CVE-2026-130089 (GCVE-0-2026-130089)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:20 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:19
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
temporal-proxy request namespace can redirect a templated upstream and leak its API key
Summary
A caller who can send requests to the temporal-proxy gRPC listener can obtain the static API key of an upstream whose address is templated from the request namespace, and then use that key directly against the upstream Temporal service. temporal-proxy does not validate the request namespace before rendering it into a templated upstream address, so when an upstream's hostPort is templated from the namespace, as in the published Temporal Cloud configuration example, a crafted namespace changes the host the proxy dials. If that upstream verifies TLS against the system trust store and sets no literal server name, a caller-controlled host with a publicly trusted certificate passes verification and receives the key. The built-in static-token and JWKS authenticators do not restrict namespaces, so any caller they admit can do this; an external authenticator that admits only listed namespaces prevents it. temporal-proxy versions 0.1.0 through 1.2.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in 1.0.2, 1.1.2, and 1.2.1, and releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed minor release line, and rotate any upstream API key that untrusted callers could reach.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-18 21:19 UTC
CWE
- CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Temporal Technologies, Inc. | temporal-proxy |
Affected:
0.1.0 , ≤ 0.10.1
(semver)
Affected: 1.0.0 , < 1.0.2 (semver) Affected: 1.1.0 , < 1.1.2 (semver) Affected: 1.2.0 , < 1.2.1 (semver) |
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{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAttack Requirements is Present because the deployment must use the upstream configuration above. Privileges Required is Low because the score assumes inbound authentication is configured; under the default, which admits every caller, no credential is needed. The subsequent-system metrics are High because the key works against the upstream Temporal service independently of the proxy.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Attack Requirements is Present because the deployment must use the upstream configuration above. Privileges Required is Low because the score assumes inbound authentication is configured; under the default, which admits every caller, no credential is needed. The subsequent-system metrics are High because the key works against the upstream Temporal service independently of the proxy."
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eA caller who can send requests to the temporal-proxy gRPC listener can obtain the static API key of an upstream whose address is templated from the request namespace, and then use that key directly against the upstream Temporal service. temporal-proxy does not validate the request namespace before rendering it into a templated upstream address, so when an upstream\u0027s hostPort is templated from the namespace, as in the published Temporal Cloud configuration example, a crafted namespace changes the host the proxy dials. If that upstream verifies TLS against the system trust store and sets no literal server name, a caller-controlled host with a publicly trusted certificate passes verification and receives the key. The built-in static-token and JWKS authenticators do not restrict namespaces, so any caller they admit can do this; an external authenticator that admits only listed namespaces prevents it. temporal-proxy versions 0.1.0 through 1.2.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in 1.0.2, 1.1.2, and 1.2.1, and releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed minor release line, and rotate any upstream API key that untrusted callers could reach.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "A caller who can send requests to the temporal-proxy gRPC listener can obtain the static API key of an upstream whose address is templated from the request namespace, and then use that key directly against the upstream Temporal service. temporal-proxy does not validate the request namespace before rendering it into a templated upstream address, so when an upstream\u0027s hostPort is templated from the namespace, as in the published Temporal Cloud configuration example, a crafted namespace changes the host the proxy dials. If that upstream verifies TLS against the system trust store and sets no literal server name, a caller-controlled host with a publicly trusted certificate passes verification and receives the key. The built-in static-token and JWKS authenticators do not restrict namespaces, so any caller they admit can do this; an external authenticator that admits only listed namespaces prevents it. temporal-proxy versions 0.1.0 through 1.2.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in 1.0.2, 1.1.2, and 1.2.1, and releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix. Upgrade to the fixed release for the deployed minor release line, and rotate any upstream API key that untrusted callers could reach."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Disclosure of the proxy\u0027s static upstream API key to a host the caller chooses. With the key, the caller can read and modify every namespace it authorizes on the upstream Temporal service, without going through the proxy, including starting, signaling, and terminating Workflows and deleting Schedules. The proxy\u0027s own data and availability are not affected."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 7.3,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-918",
"description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:20:49.623Z",
"orgId": "61241ed8-fa44-4f23-92db-b8c443751968",
"shortName": "Temporal"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Upstream address validation in temporal-proxy 1.2.0, which rejects only empty hosts and labels",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/blob/v1.2.0/internal/proxy/resolver.go#L259-L282"
},
{
"name": "Fix pull request",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/284"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/b902dcfcc1d32288c9d1d14fc2c71d2e8052a4b8"
},
{
"name": "Backport pull request for the 1.0 release line",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/294"
},
{
"name": "Backport commit on releases/v1.0.x",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/cd60785edd81cfa0c599b17f94ee7de7d8eaf061"
},
{
"name": "Backport pull request for the 1.1 release line",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/293"
},
{
"name": "Backport commit on releases/v1.1.x",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/dfb4b83f0ed20db5a9f772dd249470f7f7f15c90"
},
{
"name": "Backport pull request for the 1.2 release line",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/pull/292"
},
{
"name": "Backport commit on releases/v1.2.x",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/commit/c73636037045e31162420a13f6f0aee48ce3313a"
},
{
"name": "temporal-proxy 1.0.2",
"tags": [
"release-notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/releases/tag/v1.0.2"
},
{
"name": "temporal-proxy 1.1.2",
"tags": [
"release-notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/releases/tag/v1.1.2"
},
{
"name": "temporal-proxy 1.2.1",
"tags": [
"release-notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-proxy/releases/tag/v1.2.1"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade to temporal-proxy 1.0.2, 1.1.2, or 1.2.1, as appropriate for the deployed minor release line. Fixed releases reject a request whose templated upstream address does not render to a plain host name or IP address with an optional port, or whose templated TLS server name is not a plain host name. They also refuse at configuration load a templated hostPort or tls.serverName whose host does not end in a literal domain, as in {{ .RemoteNamespace }}.tmprl.cloud:7233, so a configuration that templates the whole host must be changed before upgrading. Rotate any upstream API key held by an affected deployment that untrusted callers could reach. Releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Upgrade to temporal-proxy 1.0.2, 1.1.2, or 1.2.1, as appropriate for the deployed minor release line. Fixed releases reject a request whose templated upstream address does not render to a plain host name or IP address with an optional port, or whose templated TLS server name is not a plain host name. They also refuse at configuration load a templated hostPort or tls.serverName whose host does not end in a literal domain, as in {{ .RemoteNamespace }}.tmprl.cloud:7233, so a configuration that templates the whole host must be changed before upgrading. Rotate any upstream API key held by an affected deployment that untrusted callers could reach. Releases before 1.0.0 receive no fix."
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "temporal-proxy request namespace can redirect a templated upstream and leak its API key",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eUse fixed upstream addresses, or routing rules that match literal namespace names, with no default or system route to a templated upstream. Alternatively, set a literal tls.serverName on the templated upstream, or use an external authenticator that admits only listed namespaces.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Use fixed upstream addresses, or routing rules that match literal namespace names, with no default or system route to a templated upstream. Alternatively, set a literal tls.serverName on the templated upstream, or use an external authenticator that admits only listed namespaces."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "61241ed8-fa44-4f23-92db-b8c443751968",
"assignerShortName": "Temporal",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-130089",
"datePublished": "2026-11-18T20:20:49.623Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-16T20:59:57.535Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T21:19:56.314Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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