GHSA-M3X9-938Q-5767
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 21:05 – Updated: 2026-11-12 21:05Summary
Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css rejected any property whose top-level Crass tokens included a :url or :bad_url, and left url out of the allowed CSS functions. Both checks ran only against the first parse of the style attribute. When scrub_css rebuilt each property it emitted identifiers with their CSS escapes decoded, so parentheses written as escapes — url\28 …\29 — hid the url token from the checks, and the rebuilt value was re-parsed into a live url() that nothing checked again. An escaped property name, six-digit escapes, escaped comments and escaped quotes all reached the same place.
Impact
A sanitized style attribute could make a viewer's browser issue a request to an attacker-chosen URL. list-style fetches on render with no interaction, cursor on hover. That leaks the viewer's IP address, user agent and access timing, and can reach hosts routable only from the viewer's network. No script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response, so the request itself is the whole impact.
Applications that sanitize user-supplied HTML with Loofah's default allowlist and display it to other people are affected.
Mitigation
Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.3.
Credit
Reported by NotAFlightRisk through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "loofah"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.25.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126207"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-184"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T21:05:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css` rejected any property whose top-level Crass tokens included a `:url` or `:bad_url`, and left `url` out of the allowed CSS functions. Both checks ran only against the first parse of the `style` attribute. When `scrub_css` rebuilt each property it emitted identifiers with their CSS escapes decoded, so parentheses written as escapes \u2014 `url\\28 \u2026\\29` \u2014 hid the `url` token from the checks, and the rebuilt value was re-parsed into a live `url()` that nothing checked again. An escaped property name, six-digit escapes, escaped comments and escaped quotes all reached the same place.\n\n## Impact\n\nA sanitized `style` attribute could make a viewer\u0027s browser issue a request to an attacker-chosen URL. `list-style` fetches on render with no interaction, `cursor` on hover. That leaks the viewer\u0027s IP address, user agent and access timing, and can reach hosts routable only from the viewer\u0027s network. No script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response, so the request itself is the whole impact.\n\nApplications that sanitize user-supplied HTML with Loofah\u0027s default allowlist and display it to other people are affected.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Loofah \u003e= 2.25.3.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by NotAFlightRisk through GitHub\u0027s private vulnerability reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767",
"modified": "2026-11-12T21:05:41Z",
"published": "2026-11-12T21:05:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/pull/324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/commit/b198a36e44c9c5408163ac50787825e8ca0b166b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/releases/tag/v2.25.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/loofah/GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Loofah: CSS url() sanitization bypass via escaped parentheses"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.