GHSA-W6X2-F5M4-XW82
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 22:41 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:41Summary
bin/fzf-tmux fails to validate layout size values given in the attached form (e.g. -l50). For -l/-u these values reach bash arithmetic expansion ($(( max - size ))), where an operand like a[$(cmd)] executes cmd as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (-x/-y/-w/-h/-p) into an unquoted tmux popup ... $opt ... invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as -e BASH_ENV=<path> (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing $BASH_ENV).
Reporter / Credits:
Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/
Details
In bin/fzf-tmux (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (^[0-9%,]+$ / ^[A-Z]$) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:
if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
size="${arg:2}" # no validation
else
if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then # only separate form validated
For -l and -u, swap is non-empty (lines 68/75), so size reaches arithmetic evaluation:
- line 120:
size=$((max - size))(non-percent values) - line 102:
opt="$opt -l $((100 - size))%"(percent, tmux >= 3.2) - line 108:
opt="$opt -p $((100 - size))"(percent, tmux < 3.2)
Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so a[$(command)] runs command. Verified end-to-end against the unmodified script (see PoC).
Second sink (same root cause): opt is used unquoted at line 236 (tmux popup -d "$PWD" $opt "bash $argsf") and line 249, so a geometry value containing spaces injects extra tmux flags, e.g. -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/script.
PoC
Verified on 0.74.4 (no tmux or fzf binary needed — a stub fzf on PATH suffices because the sink fires during bash argument parsing):
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-l a[$(id > /tmp/pwn1)]' # line 120 sink (non-percent)
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-u a[$(id > /tmp/pwn2)]%' # line 102/108 sink (percent)
$ cat /tmp/pwn1 /tmp/pwn2
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t03-arithmetic.sh). Popup flag-injection variant (tmux >= 3.2): bash bin/fzf-tmux -p '-x0 -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/evil.sh'.
Impact
Local command injection (CWE-78). fzf-tmux argv is commonly assembled by third-party scripts and editor plugins (e.g. fzf-tmux -l "${height}%"); any layout value influenced by less-trusted data (project-local config, wrapper scripts) yields arbitrary command execution as the invoking user. Suggested fixes: apply the regex validation to the attached form, constrain size to [0-9]+ before any $((...)), and build the tmux invocation as an array ("${opt_parts[@]}") instead of unquoted $opt.
Reported privately to the maintainer by email; fixes prepared for the next release.
Exploitability in practice
Impact is high (command execution as the invoking user), but a real attack requires attacker-controlled data to reach the fzf-tmux layout arguments (-l/-u). In normal use these values are set by the user or by trusted, hardcoded configuration, so a vulnerable data flow is uncommon. The issue is local-only, requires the victim to run fzf-tmux with the poisoned value, and bin/fzf-tmux has been superseded by the built-in --tmux/--popup option since 0.53.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.74.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/junegunn/fzf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.74.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-121716"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:41:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T20:17:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`bin/fzf-tmux` fails to validate layout size values given in the *attached* form (e.g. `-l50`). For `-l`/`-u` these values reach bash arithmetic expansion (`$(( max - size ))`), where an operand like `a[$(cmd)]` executes `cmd` as the invoking user during option parsing \u2014 before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (`-x/-y/-w/-h/-p`) into an unquoted `tmux popup ... $opt ...` invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as `-e BASH_ENV=\u003cpath\u003e` (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing `$BASH_ENV`).\n\n### Reporter / Credits:\nSai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/\n\n### Details\n\nIn `bin/fzf-tmux` (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (`^[0-9%,]+$` / `^[A-Z]$`) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:\n\n```bash\nif [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then\n size=\"${arg:2}\" # no validation\nelse\n if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then # only separate form validated\n```\n\nFor `-l` and `-u`, `swap` is non-empty (lines 68/75), so `size` reaches arithmetic evaluation:\n\n- line 120: `size=$((max - size))` (non-percent values)\n- line 102: `opt=\"$opt -l $((100 - size))%\"` (percent, tmux \u003e= 3.2)\n- line 108: `opt=\"$opt -p $((100 - size))\"` (percent, tmux \u003c 3.2)\n\nBash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so `a[$(command)]` runs `command`. Verified end-to-end against the unmodified script (see PoC).\n\nSecond sink (same root cause): `opt` is used unquoted at line 236 (`tmux popup -d \"$PWD\" $opt \"bash $argsf\"`) and line 249, so a geometry value containing spaces injects extra tmux flags, e.g. `-e BASH_ENV=/path/to/script`.\n\n### PoC\n\nVerified on 0.74.4 (no tmux or fzf binary needed \u2014 a stub `fzf` on PATH suffices because the sink fires during bash argument parsing):\n\n```console\n$ bash bin/fzf-tmux \u0027-l a[$(id \u003e /tmp/pwn1)]\u0027 # line 120 sink (non-percent)\n$ bash bin/fzf-tmux \u0027-u a[$(id \u003e /tmp/pwn2)]%\u0027 # line 102/108 sink (percent)\n\n$ cat /tmp/pwn1 /tmp/pwn2\nuid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...\nuid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...\n```\n\nA self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t03-arithmetic.sh). Popup flag-injection variant (tmux \u003e= 3.2): `bash bin/fzf-tmux -p \u0027-x0 -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/evil.sh\u0027`.\n\n### Impact\n\nLocal command injection (CWE-78). `fzf-tmux` argv is commonly assembled by third-party scripts and editor plugins (e.g. `fzf-tmux -l \"${height}%\"`); any layout value influenced by less-trusted data (project-local config, wrapper scripts) yields arbitrary command execution as the invoking user. Suggested fixes: apply the regex validation to the attached form, constrain `size` to `[0-9]+` before any `$((...))`, and build the tmux invocation as an array (`\"${opt_parts[@]}\"`) instead of unquoted `$opt`.\n\nReported privately to the maintainer by email; fixes prepared for the next release.\n\n### Exploitability in practice\n\nImpact is high (command execution as the invoking user), but a real attack requires attacker-controlled data to reach the fzf-tmux layout arguments (`-l`/`-u`). In normal use these values are set by the user or by trusted, hardcoded configuration, so a vulnerable data flow is uncommon. The issue is local-only, requires the victim to run fzf-tmux with the poisoned value, and `bin/fzf-tmux` has been superseded by the built-in `--tmux`/`--popup` option since 0.53.0.",
"id": "GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82",
"modified": "2026-11-19T22:41:46Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T22:41:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/security/advisories/GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-121716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/commit/f126ff29549e0983f571fbc32dddcfbede251aa7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/releases/tag/v0.74.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "fzf: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached value)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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