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CVE-2026-110855 (GCVE-0-2026-110855)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-14 22:52 – Updated: 2026-10-15 18:15- CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython… | vendor-advisory |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-be… | third-party-advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| gitpython-developers | GitPython |
Affected:
0 , < 3.2.0
(semver)
Unaffected: 3.2.0 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:gitpython_project:gitpython:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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BDU:2026-17278 (CVE-2026-110855)
Vulnerability from fstec – Published: 2026-10-22 – Updated: 2026-10-22 – View on bdu.fstec.ru Exploit publicly available Fixed- CWE-200 - Раскрытие информации
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"\u041d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u041e": "GitPython",
"\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041e\u0421 \u0438 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u044b": null,
"\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 Repo._clone() \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 Python \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0432\u0437\u0430\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u0441 git-\u0440\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438 GitPython, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f \u043a \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
"\u041d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430": "\u0421\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0435",
"\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "\u0420\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 (CWE-200)",
"\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 Repo._clone() \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 Python \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0432\u0437\u0430\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u0441 git-\u0440\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438 GitPython \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0441 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e, \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f \u043a \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
"\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": null,
"\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f": null,
"\u0421\u0432\u044f\u0437\u044c \u0441 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0418\u0411": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
"\u0421\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430",
"\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
"\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "\u041d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0431\u043e\u0440 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
"\u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases#release-3.2.0\nhttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c",
"\u0422\u0438\u043f \u041f\u041e": "\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u043b\u0430\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u041f\u041e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c",
"\u0422\u0438\u043f \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "CWE-200",
"\u0423\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 2.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 7,8)\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 3.1 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 6,5)\n\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 4.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 7,1)"
}
BREW-AIDER-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:58 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:58 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "aider",
"purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.47.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.46"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:58:10Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:58:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-APM-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:30 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:30 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "apm",
"purl": "pkg:brew/apm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-apm-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:30:32Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-BTCLI-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:30 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:30 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.51",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "btcli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/btcli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.51",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.51"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-btcli-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:30:10Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:30:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-CF2TF-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:32 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:32 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cf2tf",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cf2tf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.2_11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-cf2tf-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:32:34Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:32:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-CHECKOV-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 23:07 – Updated: 2026-10-29 23:07 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "checkov",
"purl": "pkg:brew/checkov"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.616"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.30"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-checkov-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T23:07:12Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T23:07:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-COBO-CLI-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:36 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:36 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.50",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cobo-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cobo-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.50",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.50"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-cobo-cli-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:36:33Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:36:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-CONDA-LOCK-CVE-2026… (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:39 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:39 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "conda-lock",
"purl": "pkg:brew/conda-lock"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-conda-lock-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:39:28Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:39:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-CRUFT-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 23:08 – Updated: 2026-10-29 23:08 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cruft",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cruft"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.16.0_17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-cruft-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-10-29T23:08:41Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T23:08:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
BREW-CYCODE-CVE-2026-110855 (GHSA-FX3J-RWGX-FR94)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:32 – Updated: 2026-11-03 02:52 – Source websiteSummary
Repo._clone()'s handling of separate_git_dir never disables Git.polish_url()'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since separate_git_dir can be derived from an attacker-controlled .gitmodules submodule name, a completely ordinary clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a Popen(...) log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.
Root cause / Details
git/repo/base.py's _clone() has:
sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir")
if sep_dir:
kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)
This is the only remaining Git.polish_url() call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass expand_vars=False (there is one other unguarded call site, clone_path at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 added expand_vars=False to clone_url (5 lines below this one, in the same function), git/repo/base.py:1599, remote.py:814, and submodule/base.py:686 — this one did not receive it. (submodule/root.py also currently sets expand_vars=False at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) Git.polish_url()'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain os.path.expandvars() on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.
separate_git_dir reaches _clone() from Submodule._clone_repo() (git/objects/submodule/base.py) as module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name), where name is the raw .gitmodules submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. _validated_name() (added by the fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain .. path components; it does not reject $. _need_gitfile_submodules() is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.
Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)
Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY): GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc advisory's own PoC also uses:
repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)
repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)
Observed result (ls .git/modules/):
.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)
The literal $GPY_SECRET_MARKER-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the git clone --separate-git-dir=... subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under .git/modules/ is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the git.cmd/git.repo.base loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own Popen(...) debug log line prints the fully expanded --separate-git-dir=<value> subprocess argument verbatim — remove_password_if_present() only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an OSError/FileNotFoundError referencing the original, unexpanded name, since _write_git_file_and_module_config() looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)
Control: the same call with an ordinary (no $) submodule name succeeds normally and creates .git/modules/<name> as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.
Already-known check
Checked all 35 published gitpython-developers/GitPython security advisories in full text. GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc covers the same name → .git/modules/<name> path but for path-traversal (../../..), not variable expansion. GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w covers the sibling path field reaching unguarded os.makedirs(). GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 cover expand_vars, but only on URL arguments. git log -p -S "separate_git_dir" -- git/repo/base.py shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit 57d05379).
The closest topical match is GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc ("clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options") — already fixed, and its own text discusses this same _clone() handling of separate_git_dir. That fix only added --separate-git-dir to the unsafe_git_clone_options denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; Submodule._clone_repo() explicitly sets allow_unsafe_options=True for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current main, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist — the value itself is expanded via os.path.expandvars() regardless of the denylist outcome — so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.
No advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal separate_git_dir path.
Suggested fix
Add expand_vars=False to the Git.polish_url(sep_dir) call in _clone(), matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.
Verification level
Reproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current main, real git ≥ 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary git submodule add + clone + submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).
AI Use Disclosure
AI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.
Credit: please use "baeseungwon1010" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cycode",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cycode"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.5"
},
{
"fixed": "3.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Repo._clone()`\u0027s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker\u0027s choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are.\n\n### Root cause / Details\n`git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `_clone()` has:\n\n```python\nsep_dir = kwargs.get(\"separate_git_dir\")\nif sep_dir:\n kwargs[\"separate_git_dir\"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir)\n```\n\nThis is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller\u0027s own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` \u2014 this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`\u0027s docstring itself says: \"Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs.\" Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path.\n\n`separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name \u2014 fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git \u2265 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation.\n\n### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching)\nBuilt a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name \u0027$GPY_SECRET_MARKER\u0027 ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the \"victim\" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory\u0027s own PoC also uses:\n\n```python\nrepo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir)\nrepo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)\n```\n\nObserved result (`ls .git/modules/`):\n\n```\n.git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/)\n```\n\nThe literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created \u2014 only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel \u2014 it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython\u0027s own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=\u003cvalue\u003e` subprocess argument verbatim \u2014 `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name \u2014 but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.)\n\n**Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` as expected \u2014 isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically.\n\n### Already-known check\nChecked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` cover `expand_vars`, but only on URL arguments. `git log -p -S \"separate_git_dir\" -- git/repo/base.py` shows neither fix commit touches this line; it is unchanged since its 2016 introduction (commit `57d05379`).\n\nThe closest topical match is `GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc` (\"`clone_from()`/`clone()` omit `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options`\") \u2014 already fixed, and its own text discusses this same `_clone()` handling of `separate_git_dir`. That fix only added `--separate-git-dir` to the `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist, which gates the direct-kwarg vector; `Submodule._clone_repo()` explicitly sets `allow_unsafe_options=True` for the gitfile-submodules path, unconditionally bypassing that exact denylist (confirmed: the reproduction above succeeds against current `main`, which already has that fix). The bug this report describes is independent of that denylist \u2014 the *value* itself is expanded via `os.path.expandvars()` regardless of the denylist outcome \u2014 so the two are distinct, but flagging the relationship explicitly since a reviewer would otherwise reasonably ask about it.\n\nNo advisory describes environment-variable expansion via the internal `separate_git_dir` path.\n\n### Suggested fix\nAdd `expand_vars=False` to the `Git.polish_url(sep_dir)` call in `_clone()`, matching the four other call sites already fixed for the same class of issue.\n\n### Verification level\nReproduced in a real environment: plain Linux, unmodified GitPython from current `main`, real git \u2265 1.7.5 behavior, an ordinary `git submodule add` + `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` workflow with no non-default configuration or monkeypatching required. Causation isolated via a control group (identical workflow, ordinary submodule name, no expansion).\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nAI (Claude) was used as a tool under my direction for code review, code summarization, and script development. A human reviewed and verified the AI-generated results before submission.\n\nCredit: please use \"baeseungwon1010\" (github.com/baeseungwon1010).",
"id": "BREW-cycode-CVE-2026-110855",
"modified": "2026-11-03T02:52:49Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9349ff58ee00c9fb14d515c8e693f33b2144b238"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94",
"CVE-2026-110855"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.