CVE-2026-16671 (GCVE-0-2026-16671)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 00:23 – Updated: 2026-11-13 00:23
VLAI
Title
Out-of-bounds stack write in MCUboot split-image validation with SHA-384/SHA-512 builds
Summary
split_image_check() in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c declares a fixed uint8_t loader_hash[32] buffer and passes it as the out_hash out-parameter to bootutil_img_validate(). That routine copies IMAGE_HASH_SIZE bytes into out_hash (memcpy(out_hash, hash, IMAGE_HASH_SIZE) in boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c), where IMAGE_HASH_SIZE is a compile-time constant of 64 for MCUBOOT_SHA512 or 48 for MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384/SHA-384 (boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/sha.h). The buffer tracks SHA-256 (32 bytes) while the copy length tracks the configured algorithm, so the write overruns the buffer by 16 or 32 bytes. The overflow is only present in a non-default configuration: the legacy Mynewt split-image feature must be compiled (split_go()/split_image_check(), i.e. neither MCUBOOT_DIRECT_XIP nor MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD), the digest must be larger than 32 bytes (MCUBOOT_SHA512 or MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384), and MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE must be off. split_go() is a public API with no caller inside MCUboot; it is invoked from a Mynewt application. In the default SHA-256 build there is no overflow. The over-written bytes are the one-way digest of the loader image and the overflow length is fixed at build time, so the contents are not meaningfully attacker-controlled and the size is not attacker-chosen. The realistic impact is bounded, uncontrolled corruption of the bootloader's stack on the split-boot path, manifesting as instability or failed boot in the affected configuration rather than reliable code execution. The fix is to size loader_hash to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE and pass IMAGE_HASH_SIZE as the matching seed length.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
mcu-tools mcuboot Affected: 2.0.0 , < 2.5.0 (semver)
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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          "programRoutines": [
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              "name": "split_go"
            },
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              "version": "2.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
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        }
      ],
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "split_image_check() in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c declares a fixed uint8_t loader_hash[32] buffer and passes it as the out_hash out-parameter to bootutil_img_validate(). That routine copies IMAGE_HASH_SIZE bytes into out_hash (memcpy(out_hash, hash, IMAGE_HASH_SIZE) in boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c), where IMAGE_HASH_SIZE is a compile-time constant of 64 for MCUBOOT_SHA512 or 48 for MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384/SHA-384 (boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/sha.h). The buffer tracks SHA-256 (32 bytes) while the copy length tracks the configured algorithm, so the write overruns the buffer by 16 or 32 bytes.\n\nThe overflow is only present in a non-default configuration: the legacy Mynewt split-image feature must be compiled (split_go()/split_image_check(), i.e. neither MCUBOOT_DIRECT_XIP nor MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD), the digest must be larger than 32 bytes (MCUBOOT_SHA512 or MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384), and MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE must be off. split_go() is a public API with no caller inside MCUboot; it is invoked from a Mynewt application. In the default SHA-256 build there is no overflow.\n\nThe over-written bytes are the one-way digest of the loader image and the overflow length is fixed at build time, so the contents are not meaningfully attacker-controlled and the size is not attacker-chosen. The realistic impact is bounded, uncontrolled corruption of the bootloader\u0027s stack on the split-boot path, manifesting as instability or failed boot in the affected configuration rather than reliable code execution. The fix is to size loader_hash to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE and pass IMAGE_HASH_SIZE as the matching seed length."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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            "baseSeverity": "LOW",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
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              "description": "memory-safety",
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            }
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T00:23:02.120Z",
        "orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
        "shortName": "zephyr"
      },
      "references": [
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          "name": "Fix commit",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
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          "url": "https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/9fb70f00173766d73cdadd82266bd61e4ddd0252"
        },
        {
          "name": "GHSA-vj6q-r752-fpqv",
          "url": "https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/security/advisories/GHSA-vj6q-r752-fpqv"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Out-of-bounds stack write in MCUboot split-image validation with SHA-384/SHA-512 builds",
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    "assignerShortName": "zephyr",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-16671",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-13T00:23:02.120Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-22T19:48:03.071Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T00:23:02.120Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
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      "date": "2026-11-16",
      "epss": "0.00111",
      "percentile": "0.01346"
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    "nvd": {
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                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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                "programFiles": [
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                "programRoutines": [
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                    "name": "split_go"
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            ],
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        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "split_image_check() in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c declares a fixed uint8_t loader_hash[32] buffer and passes it as the out_hash out-parameter to bootutil_img_validate(). That routine copies IMAGE_HASH_SIZE bytes into out_hash (memcpy(out_hash, hash, IMAGE_HASH_SIZE) in boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c), where IMAGE_HASH_SIZE is a compile-time constant of 64 for MCUBOOT_SHA512 or 48 for MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384/SHA-384 (boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/sha.h). The buffer tracks SHA-256 (32 bytes) while the copy length tracks the configured algorithm, so the write overruns the buffer by 16 or 32 bytes.\n\nThe overflow is only present in a non-default configuration: the legacy Mynewt split-image feature must be compiled (split_go()/split_image_check(), i.e. neither MCUBOOT_DIRECT_XIP nor MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD), the digest must be larger than 32 bytes (MCUBOOT_SHA512 or MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384), and MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE must be off. split_go() is a public API with no caller inside MCUboot; it is invoked from a Mynewt application. In the default SHA-256 build there is no overflow.\n\nThe over-written bytes are the one-way digest of the loader image and the overflow length is fixed at build time, so the contents are not meaningfully attacker-controlled and the size is not attacker-chosen. The realistic impact is bounded, uncontrolled corruption of the bootloader\u0027s stack on the split-boot path, manifesting as instability or failed boot in the affected configuration rather than reliable code execution. The fix is to size loader_hash to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE and pass IMAGE_HASH_SIZE as the matching seed length."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-16671",
        "lastModified": "2026-11-13T15:48:52.237",
        "metrics": {
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              "cvssData": {
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                "attackVector": "LOCAL",
                "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
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                "baseSeverity": "LOW",
                "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "integrityImpact": "NONE",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
                "version": "3.1"
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              "impactScore": 1.4,
              "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
              "type": "Secondary"
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        "published": "2026-11-13T02:18:57.647",
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          }
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        "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
        "weaknesses": [
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            "type": "Secondary"
          }
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      }
    }
  }
}



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