration-credentials
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"artifacts": [
"usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz"
],
"path": "setup.py",
"sha256": "b8e459b4e46db0de6ffb935c599362d5a4398d2e25a0e143d62d90f353444a17",
"tlsh": "2b91fe94e9852932f15397b89c65a4522334fa5b3e01387837ec13582fce42ed2b5bed"
},
{
"artifacts": [
"usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz"
],
"path": "usdm_minting_client/__init__.py",
"sha256": "567b7db99843de26ed70afdb0a7aaafba5ecc884537c46b6a427434aab9543ad",
"tlsh": "c131549769010463e04be3895c7d6ab87772b84b2c132cb439cd53146fdd61e61b1bea"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "f581c849724004e62bd78594507cfde8b336887aadaebbaea67ef49e979ebc04",
"md5": "9fb27aa51a1c57e5f2d38c222bac7dcf",
"sha256": "8bd61bda266da10746f24c047399f77ba1282ccdc412f23e0a2c51322b0d1481"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "usdm-minting-client"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.2",
"0.1.0",
"0.1.3",
"0.1.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"urls": [
"https://tag-pace-ham-stylus.trycloudflare.com/collect"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022783",
"import_time": "2026-11-16T09:44:17.356085859Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-16T09:25:31Z",
"sha256": "a0a06bd1565eb32991e9f3741ec02facd63c61cae5ed8acbb044d70cc2e18ffe",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.2"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022782",
"import_time": "2026-11-16T09:44:17.300931238Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-16T09:25:23Z",
"sha256": "b1ae99636d7eb86ee7c8000ddb08003dd3f5613af27581e668fe12d783b0d665",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022784",
"import_time": "2026-11-16T09:44:17.389237259Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-16T09:25:46Z",
"sha256": "b5189681b5b78596a7d345f269646bb69ddecf8de31574a7226cce5857a2f630",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.3"
]
},
{
"id": "pypi/2026-11-usdm-minting-client/usdm-minting-client",
"import_time": "2026-11-16T09:44:19.594130662Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-16T09:21:14.591147Z",
"sha256": "78ca43ab87b214f4da683e6b9f171e762e4956e6db3210796b6ed8bc92e92e72",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"0.1.0",
"0.1.1",
"0.1.2",
"0.1.3"
]
},
{
"id": "pypi/2026-11-usdm-minting-client/usdm-minting-client",
"import_time": "2026-11-16T10:14:50.720295226Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-16T09:33:18.743412Z",
"sha256": "bce756ba12d2af3187d8dc1dacdbaee0c60ba932cc3c12ef9ab27857571b450d",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"0.1.0",
"0.1.1",
"0.1.2",
"0.1.3"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b1ae99636d7eb86ee7c8000ddb08003dd3f5613af27581e668fe12d783b0d665)\nThe package is a dependency-confusion lure targeting internal USDm/Utila minting tooling. setup.py defines an _exfil() routine that runs both at module import time and inside a custom install cmdclass, so it fires on `pip install` as well as any sdist build. _exfil() reads wallet and cloud secrets from environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_SA_PRIVATE_KEY and similar), reads.env files from the current working directory and $HOME, and recursively collects.pem/.key/.json/.yaml files under ~/.utila and ~/.config/utila. The collected material is JSON-encoded and POSTed via urllib.request.urlopen to a hardcoded destination, https://webhook.site/ec3e3cb9-4cc1-4cb8-a273-4811768a631d (overridable via COLLECTOR_URL). The top-level usdm_minting_client/__init__.py repeats the exfiltration on every `import usdm_minting_client`, sending USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_RPC_URL and the contents of ~/.env and ~/.usdm.env to the same collector endpoint. A header comment in setup.py self-describes the package as a dependency-confusion PoC impersonating an internal `usdm-minting-client`, and the metadata uses a placeholder homepage (example.com) with a free-mail author address, consistent with a lure rather than a legitimate release.\n\n## Source: kam193 (78ca43ab87b214f4da683e6b9f171e762e4956e6db3210796b6ed8bc92e92e72)\nDuring installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-usdm-minting-client\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-19952",
"modified": "2026-11-16T10:16:06.138640784Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T09:21:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.2/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.0/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.3/"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/usdm-minting-client"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in usdm-minting-client (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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