GHSA-R7WG-F7R2-8WF7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 20:34 – Updated: 2026-11-19 20:34Summary
axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.
Details
The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:
- _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk — no hash comparison against any published value.
- _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.
- There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.
The binary is not dead code — it's on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:
result = subprocess.run(
[path, "read", str(tmp_path)],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds,
)
PoC
This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather than a live payload:
Clone sammyjdev/axon and open src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py. Confirm _http_download() and _extract_binary() perform no hash/signature check before chmod +x. Trace the call chain: bootstrap_rtkx() → _http_download() → _extract_binary() → rtk_binary_path() (in rtk.py) → subprocess.run() in compress_text_with_rtk(). Optionally demonstrate impact safely: point download_url() / the download callable (already injectable per the module's own docstring, "the download step is injectable so the extraction logic is testable offline") at a local HTTP server serving an attacker-controlled archive, and confirm it gets extracted, chmod +x'd, and executed with no rejection.
Impact
Type: CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), leading to potential arbitrary code execution. Who's affected: Any axon user who runs axon rtk-install or triggers auto-bootstrap, if sammyjdev/rtkx's release pipeline or a maintainer's release credentials are ever compromised. Not exploitable today without that precondition, but the missing control removes the last line of defense against a supply-chain compromise of the binary dependency.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "axon-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76818"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-494"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:34:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\naxon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity \u2014 no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.\n\n### Details\nThe download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:\n\n- _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk \u2014 no hash comparison against any published value.\n- _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.\n- There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.\n\nThe binary is not dead code \u2014 it\u0027s on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:\n\n`\nresult = subprocess.run(\n [path, \"read\", str(tmp_path)],\n capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds,\n)`\n\n\n### PoC\nThis is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather than a live payload:\n\nClone sammyjdev/axon and open src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py.\nConfirm _http_download() and _extract_binary() perform no hash/signature check before chmod +x.\nTrace the call chain: bootstrap_rtkx() \u2192 _http_download() \u2192 _extract_binary() \u2192 rtk_binary_path() (in rtk.py) \u2192 subprocess.run() in compress_text_with_rtk().\nOptionally demonstrate impact safely: point download_url() / the download callable (already injectable per the module\u0027s own docstring, \"the download step is injectable so the extraction logic is testable offline\") at a local HTTP server serving an attacker-controlled archive, and confirm it gets extracted, chmod +x\u0027d, and executed with no rejection.\n\n### Impact\nType: CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), \nleading to potential arbitrary code execution.\nWho\u0027s affected: Any axon user who runs axon rtk-install or triggers auto-bootstrap, if sammyjdev/rtkx\u0027s release pipeline or a maintainer\u0027s release credentials are ever compromised. Not exploitable today without that precondition, but the missing control removes the last line of defense against a supply-chain compromise of the binary dependency.",
"id": "GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7",
"modified": "2026-11-19T20:34:53Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T20:34:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/security/advisories/GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76818"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/rtkx/pull/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/rtkx/pull/3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/398e47d5d2b1e1ba88c8d2bac90ac30811a9152b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/c5863e616688c6c60b2716db9ce4b1b522213b8c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/d2cc7bccd99c76ec06ac7f7f04d3b2f765c9e741"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Axon: Download of Code Without Integrity Check in axon-mcp"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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