HSEC-2026-0015
Vulnerability from osv_haskell – Published: 2026-11-16 02:22 – Updated: 2026-11-16 02:22 – Source websiteMissing validation of CONNECT requests in http2
For CONNECT requests, checkRequestHeader (Network/HTTP2/H2/HPACK.hs) in http2 up to 5.4.13 returned early, only requiring the absence of :scheme and :path. Every other check was skipped:
- the requirement that
:authorityis present (RFC 9113, Section 8.5); - the check that
:authorityandHostagree, which applies to every other request (RFC 9113, Section 8.3.1: a server SHOULD treat a mismatch as malformed); - the common checks for
:status,ConnectionandTE.
A CONNECT request carrying :authority: a.example and Host: b.example was therefore accepted. Consumers that read Host see b.example where intermediaries that read :authority see a.example. warp, for example, sets requestHeaderHost to Host when present and falls back to :authority, so an application behind an intermediary that routes or authorizes on :authority handles a request other than the one the intermediary validated — a request can be smuggled past the front-end's access control, validation, logging or WAF rules.
Exploitation requires a front-end that makes decisions based on :authority while the application behind it bases routing or authorization on Host; a directly exposed server sees only one authority.
A CONNECT request with neither :authority nor :path also passed validation and reached warp 3.4.21, where fromJust (mPath <|> mAuth) (Network/Wai/Handler/Warp/HTTP2/Request.hs) threw. The exception was raised in the stream's worker thread, so it reset one stream and did not affect the server process.
Resolution
http2 5.4.14 validates CONNECT requests like every other request: :authority is required, :scheme and :path are forbidden, and the common checks apply, including the :authority/Host consistency check. A malformed request is rejected with a stream error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR, leaving the connection itself in place. With every request thus carrying :path or :authority when it reaches warp, the fromJust can no longer fail, so warp needs no change.
The same release also stops the server from pushing on a request that has no :scheme or :authority, where a push previously crashed on the missing :scheme.
Upgrade to http2 5.4.14 or later. Series before 4.0 performed no :authority/Host consistency check at all, for any request, and are unsupported; upgrade regardless.
Credits
Reported by Akash Sebastian (@akashseb). Validated and fixed by Kazu Yamamoto.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"human_link": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/published/2026/HSEC-2026-0015.md",
"osv": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/haskell/security-advisories/refs/heads/generated/osv-export/2026/HSEC-2026-0015.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hackage",
"name": "http2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"home": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories",
"osvs": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/haskell/security-advisories/refs/heads/generated/osv-export",
"repository": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories"
},
"details": "# Missing validation of CONNECT requests in http2\n\nFor CONNECT requests, `checkRequestHeader` (`Network/HTTP2/H2/HPACK.hs`) in http2 up to 5.4.13 returned early, only requiring the absence of `:scheme` and `:path`. Every other check was skipped:\n\n* the requirement that `:authority` is present (RFC 9113, Section 8.5);\n* the check that `:authority` and `Host` agree, which applies to every other request (RFC 9113, Section 8.3.1: a server SHOULD treat a mismatch as malformed);\n* the common checks for `:status`, `Connection` and `TE`.\n\nA CONNECT request carrying `:authority: a.example` and `Host: b.example` was therefore accepted. Consumers that read `Host` see `b.example` where intermediaries that read `:authority` see `a.example`. warp, for example, sets `requestHeaderHost` to `Host` when present and falls back to `:authority`, so an application behind an intermediary that routes or authorizes on `:authority` handles a request other than the one the intermediary validated \u2014 a request can be smuggled past the front-end\u0027s access control, validation, logging or WAF rules.\n\nExploitation requires a front-end that makes decisions based on `:authority` while the application behind it bases routing or authorization on `Host`; a directly exposed server sees only one authority.\n\nA CONNECT request with neither `:authority` nor `:path` also passed validation and reached warp 3.4.21, where `fromJust (mPath \u003c|\u003e mAuth)` (`Network/Wai/Handler/Warp/HTTP2/Request.hs`) threw. The exception was raised in the stream\u0027s worker thread, so it reset one stream and did not affect the server process.\n\n## Resolution\n\nhttp2 5.4.14 validates CONNECT requests like every other request: `:authority` is required, `:scheme` and `:path` are forbidden, and the common checks apply, including the `:authority`/`Host` consistency check. A malformed request is rejected with a stream error of type `PROTOCOL_ERROR`, leaving the connection itself in place. With every request thus carrying `:path` or `:authority` when it reaches warp, the `fromJust` can no longer fail, so warp needs no change.\n\nThe same release also stops the server from pushing on a request that has no `:scheme` or `:authority`, where a push previously crashed on the missing `:scheme`.\n\nUpgrade to http2 5.4.14 or later. Series before 4.0 performed no `:authority`/`Host` consistency check at all, for any request, and are unsupported; upgrade regardless.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Akash Sebastian (@akashseb). Validated and fixed by Kazu Yamamoto.\n",
"id": "HSEC-2026-0015",
"modified": "2026-11-16T02:22:07Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T02:22:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/http2/commit/7c119b5890fefa6a00a2c389fb85f15d4b683a60"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/http2/commit/da1453d3be3277b4b5efba63b97c7a21d32d4e96"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://hackage.haskell.org/package/http2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.5.0",
"summary": "Missing validation of CONNECT requests in http2"
}
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