GHSA-Q87H-C5M7-659J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 23:48 – Updated: 2026-11-20 23:48Summary
Every sibling <table> adds another level of the parent's indentation, so the size of get_text() output grows quadratically with the number of tables. In the measurements below, a 240 KB HTML document produces about 1 billion characters and uses about 1 GB of memory.
Details
table_end_handler() (model/tag/table_tag.py) writes the rendered table into the parent element with HtmlElement.write_verbatim_text() (model/html_element.py). For a block-level parent, write_verbatim_text() calls canvas.open_block(), which pushes the parent's padding_inline onto the prefix stack. The following close_block() never pops it; only Canvas.close_tag() calls prefix.remove_last_prefix(). So each table leaves one extra padding entry on the stack.
This has been present since 2.0 (commit 84ec720).
>>> get_text('<ul>' + '<table><tr><td>a</td></tr></table>' * 4 + '</ul>')
' a\n \n a\n \n a\n \n a\n '
PoC
import sys, time, resource
from inscriptis import get_text
n = int(sys.argv[1])
html = "<ul>" + "<table></table>" * n + "</ul>"
t = time.time(); out = get_text(html)
print(len(html), f"{time.time()-t:.2f}s", len(out), resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss // 2**20, "MiB")
inscriptis 2.7.5, Python 3.11, macOS (2.0.0 behaves the same):
| tables | HTML | time | output chars | peak RSS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1,000 | 15 KB | 0.02 s | 4.0 M | 31 MiB |
| 4,000 | 60 KB | 0.33 s | 64 M | 154 MiB |
| 8,000 | 120 KB | 1.31 s | 256 M | 463 MiB |
| 16,000 | 240 KB | 5.63 s | 1,024 M | 991 MiB |
When the input doubles, output size and memory grow about 4 times.
Impact
Any application that converts untrusted HTML with inscriptis can be made to exhaust memory with a small document. This includes crawlers, RAG and LLM ingestion pipelines, and inscriptis-api. No authentication and no user interaction are needed.
Fix
self.canvas.write(self, text, whitespace=WhiteSpace.pre)
if self.display == Display.block:
+ self.canvas.current_block.prefix.remove_last_prefix()
self.canvas.close_block(self)
With this change the 240 KB input above produces 288 K characters in 0.14 s with 27 MiB peak RSS. A single table renders exactly as before, and the existing test suite passes.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.7.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "inscriptis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-132277"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T23:48:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T17:18:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Summary\n\nEvery sibling `\u003ctable\u003e` adds another level of the parent\u0027s indentation, so the size of `get_text()` output grows quadratically with the number of tables. In the measurements below, a 240 KB HTML document produces about 1 billion characters and uses about 1 GB of memory.\n\n# Details\n\n`table_end_handler()` (`model/tag/table_tag.py`) writes the rendered table into the parent element with `HtmlElement.write_verbatim_text()` (`model/html_element.py`). For a block-level parent, `write_verbatim_text()` calls `canvas.open_block()`, which pushes the parent\u0027s `padding_inline` onto the prefix stack. The following `close_block()` never pops it; only `Canvas.close_tag()` calls `prefix.remove_last_prefix()`. So each table leaves one extra padding entry on the stack.\n\nThis has been present since 2.0 (commit 84ec720).\n\n```python\n\u003e\u003e\u003e get_text(\u0027\u003cul\u003e\u0027 + \u0027\u003ctable\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ea\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u0027 * 4 + \u0027\u003c/ul\u003e\u0027)\n\u0027 a\\n \\n a\\n \\n a\\n \\n a\\n \u0027\n```\n\n# PoC\n\n```python\nimport sys, time, resource\nfrom inscriptis import get_text\n\nn = int(sys.argv[1])\nhtml = \"\u003cul\u003e\" + \"\u003ctable\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\" * n + \"\u003c/ul\u003e\"\nt = time.time(); out = get_text(html)\nprint(len(html), f\"{time.time()-t:.2f}s\", len(out), resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss // 2**20, \"MiB\")\n```\n\ninscriptis 2.7.5, Python 3.11, macOS (2.0.0 behaves the same):\n\n| tables | HTML | time | output chars | peak RSS |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1,000 | 15 KB | 0.02 s | 4.0 M | 31 MiB |\n| 4,000 | 60 KB | 0.33 s | 64 M | 154 MiB |\n| 8,000 | 120 KB | 1.31 s | 256 M | 463 MiB |\n| 16,000 | 240 KB | 5.63 s | 1,024 M | 991 MiB |\n\nWhen the input doubles, output size and memory grow about 4 times.\n\n# Impact\n\nAny application that converts untrusted HTML with inscriptis can be made to exhaust memory with a small document. This includes crawlers, RAG and LLM ingestion pipelines, and `inscriptis-api`. No authentication and no user interaction are needed.\n\n# Fix\n\n```diff\n self.canvas.write(self, text, whitespace=WhiteSpace.pre)\n\n if self.display == Display.block:\n+ self.canvas.current_block.prefix.remove_last_prefix()\n self.canvas.close_block(self)\n```\n\nWith this change the 240 KB input above produces 288 K characters in 0.14 s with 27 MiB peak RSS. A single table renders exactly as before, and the existing test suite passes.",
"id": "GHSA-q87h-c5m7-659j",
"modified": "2026-11-20T23:48:51Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T23:48:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/weblyzard/inscriptis/security/advisories/GHSA-q87h-c5m7-659j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-132277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/weblyzard/inscriptis/commit/dc122894cd671a0227f8fdad60464acddaf40fc8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/weblyzard/inscriptis"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/weblyzard/inscriptis/releases/tag/2.7.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Inscriptis: Quadratic memory growth from sibling \u003ctable\u003e elements in get_text()"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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