GHSA-J8RW-JP99-435V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:14 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:14Summary
A forge.tls client throws an uncaught TypeError from connection.process() when it receives a ServerHello while it has no session: after a close_notify alert or a call to close(), or before handshake() is called. A malicious server or an on-path attacker can use this to terminate a Node.js process. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.
Details
tls.handleHandshake() in lib/tls.js updates the handshake digests with c.session.md5.update(bytes) before it calls the message handler. A client creates its session in handshake(), and c.reset() sets it to null when the connection is closed. Closing doesn't set the fail flag, and the client goes back to expecting a ServerHello, so a Handshake record received afterwards still reaches handleHandshake(), which throws TypeError: Cannot read properties of null (reading 'md5').
This happens:
- after the server sends a close_notify alert (at any alert level);
- after the application calls close();
- before the application calls handshake().
The exception propagates out of connection.process(). Applications that pass socket data to process() from a data event handler without catching exceptions, as in the README example, terminate. After a reset the connection uses no encryption, so an on-path attacker can inject the records even when the real server is honest.
Servers are not affected: a server creates its session when it receives a ClientHello.
The fix handles these records like other unexpected records on a closed client: they are ignored.
Patches
Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.
Workarounds
Catch exceptions thrown by connection.process() and close the socket, or stop passing socket data to process() once the closed callback has been called and until handshake() is called again.
Resources
- RFC 5246, section 7.2.1 (Closure Alerts): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246#section-7.2.1
- Related: GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h (another TLS client
TypeError, fixed in 1.4.1): https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h
Severity
CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (5.9, Moderate) CVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (8.2) CVSS 4.0 has no counterpart to 3.1's AC:H beyond AT:P and scores this higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.
Credits
Reported by @manus-use.
Proof of concept
var c = forge.tls.createConnection({server: false, ...});
c.handshake();
// warning close_notify alert, then an empty ServerHello, in separate
// process() calls
c.process(forge.util.hexToBytes('15030100020100'));
c.process(forge.util.hexToBytes('160301000402000000'));
// <= 1.4.2: TypeError: Cannot read properties of null (reading 'md5')
// 1.4.3: the record is ignored
The reporter's PoC is in tests/pocs/ghsa-j8rw-jp99-435v.js, and regression tests are in tests/unit/tls.js.
Impact
Applications that use forge.tls as a client and pass data from a network socket to connection.process() are affected. The server they connect to, or an on-path attacker, can make process() throw; if the application doesn't catch it, the Node.js process terminates, dropping all its connections. Servers built on forge.tls are not affected. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "node-forge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:14:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA `forge.tls` client throws an uncaught `TypeError` from `connection.process()` when it receives a ServerHello while it has no session: after a `close_notify` alert or a call to `close()`, or before `handshake()` is called. A malicious server or an on-path attacker can use this to terminate a Node.js process. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.\n\n### Details\n`tls.handleHandshake()` in `lib/tls.js` updates the handshake digests with `c.session.md5.update(bytes)` before it calls the message handler. A client creates its session in `handshake()`, and `c.reset()` sets it to `null` when the connection is closed. Closing doesn\u0027t set the fail flag, and the client goes back to expecting a ServerHello, so a Handshake record received afterwards still reaches `handleHandshake()`, which throws `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null (reading \u0027md5\u0027)`.\n\nThis happens:\n- after the server sends a `close_notify` alert (at any alert level);\n- after the application calls `close()`;\n- before the application calls `handshake()`.\n\nThe exception propagates out of `connection.process()`. Applications that pass socket data to `process()` from a `data` event handler without catching exceptions, as in the README example, terminate. After a reset the connection uses no encryption, so an on-path attacker can inject the records even when the real server is honest.\n\nServers are not affected: a server creates its session when it receives a ClientHello.\n\nThe fix handles these records like other unexpected records on a closed client: they are ignored.\n\n#### Patches\nFixed in node-forge 1.4.3.\n\n#### Workarounds\nCatch exceptions thrown by `connection.process()` and close the socket, or stop passing socket data to `process()` once the `closed` callback has been called and until `handshake()` is called again.\n\n#### Resources\n- RFC 5246, section 7.2.1 (Closure Alerts): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246#section-7.2.1\n- Related: GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h (another TLS client `TypeError`, fixed in 1.4.1): https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h\n\n#### Severity\nCVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (5.9, Moderate)\nCVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (8.2)\nCVSS 4.0 has no counterpart to 3.1\u0027s AC:H beyond AT:P and scores this higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.\n\n#### Credits\nReported by @manus-use.\n\n### Proof of concept\n var c = forge.tls.createConnection({server: false, ...});\n c.handshake();\n // warning close_notify alert, then an empty ServerHello, in separate\n // process() calls\n c.process(forge.util.hexToBytes(\u002715030100020100\u0027));\n c.process(forge.util.hexToBytes(\u0027160301000402000000\u0027));\n // \u003c= 1.4.2: TypeError: Cannot read properties of null (reading \u0027md5\u0027)\n // 1.4.3: the record is ignored\n\nThe reporter\u0027s PoC is in tests/pocs/ghsa-j8rw-jp99-435v.js, and regression tests are in tests/unit/tls.js.\n\n### Impact\nApplications that use `forge.tls` as a client and pass data from a network socket to `connection.process()` are affected. The server they connect to, or an on-path attacker, can make `process()` throw; if the application doesn\u0027t catch it, the Node.js process terminates, dropping all its connections. Servers built on `forge.tls` are not affected. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact.",
"id": "GHSA-j8rw-jp99-435v",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:14:26Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:14:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-j8rw-jp99-435v"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/pull/1169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/2cfaeb516cb3d4aff1c0569d39394df41c5cb17c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/releases/tag/v1.4.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Forge: TLS client crash on a handshake record received without a session"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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