GHSA-P9WJ-W8XQ-VJX6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 21:26 – Updated: 2026-11-12 21:26
VLAI
Summary
Loofah allowed_uri? treats javascript&#x3a alert(1) as safe
Details

Summary

Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? returns true for a javascript: or vbscript: URI whose scheme is split by a numeric character reference without a trailing semicolon, followed by a character that allowed_uri? strips, such as a space or tab. A browser ends the reference at that character and reads javascript: alert(1) as javascript: alert(1).

Details

allowed_uri? strips control characters and whitespace before it decodes numeric character references. Removing the character that ends a semicolon-less reference lets the reference run on into the following text, so : alert decodes as Ϊ (U+03AA) instead of a colon, and no scheme is detected. The same applies to decimal references and to references that encode a scheme letter, as in j\tavascript:alert(1).

Loofah's default sanitize() path is not affected, because Nokogiri decodes the entity during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI. This issue affects only callers of the public allowed_uri? string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.

Impact

Applications that validate a user-controlled URL with Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? and then render the approved value into an href or another browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. Rails::HTML::Sanitizer.allowed_uri? re-exports the same helper.

Mitigation

Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.3.

Credit

Responsibly reported by GitHub user @manus-pi.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "loofah"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.25.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.25.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126209"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T21:26:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` returns `true` for a `javascript:` or `vbscript:` URI whose scheme is split by a numeric character reference without a trailing semicolon, followed by a character that `allowed_uri?` strips, such as a space or tab. A browser ends the reference at that character and reads `javascript\u0026#x3a alert(1)` as `javascript: alert(1)`.\n\n## Details\n\n`allowed_uri?` strips control characters and whitespace before it decodes numeric character references. Removing the character that ends a semicolon-less reference lets the reference run on into the following text, so `\u0026#x3a alert` decodes as `\u0026#x3aa` (U+03AA) instead of a colon, and no scheme is detected. The same applies to decimal references and to references that encode a scheme letter, as in `\u0026#x6a\\tavascript:alert(1)`.\n\nLoofah\u0027s default `sanitize()` path is **not** affected, because Nokogiri decodes the entity during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI. This issue affects only callers of the public `allowed_uri?` string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that validate a user-controlled URL with `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` and then render the approved value into an `href` or another browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. `Rails::HTML::Sanitizer.allowed_uri?` re-exports the same helper.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Loofah \u003e= 2.25.3.\n\n## Credit\n\nResponsibly reported by GitHub user @manus-pi.",
  "id": "GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T21:26:25Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T21:26:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/pull/324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/commit/62c04841e8252a1b5373afcd2b89fb9b8279e317"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/releases/tag/v2.25.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/loofah/GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Loofah allowed_uri? treats javascript\u0026#x3a alert(1) as safe"
}



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