CVE-2026-65625 (GCVE-0-2026-65625)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 19:52 – Updated: 2026-11-02 19:43
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Attacker-controlled AES-GCM authentication tag length allows tag forgery in jose
Summary
The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.
This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-02 18:37 UTC
CWE
- CWE-354 - Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/securi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65625.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65625 | related |
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit… | related |
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| potatosalad | jose |
Affected:
1.2.0 , < 1.11.13
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| potatosalad | jose |
Affected:
8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a , < 3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"status": "final",
"title": "jose: jose: Integrity bypass via truncated AES-GCM authentication tag",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-65625.json",
"version": "3"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-65625",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-02T18:37:20.109836Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T19:35:07.832Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"jose_jwa_aes"
],
"packageName": "jose",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/jose",
"product": "jose",
"programFiles": [
"src/jwa/jose_jwa_aes.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "jose_jwa_aes:block_decrypt/4"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_aes:gcm_block_decrypt/6"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"vendor": "potatosalad",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.11.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.2.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"jose_jwa_aes"
],
"packageName": "potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"product": "jose",
"programFiles": [
"src/jwa/jose_jwa_aes.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "jose_jwa_aes:block_decrypt/4"
},
{
"name": "jose_jwa_aes:gcm_block_decrypt/6"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"vendor": "potatosalad",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability is only exploitable when AES-GCM is handled by the pure-Erlang \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_aes\u003c/code\u003e fallback. That fallback is used on deployments where the Erlang/OTP \u003ccode\u003ecrypto\u003c/code\u003e NIF does not expose native AES-GCM (for example FIPS builds, or stripped or older OTP releases). Deployments with a native AES-GCM crypto provider dispatch GCM through \u003ccode\u003ecrypto\u003c/code\u003e and are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "This vulnerability is only exploitable when AES-GCM is handled by the pure-Erlang `jose_jwa_aes` fallback. That fallback is used on deployments where the Erlang/OTP `crypto` NIF does not expose native AES-GCM (for example FIPS builds, or stripped or older OTP releases). Deployments with a native AES-GCM crypto provider dispatch GCM through `crypto` and are not affected."
}
],
"value": "This vulnerability is only exploitable when AES-GCM is handled by the pure-Erlang jose_jwa_aes fallback. That fallback is used on deployments where the Erlang/OTP crypto NIF does not expose native AES-GCM (for example FIPS builds, or stripped or older OTP releases). Deployments with a native AES-GCM crypto provider dispatch GCM through crypto and are not affected."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.11.13",
"versionStartIncluding": "1.2.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Andrew Bennett"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_aes\u003c/code\u003e derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the \u003ccode\u003e{aes_gcm, Bits}\u003c/code\u003e clause of \u003ccode\u003eblock_decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e, the incoming tag is guarded only by \u003ccode\u003eis_binary/1\u003c/code\u003e, with no check on its length. Verification in \u003ccode\u003egcm_block_decrypt/6\u003c/code\u003e then computes \u003ccode\u003eTBits = bit_size(T)\u003c/code\u003e and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in `jose_jwa_aes` derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the `{aes_gcm, Bits}` clause of `block_decrypt/4`, the incoming tag is guarded only by `is_binary/1`, with no check on its length. Verification in `gcm_block_decrypt/6` then computes `TBits = bit_size(T)` and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13."
}
],
"value": "The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-475",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-475 Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-354",
"description": "CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T19:52:54.987Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-6gxw-6f7r-cjr6"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-65625",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65625.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-65625",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65625"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 8848b17 in potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 3fa1f8e in potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Attacker-controlled AES-GCM authentication tag length allows tag forgery in jose",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eEnsure the runtime provides a crypto provider with native AES-GCM support (a standard Erlang/OTP build linked against OpenSSL) so that JOSE dispatches AES-GCM to the native \u003ccode\u003ecrypto\u003c/code\u003e NIF instead of the \u003ccode\u003ejose_jwa_aes\u003c/code\u003e fallback.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Ensure the runtime provides a crypto provider with native AES-GCM support (a standard Erlang/OTP build linked against OpenSSL) so that JOSE dispatches AES-GCM to the native `crypto` NIF instead of the `jose_jwa_aes` fallback."
}
],
"value": "Ensure the runtime provides a crypto provider with native AES-GCM support (a standard Erlang/OTP build linked against OpenSSL) so that JOSE dispatches AES-GCM to the native crypto NIF instead of the jose_jwa_aes fallback."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-65625",
"datePublished": "2026-10-26T19:52:54.987Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-22T13:55:59.401Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T19:43:05.255Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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