GHSA-474X-HRWR-FGX4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:09 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:09
VLAI
Summary
fast-xml-parser: Quadratic CPU consumption scanning unterminated stop-node tags
Details

Summary

With the non-default stopNodes option, a stop node's body with many "" anywhere after makes readStopNodeData() rescan the entire remaining input from every "<". The failed lookahead is neither cached nor bounded, so n fragments cost O(n²) before the parser throws. Availability-only (CPU exhaustion), needs the non-default stopNodes option — not benchmarked yet, see Proof of Concept.

Details

CWE-407 — Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

Code - OrderedObjParser.js:520 — parseXml() calls readStopNodeData() after a matching stop node opens - OrderedObjParser.js:810 — calls readTagExp() for every non-special < - OrderedObjParser.js:688-722 — tagExpWithClosingIndex() scans to end-of-input and returns undefined when no > exists - OrderedObjParser.js:812-818 — on failure, i isn't advanced, so the next < repeats the same full scan - OrderedObjParser.js:423 — the main parse loop throws immediately on the same failure; only the stop-node path retries

Root cause: a failed closing-> lookahead is neither cached nor bounded — n copies of <a with no later > means n scans over the remaining input, O(n²) work, before it finally throws.

Fix 1. Throw immediately in readStopNodeData() when readTagExp() returns undefined 2. Or break the loop on the first failed scan 3. Or find the next > once and reuse/bound that result 4. Add a test asserting near-linear scaling when payload size doubles

Proof of concept

Not benchmarked — static-analysis finding, confidence 0.5.

To confirm: configure stopNodes matching a root element. Build input as '<stop>' + '<a '.repeat(n). Time parse() until it throws Unexpected end of <tag>. Start around n=10,000 and double it — quadratic should show ~4x time per doubling, linear ~2x. Control: same input with a > present, or stopNodes unset.

Impact

CPU-exhaustion DoS in Node.js services parsing untrusted XML with stopNodes enabled. A ~100KB payload is estimated at ~10⁹ character operations (roughly a second or more of blocked event loop) — analytical estimate, not a benchmark. No confidentiality/integrity impact. CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L (3.7, Low).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.12.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126066"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:09:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWith the non-default stopNodes option, a stop node\u0027s body with many \"\u003ca \" fragments and no closing \"\u003e\" anywhere after makes readStopNodeData() rescan the entire remaining input from every \"\u003c\". The failed lookahead is neither cached nor bounded, so n fragments cost O(n\u00b2) before the parser throws. Availability-only (CPU exhaustion), needs the non-default stopNodes option \u2014 not benchmarked yet, see Proof of Concept.\n\n### Details\n\n**CWE-407** \u2014 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity\n\n**Code**\n- `OrderedObjParser.js:520` \u2014 `parseXml()` calls `readStopNodeData()` after a matching stop node opens\n- `OrderedObjParser.js:810` \u2014 calls `readTagExp()` for every non-special `\u003c`\n- `OrderedObjParser.js:688-722` \u2014 `tagExpWithClosingIndex()` scans to end-of-input and returns `undefined` when no `\u003e` exists\n- `OrderedObjParser.js:812-818` \u2014 on failure, `i` isn\u0027t advanced, so the next `\u003c` repeats the same full scan\n- `OrderedObjParser.js:423` \u2014 the main parse loop throws immediately on the same failure; only the stop-node path retries\n\n**Root cause:** a failed closing-`\u003e` lookahead is neither cached nor bounded \u2014 `n` copies of `\u003ca ` with no later `\u003e` means `n` scans over the remaining input, O(n\u00b2) work, before it finally throws.\n\n**Fix**\n1. Throw immediately in `readStopNodeData()` when `readTagExp()` returns `undefined`\n2. Or break the loop on the first failed scan\n3. Or find the next `\u003e` once and reuse/bound that result\n4. Add a test asserting near-linear scaling when payload size doubles\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nNot benchmarked \u2014 static-analysis finding, confidence 0.5.\n\nTo confirm: configure `stopNodes` matching a root element. Build input as `\u0027\u003cstop\u003e\u0027 + \u0027\u003ca \u0027.repeat(n)`. Time `parse()` until it throws `Unexpected end of \u003ctag\u003e`. Start around n=10,000 and double it \u2014 quadratic should show ~4x time per doubling, linear ~2x. Control: same input with a `\u003e` present, or `stopNodes` unset.\n\n### Impact\n\nCPU-exhaustion DoS in Node.js services parsing untrusted XML with `stopNodes` enabled. A ~100KB payload is estimated at ~10\u2079 character operations (roughly a second or more of blocked event loop) \u2014 analytical estimate, not a benchmark. No confidentiality/integrity impact. CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L` (3.7, Low).",
  "id": "GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T21:09:44Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T21:09:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/0c3659348364959da62954b73728fb3bd05ebcb4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v5.12.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser: Quadratic CPU consumption scanning unterminated stop-node tags"
}



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