GHSA-GM9R-HVC9-96GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 22:50 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:50Summary
_extract_from_forwarded_header() (guard_core/utils.py:172-181 in 3.12.0; :179 on master 08780f1) returns the selected X-Forwarded-For entry without any ipaddress validation. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes client_ip and flows into BehaviorTracker (guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a KEYS glob pattern:
key = f"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}"
await self.redis_handler.set_key("behavior_usage", f"{key}:{current_time}", "1", ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f"behavior_usage:{key}:*"
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern) # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace
Same shape in track_return_pattern() (behavior_handler.py:135-142). redis_handler.keys() maps to the blocking Redis KEYS command (guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275).
Details
Three consequences, in increasing severity:
- Cross-client counter contamination.
X-Forwarded-For: *makes the glob match every client's behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client9.9.9.9hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carryingXFF: *issued the patternbehavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*, counted the victim's events, and tripped the rule on its first request. An embedded:also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (behavior_handler.py:94-100). - Unbounded key-space growth + blocking scans. Each request creates a new unique key (
f"{key}:{current_time}") and then issues a blockingKEYSscan whose cost grows with total keys — on the shared Redis instance, degrading every guard-core instance using it. Rotating arbitrary XFF strings multiplies distinct keys without bound. - Error path. A tripped
banaction passes the non-IP string toip_ban_manager.ban_ip(), whoseipaddressvalidation raisesValueErroruncaught in the behavioral processor — the request 500s.
PoC
import asyncio
from types import SimpleNamespace
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from guard_core.utils import extract_client_ip
class CIHeaders(dict):
def get(self, key, default=None):
for k, v in self.items():
if k.lower() == key.lower():
return v
return default
class FakeRequest:
def __init__(self, xff):
self.state = SimpleNamespace()
self.client_host = "10.0.0.1" # the TRUSTED proxy
self.headers = CIHeaders({"X-Forwarded-For": xff})
async def main():
config = SecurityConfig(trusted_proxies=("10.0.0.1",), enable_redis=False)
ip = await extract_client_ip(FakeRequest("*"), config)
print(repr(ip)) # -> '*' (arbitrary string, no validation)
asyncio.run(main())
Then BehaviorTracker.track_endpoint_usage("app.login", "*", rule) issues KEYS behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:* — matching other clients' keys (full fake-Redis script: poc_xff_redis.py, available on request).
Impact
Integrity and availability of the behavioral-analytics subsystem and the shared Redis instance, in deployments where the extracted XFF position is attacker-controllable. No data exposure; not reachable with default settings (trusted_proxies defaults empty).
Fix: validate the extracted XFF entry with ipaddress.ip_address() before returning it from extract_client_ip() (fall back to the connecting IP on failure); escape glob metacharacters (*?[]) in anything interpolated into a KEYS pattern — or replace the KEYS+per-request-key design with an atomic counter / Lua sliding window (the rate-limit Lua script already shows the right shape).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "guard-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-129304"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:50:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T20:19:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`_extract_from_forwarded_header()` (`guard_core/utils.py:172-181` in 3.12.0; `:179` on master `08780f1`) returns the selected `X-Forwarded-For` entry **without any `ipaddress` validation**. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes `client_ip` and flows into `BehaviorTracker` (`guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102`), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a `KEYS` glob pattern:\n\n```python\nkey = f\"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}\"\nawait self.redis_handler.set_key(\"behavior_usage\", f\"{key}:{current_time}\", \"1\", ttl=rule.window)\npattern = f\"behavior_usage:{key}:*\"\nkeys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern) # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace\n```\n\nSame shape in `track_return_pattern()` (`behavior_handler.py:135-142`). `redis_handler.keys()` maps to the blocking Redis `KEYS` command (`guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275`).\n\n### Details\n\nThree consequences, in increasing severity:\n\n1. **Cross-client counter contamination.** `X-Forwarded-For: *` makes the glob match *every* client\u0027s behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client `9.9.9.9` hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying `XFF: *` issued the pattern `behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*`, counted the victim\u0027s events, and tripped the rule on its **first** request. An embedded `:` also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (`behavior_handler.py:94-100`).\n2. **Unbounded key-space growth + blocking scans.** Each request creates a **new unique key** (`f\"{key}:{current_time}\"`) and then issues a blocking `KEYS` scan whose cost grows with total keys \u2014 on the shared Redis instance, degrading every guard-core instance using it. Rotating arbitrary XFF strings multiplies distinct keys without bound.\n3. **Error path.** A tripped `ban` action passes the non-IP string to `ip_ban_manager.ban_ip()`, whose `ipaddress` validation raises `ValueError` uncaught in the behavioral processor \u2014 the request 500s.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\nfrom guard_core.models import SecurityConfig\nfrom guard_core.utils import extract_client_ip\n\nclass CIHeaders(dict):\n def get(self, key, default=None):\n for k, v in self.items():\n if k.lower() == key.lower():\n return v\n return default\n\nclass FakeRequest:\n def __init__(self, xff):\n self.state = SimpleNamespace()\n self.client_host = \"10.0.0.1\" # the TRUSTED proxy\n self.headers = CIHeaders({\"X-Forwarded-For\": xff})\n\nasync def main():\n config = SecurityConfig(trusted_proxies=(\"10.0.0.1\",), enable_redis=False)\n ip = await extract_client_ip(FakeRequest(\"*\"), config)\n print(repr(ip)) # -\u003e \u0027*\u0027 (arbitrary string, no validation)\n\nasyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nThen `BehaviorTracker.track_endpoint_usage(\"app.login\", \"*\", rule)` issues `KEYS behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*` \u2014 matching other clients\u0027 keys (full fake-Redis script: `poc_xff_redis.py`, available on request).\n\n### Impact\n\nIntegrity and availability of the behavioral-analytics subsystem and the shared Redis instance, in deployments where the extracted XFF position is attacker-controllable. No data exposure; not reachable with default settings (`trusted_proxies` defaults empty).\n\n**Fix:** validate the extracted XFF entry with `ipaddress.ip_address()` before returning it from `extract_client_ip()` (fall back to the connecting IP on failure); escape glob metacharacters (`*?[]`) in anything interpolated into a `KEYS` pattern \u2014 or replace the KEYS+per-request-key design with an atomic counter / Lua sliding window (the rate-limit Lua script already shows the right shape).",
"id": "GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv",
"modified": "2026-11-19T22:50:33Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T22:50:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/security/advisories/GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/pull/68"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/commit/c07239fa1c5aa93e3f179440e79dad652977d3e4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/releases/tag/3.13.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rennf93/guard-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob pattern"
}
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