GHSA-4M76-XFJ5-7975
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 23:24 – Updated: 2026-11-12 23:24Summary
mount() and app.mount() remove the mount prefix from the request path and forward the rest to the mounted application. Two mistakes in that step let a crafted request reach a route of the mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware, such as an authentication check on /app/admin/*. The outer application routes on the original path, so the middleware does not run.
Details
- Dynamic prefix (all affected versions): for a mount such as
/api/:tenant/*, the prefix was removed by the length of the route pattern, not of the matched prefix. A request with a longer or shorter first segment is cut in the middle, so/api/a/xxxxx/admin/secretreaches the mounted application as/admin/secret. - Re-normalization (since 4.12.21): the forwarded path was built from the decoded request path and assigned to
url.pathname, which turns a decoded backslash into/and collapses.../app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secretreaches the mounted application as/admin/secret.
The fix removes the prefix segment by segment from the raw pathname, using the matched parameter values for its length. Route patterns that cannot be handled safely now throw: duplicate parameter names and a wildcard inside the last segment such as /assets*. A trailing slash in an app.mount() prefix no longer removes an extra segment.
Impact
An unauthenticated client can reach a route of a mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware.
This affects applications that use mount() or app.mount() and rely on middleware registered on a sub-path inside the mount prefix for authentication or authorization.
Workarounds
Register the authentication middleware inside the mounted application.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hono"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.13.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126357"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T23:24:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`mount()` and `app.mount()` remove the mount prefix from the request path and forward the rest to the mounted application. Two mistakes in that step let a crafted request reach a route of the mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware, such as an authentication check on `/app/admin/*`. The outer application routes on the original path, so the middleware does not run.\n\n### Details\n\n1. **Dynamic prefix** (all affected versions): for a mount such as `/api/:tenant/*`, the prefix was removed by the length of the route pattern, not of the matched prefix. A request with a longer or shorter first segment is cut in the middle, so `/api/a/xxxxx/admin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`.\n2. **Re-normalization** (since 4.12.21): the forwarded path was built from the decoded request path and assigned to `url.pathname`, which turns a decoded backslash into `/` and collapses `..`. `/app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`.\n\nThe fix removes the prefix segment by segment from the raw pathname, using the matched parameter values for its length. Route patterns that cannot be handled safely now throw: duplicate parameter names and a wildcard inside the last segment such as `/assets*`. A trailing slash in an `app.mount()` prefix no longer removes an extra segment.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated client can reach a route of a mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware.\n\nThis affects applications that use `mount()` or `app.mount()` and rely on middleware registered on a sub-path inside the mount prefix for authentication or authorization.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRegister the authentication middleware inside the mounted application.",
"id": "GHSA-4m76-xfj5-7975",
"modified": "2026-11-12T23:24:11Z",
"published": "2026-11-12T23:24:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-4m76-xfj5-7975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/34f90432a1794b28e52802670efcd01963f716d6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.13.16"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Hono: `mount()` and `app.mount()` can forward a path that bypasses middleware scoped inside the mount prefix"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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