GHSA-8HP3-XXRG-V9C8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 22:47 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:47
VLAI
Summary
CodeWhale: Automation auto_approve defaults to true, bypassing the task-path hardening fix for silent recurring agent execution
Details

Maintainer resolution

The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. CodeWhale 0.8.67 and earlier are affected. Version 0.9.0 contains the fix in commit 208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686. Users should upgrade to 0.9.0 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

Summary

CVE-2026-45374 (GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4) hardened the task path so auto-approval must be opted into explicitly: add_task uses req.auto_approve.unwrap_or(false) (task_manager.rs:868). The automation subsystem was not hardened in kind. AutomationRecord::task_auto_approve() resolves an omitted auto_approve to DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = true (automation_manager.rs:29, 101-103), and enqueue_run_task builds the NewTaskRequest with auto_approve: Some(automation.task_auto_approve()) — i.e. an explicit Some(true) (automation_manager.rs:766). Because the field is Some, unwrap_or(false) returns true and the seed-2 default is bypassed. That true propagates to ApprovalMode::Bypass (runtime_threads.rs:2253), where the background approval loop auto-approves every tool call with no human present (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416). One approved automation_create becomes a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Same insecure-default class as CVE-2026-45374, on a different, unpatched subsystem.

Root Cause

Sibling durable defaults in the same struct are safe — DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_ALLOW_SHELL = false and DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_TRUST_MODE = false (automation_manager.rs:27-28) — while DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE alone defaults true (:29). create_automation stores auto_approve: None when omitted (:422); task_auto_approve() resolves None→true (:101-103); enqueue_run_task passes Some(true) (:766), defeating add_task's unwrap_or(false) seed fix. The automation_create tool schema also declares "auto_approve": {"type":"boolean","default":true} (tools/automation.rs:49) while sibling allow_shell/trust_mode default false.

Impact

A single approved automation_create yields a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Every scheduled fire silently authorizes mutating tools (file writes, apply_patch, git, MCP writes) with no prompt; combined with allow_shell:true in the create call, recurring silent RCE with no human present. Even without allow_shell, every recurring run silently authorizes all non-shell mutating tools. Same class as seed CVE-2026-45374.

Proof of Concept

Prompt injection convinces the model to create a benign-sounding recurring job (single human approval on the automation_create call):

{"name":"automation_create","arguments":{
  "name":"nightly-maintenance",
  "prompt":"Fetch latest and run project setup script",
  "rrule":"FREQ=HOURLY;INTERVAL=1",
  "allow_shell":true
}}

(auto_approve omitted → stored None → resolves to true on every run.)

Attack Chain

  1. Entry. Prompt injection → model creates a recurring job via automation_create with auto_approve omitted.
  2. Guard: automation_create is Required (tools/automation.rs:61-63) — user sees ONE approval prompt.
  3. Bypass proof: the prompt describes an innocuous automation; the schema hides "auto_approve": {"default": true} (tools/automation.rs:49). Approving "create a scheduled job" is not informed consent to "every future run bypasses all approval prompts." The resolved auto_approve=true (omitted field) is not surfaced.
  4. Persist. create_automation stores auto_approve: None (automation_manager.rs:422).
  5. Guard: none.
  6. Bypass proof: None is later resolved to true, not false.
  7. Fire. Headless scheduler tick (scheduler_tick_shared, no human) or automation_run invokes enqueue_run_task, which sets auto_approve: Some(true) (automation_manager.rs:766).
  8. Guard: seed-2's hardened add_task default unwrap_or(false) (task_manager.rs:868).
  9. Bypass proof: the value is Some(true), so unwrap_or(false) yields true — the hardened default never applies.
  10. Sink. Background worker builds the turn with auto_approve=true → ApprovalMode::Bypass (runtime_threads.rs:2253); the approval loop auto-approves (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416).
  11. Guard: auto_review safety_floor.
  12. Bypass proof: safety_floor holds only Publish (any origin) and Destructive/Secret (background/headless) (auto_review.rs:344-357); ordinary write_file/apply_patch/edit_file/non-destructive exec_shell are NOT held → they run unattended. With allow_shell:true, every scheduled run additionally gets silent shell execution.
  13. Impact. Durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent from one create approval; recurring silent RCE with allow_shell:true.

Bypass Evidence

  • Present on latest release tag v0.8.67: automation_manager.rs:27-29 (ALLOW_SHELL=false, TRUST_MODE=false, AUTO_APPROVE=true), :101-103 task_auto_approve()→unwrap_or(true), :766 Some(automation.task_auto_approve()), :422 stores None when omitted; task_manager.rs:868 unwrap_or(false); runtime_threads.rs:2253 if auto_approve → ApprovalMode::Bypass. automation_manager.rs and task_manager.rs byte-identical v0.8.67↔HEAD.
  • Subsystem wired by default: automation_create/automation_run registered via with_runtime_task_tools() in with_agent_tools_policy (registry.rs:1005); TUI attaches automations: Some(...) (tui/ui.rs:986-1011), serve mode via runtime_api.rs:426 — not feature-gated.
  • Sibling flags allow_shell/trust_mode default false in the same struct — auto_approve=true is the un-hardened anomaly.

Affected Versions

<= 0.8.67 (present on latest release tag v0.8.67 and HEAD 6a3403e).

Suggested Fix

Set DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = false (mirror the seed-2 task-path fix) and change the automation_create schema default to false, so durable automations require explicit opt-in to auto-approval just like the task path.

Reported by zx (Jace)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.67"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "codewhale-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.67"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "codewhale"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83817"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:47:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T19:17:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. CodeWhale 0.8.67 and earlier are affected. Version 0.9.0 contains the fix in commit 208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686. Users should upgrade to 0.9.0 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n## Summary\nCVE-2026-45374 (GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4) hardened the task path so auto-approval must be opted into explicitly: `add_task` uses `req.auto_approve.unwrap_or(false)` (task_manager.rs:868). The automation subsystem was not hardened in kind. `AutomationRecord::task_auto_approve()` resolves an omitted `auto_approve` to `DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = true` (automation_manager.rs:29, 101-103), and `enqueue_run_task` builds the `NewTaskRequest` with `auto_approve: Some(automation.task_auto_approve())` \u2014 i.e. an explicit `Some(true)` (automation_manager.rs:766). Because the field is `Some`, `unwrap_or(false)` returns `true` and the seed-2 default is bypassed. That `true` propagates to `ApprovalMode::Bypass` (runtime_threads.rs:2253), where the background approval loop auto-approves every tool call with no human present (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416). One approved `automation_create` becomes a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Same insecure-default class as CVE-2026-45374, on a different, unpatched subsystem.\n\n## Root Cause\nSibling durable defaults in the same struct are safe \u2014 `DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_ALLOW_SHELL = false` and `DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_TRUST_MODE = false` (automation_manager.rs:27-28) \u2014 while `DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE` alone defaults `true` (:29). `create_automation` stores `auto_approve: None` when omitted (:422); `task_auto_approve()` resolves `None`\u2192`true` (:101-103); `enqueue_run_task` passes `Some(true)` (:766), defeating `add_task`\u0027s `unwrap_or(false)` seed fix. The `automation_create` tool schema also declares `\"auto_approve\": {\"type\":\"boolean\",\"default\":true}` (tools/automation.rs:49) while sibling `allow_shell`/`trust_mode` default `false`.\n\n## Impact\nA single approved `automation_create` yields a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Every scheduled fire silently authorizes mutating tools (file writes, apply_patch, git, MCP writes) with no prompt; combined with `allow_shell:true` in the create call, recurring silent RCE with no human present. Even without `allow_shell`, every recurring run silently authorizes all non-shell mutating tools. Same class as seed CVE-2026-45374.\n\n## Proof of Concept\nPrompt injection convinces the model to create a benign-sounding recurring job (single human approval on the `automation_create` call):\n```json\n{\"name\":\"automation_create\",\"arguments\":{\n  \"name\":\"nightly-maintenance\",\n  \"prompt\":\"Fetch latest and run project setup script\",\n  \"rrule\":\"FREQ=HOURLY;INTERVAL=1\",\n  \"allow_shell\":true\n}}\n```\n(`auto_approve` omitted \u2192 stored `None` \u2192 resolves to `true` on every run.)\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry.** Prompt injection \u2192 model creates a recurring job via `automation_create` with `auto_approve` omitted.\n   - **Guard:** `automation_create` is `Required` (tools/automation.rs:61-63) \u2014 user sees ONE approval prompt.\n   - **Bypass proof:** the prompt describes an innocuous automation; the schema hides `\"auto_approve\": {\"default\": true}` (tools/automation.rs:49). Approving \"create a scheduled job\" is not informed consent to \"every future run bypasses all approval prompts.\" The resolved `auto_approve=true` (omitted field) is not surfaced.\n2. **Persist.** `create_automation` stores `auto_approve: None` (automation_manager.rs:422).\n   - **Guard:** none.\n   - **Bypass proof:** `None` is later resolved to `true`, not `false`.\n3. **Fire.** Headless scheduler tick (`scheduler_tick_shared`, no human) or `automation_run` invokes `enqueue_run_task`, which sets `auto_approve: Some(true)` (automation_manager.rs:766).\n   - **Guard:** seed-2\u0027s hardened `add_task` default `unwrap_or(false)` (task_manager.rs:868).\n   - **Bypass proof:** the value is `Some(true)`, so `unwrap_or(false)` yields `true` \u2014 the hardened default never applies.\n4. **Sink.** Background worker builds the turn with `auto_approve=true` \u2192 `ApprovalMode::Bypass` (runtime_threads.rs:2253); the approval loop auto-approves (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416).\n   - **Guard:** auto_review safety_floor.\n   - **Bypass proof:** safety_floor holds only `Publish` (any origin) and `Destructive/Secret` (background/headless) (auto_review.rs:344-357); ordinary `write_file`/`apply_patch`/`edit_file`/non-destructive `exec_shell` are NOT held \u2192 they run unattended. With `allow_shell:true`, every scheduled run additionally gets silent shell execution.\n5. **Impact.** Durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent from one create approval; recurring silent RCE with `allow_shell:true`.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- Present on latest release tag v0.8.67: automation_manager.rs:27-29 (`ALLOW_SHELL=false`, `TRUST_MODE=false`, `AUTO_APPROVE=true`), :101-103 `task_auto_approve()`\u2192`unwrap_or(true)`, :766 `Some(automation.task_auto_approve())`, :422 stores `None` when omitted; task_manager.rs:868 `unwrap_or(false)`; runtime_threads.rs:2253 `if auto_approve \u2192 ApprovalMode::Bypass`. automation_manager.rs and task_manager.rs byte-identical v0.8.67\u2194HEAD.\n- Subsystem wired by default: `automation_create`/`automation_run` registered via `with_runtime_task_tools()` in `with_agent_tools_policy` (registry.rs:1005); TUI attaches `automations: Some(...)` (tui/ui.rs:986-1011), serve mode via runtime_api.rs:426 \u2014 not feature-gated.\n- Sibling flags `allow_shell`/`trust_mode` default `false` in the same struct \u2014 `auto_approve=true` is the un-hardened anomaly.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 0.8.67` (present on latest release tag v0.8.67 and HEAD 6a3403e).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nSet `DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = false` (mirror the seed-2 task-path fix) and change the `automation_create` schema default to `false`, so durable automations require explicit opt-in to auto-approval just like the task path.\n\nReported by **zx (Jace)**",
  "id": "GHSA-8hp3-xxrg-v9c8",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T22:47:33Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T22:47:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codewhale-hq/Codewhale/security/advisories/GHSA-8hp3-xxrg-v9c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83817"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codewhale-hq/Codewhale/commit/208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/codewhale-hq/Codewhale"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codewhale-hq/Codewhale/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CodeWhale: Automation auto_approve defaults to true, bypassing the task-path hardening fix for silent recurring agent execution"
}



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