CVE-2026-120287 (GCVE-0-2026-120287)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-17 16:53 – Updated: 2026-11-17 17:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multipart `:length` limit not charged for part and header framing in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART in elixir-plug plug allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust memory via a multipart request body built from parts without headers, or from header lines without a name and a value. The parser charges the :length limit only with the name and value bytes of each part header and the bytes of each part body. The part delimiter, the header separator, and the line endings cost nothing.
In lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 keeps an entry for every part without a content-disposition header, together with its header list, until the whole body is read. A request made of such parts does not reach the limit at any size, and the parser process holds a multiple of the request size in memory until parsing completes. Any endpoint that uses Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is reachable.
This issue affects plug: from 1.13.0 before 1.20.4.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-17 17:57 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.13.0 , < 1.20.4
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
e06acbd3d381931f23cbde7d763136c9ccb091ac , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eLimit the request body size in a reverse proxy in front of the application, for example with \u003ccode\u003eclient_max_body_size\u003c/code\u003e in nginx. The proxy rejects a larger body before it reaches the parser. This limits the memory that one request can hold but does not remove the multiplication: a body below the proxy limit still passes the \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e limit.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBuild a multipart body with the boundary \u003ccode\u003eb\u003c/code\u003e that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening \u003ccode\u003e--b\\r\\n\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e, then \u003ccode\u003e\\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e repeated 500,000 times, then \u003ccode\u003e\\r\\n--b--\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e. The body is 4.5 MB.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCreate a connection with \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body)\u003c/code\u003e and the request header \u003ccode\u003econtent-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCall \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5\u003c/code\u003e with the options from \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eObserve that the call returns \u003ccode\u003e{:ok, %{}, conn}\u003c/code\u003e and not \u003ccode\u003e{:error, :too_large, conn}\u003c/code\u003e, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRepeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of \u003ccode\u003e:\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
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"value": "1. Build a multipart body with the boundary `b` that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening `--b\\r\\n\\r\\n`, then `\\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n` repeated 500,000 times, then `\\r\\n--b--\\r\\n`. The body is 4.5 MB.\n2. Create a connection with `Plug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body)` and the request header `content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b`.\n3. Call `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5` with the options from `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000)`.\n4. Observe that the call returns `{:ok, %{}, conn}` and not `{:error, :too_large, conn}`, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\n5. Repeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of `:\\r\\n`. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size."
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"value": "* Build a multipart body with the boundary b that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening --b\\r\\n\\r\\n, then \\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n repeated 500,000 times, then \\r\\n--b--\\r\\n. The body is 4.5 MB.\n* Create a connection with Plug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body) and the request header content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b.\n* Call Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5 with the options from Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000).\n* Observe that the call returns {:ok, %{}, conn} and not {:error, :too_large, conn}, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\n* Repeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of :\\r\\n. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size."
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. What the limit counts.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5\u003c/code\u003e subtracts the result of \u003ccode\u003eheaders_size/1\u003c/code\u003e from the remaining \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e limit. \u003ccode\u003eheaders_size/1\u003c/code\u003e sums \u003ccode\u003ebyte_size(key) + byte_size(value)\u003c/code\u003e for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Inputs that cost zero.\u003c/strong\u003e A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only \u003ccode\u003e:\u003c/code\u003e followed by CRLF also costs 0, because \u003ccode\u003e:plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3\u003c/code\u003e accepts the empty name and returns the header \u003ccode\u003e{\"\", \"\"}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Retention.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003emultipart_type/1\u003c/code\u003e returns \u003ccode\u003e{:binary, nil}\u003c/code\u003e for a part without a \u003ccode\u003econtent-disposition\u003c/code\u003e header. The parser then prepends \u003ccode\u003e{nil, headers, body}\u003c/code\u003e to its accumulator for that part. \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3\u003c/code\u003e drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4. Limits that stay in effect.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Conn.read_part_headers/2\u003c/code\u003e limits one header block to the smaller of \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e:read_length\u003c/code\u003e. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn plug 1.20.3 with \u003ccode\u003elength: 100_000\u003c/code\u003e, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 \u003ccode\u003e:\u003c/code\u003e header lines each peaked at 283 MiB.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "**1. What the limit counts.** `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5` subtracts the result of `headers_size/1` from the remaining `:length` limit. `headers_size/1` sums `byte_size(key) + byte_size(value)` for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\n\n**2. Inputs that cost zero.** A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only `:` followed by CRLF also costs 0, because `:plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3` accepts the empty name and returns the header `{\"\", \"\"}`.\n\n**3. Retention.** `multipart_type/1` returns `{:binary, nil}` for a part without a `content-disposition` header. The parser then prepends `{nil, headers, body}` to its accumulator for that part. `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3` drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\n\n**4. Limits that stay in effect.** `Plug.Conn.read_part_headers/2` limits one header block to the smaller of `:length` and `:read_length`. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\n\nOn plug 1.20.3 with `length: 100_000`, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 `:` header lines each peaked at 283 MiB."
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"value": "1. What the limit counts. Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 subtracts the result of headers_size/1 from the remaining :length limit. headers_size/1 sums byte_size(key) + byte_size(value) for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\n\n2. Inputs that cost zero. A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only : followed by CRLF also costs 0, because :plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3 accepts the empty name and returns the header {\"\", \"\"}.\n\n3. Retention. multipart_type/1 returns {:binary, nil} for a part without a content-disposition header. The parser then prepends {nil, headers, body} to its accumulator for that part. Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3 drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\n\n4. Limits that stay in effect. Plug.Conn.read_part_headers/2 limits one header block to the smaller of :length and :read_length. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\n\nOn plug 1.20.3 with length: 100_000, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 : header lines each peaked at 283 MiB."
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"datePublished": "2026-11-17T16:53:38.533Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-17T03:12:34.331Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T17:58:14.260Z",
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},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART\u0027:multipart_type/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug",
"vendor": "elixir-plug",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.20.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.13.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART\u0027"
],
"packageName": "elixir-plug/plug",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/elixir-plug/plug",
"product": "plug",
"programFiles": [
"lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART\u0027:parse/5"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART\u0027:parse_multipart_headers/5"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART\u0027:multipart_type/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug",
"vendor": "elixir-plug",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "497913f2a6d744d693e98e96c5b9c6d88c265695",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"at": "3d3fb645323643935c6c94863c1b3edfd62e2828",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e06acbd3d381931f23cbde7d763136c9ccb091ac",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART in elixir-plug plug allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust memory via a multipart request body built from parts without headers, or from header lines without a name and a value. The parser charges the :length limit only with the name and value bytes of each part header and the bytes of each part body. The part delimiter, the header separator, and the line endings cost nothing.\n\nIn lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 keeps an entry for every part without a content-disposition header, together with its header list, until the whole body is read. A request made of such parts does not reach the limit at any size, and the parser process holds a multiple of the request size in memory until parsing completes. Any endpoint that uses Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is reachable.\n\nThis issue affects plug: from 1.13.0 before 1.20.4."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-120287",
"lastModified": "2026-11-17T18:17:48.300",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-120287",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-17T17:57:59.776542Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-17T17:17:53.920",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-120287.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/3d3fb645323643935c6c94863c1b3edfd62e2828"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/497913f2a6d744d693e98e96c5b9c6d88c265695"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/e06acbd3d381931f23cbde7d763136c9ccb091ac"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/security/advisories/GHSA-qj4r-jh2r-rw3f"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-120287"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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