GHSA-M29V-3G7G-9C63

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 16:00 – Updated: 2026-11-19 16:00
VLAI
Summary
Mareforma: search_claims skips verify-on-read, serving forged rows
Details

What's wrong

search_claims never calls _row_verified_on_read. Its row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appends the row. query_claims runs the same projection but additionally re-verifies REPLICATED/ESTABLISHED signatures on read (line 4023) and drops any row that fails, per the documented tamper guarantee in the comment block above it: a high-trust row whose signature does not verify is excluded from query results entirely.

So a tampered or forged high-trust row splits the two read paths. Any process with DB write access, or an attacker copying a genuine validation envelope onto a fresh row, can flip a row to ESTABLISHED. query() drops it; search() serves it at its persisted trust level. Verified in a runtime check against a forged ESTABLISHED row:

query() returns forged row: False
search() returns forged row: True   # support_level ESTABLISHED, 'verified' key absent

The docstring makes this worse: search_claims promises "the same projection as query_claims" and that the include_unverified filter "applies identically", so callers reasonably trust search results equally. The forged row also lacks the verified key entirely, so a consumer cannot tell it went unchecked.

Severity and impact

High. The verify-on-read tamper exclusion is a stated trust guarantee, and search is a primary read surface. A forged ESTABLISHED finding that query correctly rejects is served by search as genuine, with no marker that verification was skipped.

Location

  • mareforma/db/core.py:4206 search_claims row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appends
  • mareforma/db/core.py:4114 search_claims signature and docstring, which claims query_claims-identical semantics
  • mareforma/db/core.py:4023 query_claims verify-on-read call that search_claims lacks

Fix direction

Mirror query_claims: add a verify_cache: dict = {} and, inside the search_claims row loop after the include_unverified check, drop rows that fail _row_verified_on_read(conn, d, verify_cache). Since the verify filter can drop rows even when include_unverified=True, remove the single-batch break on include_unverified and keep batching until limit survivors or the FTS5 match-set is exhausted, with the same scan ceiling query_claims uses. Also set single_trust_domain / trust_domain_root on surviving ESTABLISHED rows if the "same projection" promise is to hold.

Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on main, then make it pass.

Quality bar

SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mareforma"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.7"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.3.7"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71533"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T16:00:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T23:17:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## What\u0027s wrong\n\n`search_claims` never calls `_row_verified_on_read`. Its row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appends the row. `query_claims` runs the same projection but additionally re-verifies REPLICATED/ESTABLISHED signatures on read (line 4023) and drops any row that fails, per the documented tamper guarantee in the comment block above it: a high-trust row whose signature does not verify is excluded from query results entirely.\n\nSo a tampered or forged high-trust row splits the two read paths. Any process with DB write access, or an attacker copying a genuine validation envelope onto a fresh row, can flip a row to ESTABLISHED. `query()` drops it; `search()` serves it at its persisted trust level. Verified in a runtime check against a forged ESTABLISHED row:\n\n```\nquery() returns forged row: False\nsearch() returns forged row: True   # support_level ESTABLISHED, \u0027verified\u0027 key absent\n```\n\nThe docstring makes this worse: `search_claims` promises \"the same projection as query_claims\" and that the `include_unverified` filter \"applies identically\", so callers reasonably trust search results equally. The forged row also lacks the `verified` key entirely, so a consumer cannot tell it went unchecked.\n\n## Severity and impact\n\n**High.** The verify-on-read tamper exclusion is a stated trust guarantee, and search is a primary read surface. A forged ESTABLISHED finding that query correctly rejects is served by search as genuine, with no marker that verification was skipped.\n\n## Location\n\n- `mareforma/db/core.py:4206` search_claims row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appends\n- `mareforma/db/core.py:4114` search_claims signature and docstring, which claims query_claims-identical semantics\n- `mareforma/db/core.py:4023` query_claims verify-on-read call that search_claims lacks\n\n## Fix direction\n\nMirror `query_claims`: add a `verify_cache: dict = {}` and, inside the search_claims row loop after the include_unverified check, drop rows that fail `_row_verified_on_read(conn, d, verify_cache)`. Since the verify filter can drop rows even when `include_unverified=True`, remove the single-batch break on `include_unverified` and keep batching until `limit` survivors or the FTS5 match-set is exhausted, with the same scan ceiling `query_claims` uses. Also set `single_trust_domain` / `trust_domain_root` on surviving ESTABLISHED rows if the \"same projection\" promise is to hold.\n\nDo red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on `main`, then make it pass.\n\n## Quality bar\n\nSOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-m29v-3g7g-9c63",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T16:00:52Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T16:00:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/security/advisories/GHSA-m29v-3g7g-9c63"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71533"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/pull/58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/commit/8b5291792128326a22f240123659d2754446c194"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mareforma/mareforma"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/releases/tag/v0.3.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mareforma: search_claims skips verify-on-read, serving forged rows"
}



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