CVE-2025-68183 (GCVE-0-2025-68183)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-16 13:43 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:10
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr
Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will
be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in
security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the
file.
For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix
evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,
installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA
signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,
# getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash
# file: usr/bin/bash
security.ima=0x0404...
This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag
that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated
when the file is closed.
Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing
security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.
Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing
the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.
Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last
step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main() {
const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary";
const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304";
int length = strlen(hex_string);
char* ima_attr_value;
int fd;
fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("Error opening file");
return 1;
}
ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );
for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) {
sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]);
}
if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {
perror("Error setting extended attribute");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0";
if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {
perror("Error setting extended attribute");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
Severity
7.8 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407
(git)
Affected: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292 (git) Affected: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < 02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023 (git) Affected: e3ccfe1ad7d895487977ef64eda3441d16c9851a , < 88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd (git) |
|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
5.14
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.14 (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.117 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.58 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.17.8 , ≤ 6.17.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
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"descriptions": [
{
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr\n\nCurrently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will\nbe reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in\nsecurity.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the\nfile.\n\nFor example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with \"ima_appraise=fix\nevm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb\" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,\ninstalling/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA\nsignature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,\n\n # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash\n # file: usr/bin/bash\n security.ima=0x0404...\n\nThis happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag\nthat had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated\nwhen the file is closed.\n\nSimilarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing\nsecurity xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.\n\nPrevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing\nthe IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.\n\nHere\u0027s a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last\nstep which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,\n\n #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n #include \u003csys/xattr.h\u003e\n #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\n int main() {\n const char* file_path = \"/usr/sbin/test_binary\";\n const char* hex_string = \"030204d33204490066306402304\";\n int length = strlen(hex_string);\n char* ima_attr_value;\n int fd;\n\n fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);\n if (fd == -1) {\n perror(\"Error opening file\");\n return 1;\n }\n\n ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );\n for (int i = 0, j = 0; i \u003c length; i += 2, j++) {\n sscanf(hex_string + i, \"%2hhx\", \u0026ima_attr_value[j]);\n }\n\n if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.ima\", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {\n perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n close(fd);\n return 1;\n }\n\n const char* selinux_value= \"system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0\";\n if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.selinux\", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {\n perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n close(fd);\n return 1;\n }\n\n close(fd);\n\n return 0;\n }"
}
],
"metrics": [
{
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"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - Triggering requires local syscalls against a file on the system \u2014 `setxattr`/`fsetxattr` on an EVM-protected xattr, `setfacl`, or `fremovexattr` \u2014 followed by an open/close of the target file. No network, adjacent-network, or physical path reaches the IMA appraisal hooks.\nAC:L - The commit ships a deterministic reproducer: setting any EVM-protected xattr or a POSIX ACL unconditionally clears IMA_DIGSIG every time, with no memory-layout or timing luck involved. The enforce-mode variant needs a race against `process_measurement()`\u0027s `MAY_WRITE` check, but `ima_reset_appraise_flags()` takes no `iint-\u003emutex`, and the attacker drives both sides (one thread spinning on `setxattr(\"system.posix_acl_access\")`, another on `open(O_WRONLY)`); the required IMA-appraise + EVM configuration is a shipped, supported Fedora/RHEL setup, not a rare build option.\nPR:L - `vfs_set_acl()` invokes `security_inode_set_acl()` \u2192 `ima_inode_set_acl()` \u2192 `ima_reset_appraise_flags(inode, 0)` before `set_posix_acl()` ever reaches its `inode_owner_or_capable()` check, so an unprivileged user with no capabilities and no ownership of the file clears the cached IMA_DIGSIG bit on any signed appraised binary \u2014 the syscall fails with -EPERM only after the flag is already gone. No CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this path, unlike the `security.ima` path guarded by `ima_protect_xattr()`.\nUI:N - The attacker performs the xattr/ACL operation and the file open/close entirely from their own process; no victim must mount a filesystem, open a file, or take any other action for the IMA_DIGSIG flag to be cleared and the signature to be replaced.\nS:U - The defeated control (IMA appraisal) and the affected resources (files and their security xattrs) live in the same kernel security authority; no VM, hypervisor, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Clearing IMA_DIGSIG both drops the \"signed files cannot be opened for write\" enforcement at `ima_main.c:472` and lets `ima_update_xattr()` re-bless the modified content with a fresh hash plus EVM HMAC, so attacker-substituted content in an appraised executable passes appraisal and subsequently runs \u2014 typically in a privileged/service context \u2014 yielding full disclosure of data reachable by that code. This is the standard treatment of a code-integrity/signature-verification bypass; the bug itself contains no direct memory-read primitive.\nI:H - The file\u0027s IMA digital signature \u2014 the one integrity artifact a local attacker cannot forge, since it is verified against the trusted IMA keyring \u2014 is silently destroyed and replaced by a locally computed hash written through `__vfs_setxattr_noperm()`, which bypasses the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` gate in `ima_protect_xattr()`. Combined with the lost write-block, this converts \"signed and immutable\" into \"mutable and re-blessed on close\", a complete integrity bypass of IMA appraisal for the affected file.\nA:H - Once a signature is replaced by a plain hash, any policy carrying IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED (`appraise_type=imasig`) rejects that file in enforce mode, so appraised binaries become permanently unexecutable \u2014 applied to system-critical files such as init, sshd, or libc consumers this denies service and can leave the system unbootable, and the corrupted xattr persists on disk until the file is re-signed out of band."
}
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr\n\nCurrently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will\nbe reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in\nsecurity.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the\nfile.\n\nFor example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with \"ima_appraise=fix\nevm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb\" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,\ninstalling/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA\nsignature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,\n\n # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash\n # file: usr/bin/bash\n security.ima=0x0404...\n\nThis happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag\nthat had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated\nwhen the file is closed.\n\nSimilarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing\nsecurity xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.\n\nPrevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing\nthe IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.\n\nHere\u0027s a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last\nstep which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,\n\n #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n #include \u003csys/xattr.h\u003e\n #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\n int main() {\n const char* file_path = \"/usr/sbin/test_binary\";\n const char* hex_string = \"030204d33204490066306402304\";\n int length = strlen(hex_string);\n char* ima_attr_value;\n int fd;\n\n fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);\n if (fd == -1) {\n perror(\"Error opening file\");\n return 1;\n }\n\n ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );\n for (int i = 0, j = 0; i \u003c length; i += 2, j++) {\n sscanf(hex_string + i, \"%2hhx\", \u0026ima_attr_value[j]);\n }\n\n if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.ima\", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {\n perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n close(fd);\n return 1;\n }\n\n const char* selinux_value= \"system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0\";\n if (fsetxattr(fd, \"security.selinux\", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {\n perror(\"Error setting extended attribute\");\n close(fd);\n return 1;\n }\n\n close(fd);\n\n return 0;\n }"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nima: no borrar el flag IMA_DIGSIG al establecer o eliminar un xattr que no es de IMA\n\nActualmente, cuando tanto IMA como EVM est\u00e1n en modo fix, la firma IMA se restablecer\u00e1 al hash IMA si un programa primero almacena la firma IMA en security.ima y luego escribe/elimina alg\u00fan otro xattr de seguridad para el archivo.\n\nPor ejemplo, en Fedora, despu\u00e9s de arrancar el kernel con \u0027ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb\u0027 e instalar rpm-plugin-ima, instalar/reinstalar un paquete no generar\u00e1 una buena firma IMA de referencia. En su lugar, se genera un hash IMA,\n\n # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash\n # file: usr/bin/bash\n security.ima=0x0404...\n\nEsto sucede porque al establecer security.selinux, el flag IMA_DIGSIG que se hab\u00eda establecido previamente fue borrado. Como resultado, se genera un hash IMA cuando se cierra el archivo.\n\nDe manera similar, la firma IMA puede borrarse al cerrar el archivo despu\u00e9s de eliminar un xattr de seguridad como security.evm o al establecer/eliminar una ACL.\n\nEvitar reemplazar la firma de archivo IMA con un hash de archivo, impidiendo que el flag IMA_DIGSIG se restablezca.\n\nAqu\u00ed hay un reproductor m\u00ednimo en C que establece security.selinux como el \u00faltimo paso, que tambi\u00e9n puede ser reemplazado eliminando security.evm o estableciendo una ACL,\n\n #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n #include \u003csys/xattr.h\u003e\n #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstring.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n\n int main() {\n const char file_path = \u201c/usr/sbin/test_binary\u201d;\n const char hex_string = \u201c030204d33204490066306402304\u201d;\n int length = strlen(hex_string);\n char ima_attr_value;\n int fd;\n\n fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);\n if (fd == -1) {\n perror(\u201cError opening file\u201d);\n return 1;\n }\n\n ima_attr_value = (char)malloc(length / 2 );\n for (int i = 0, j = 0; i \u003c length; i += 2, j++) {\n sscanf(hex_string + i, \u201c%2hhx\u201d, \u0026ima_attr_value[j]);\n }\n\n if (fsetxattr(fd, \u201csecurity.ima\u201d, ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {\n perror(\u201cError setting extended attribute\u201d);\n close(fd);\n return 1;\n }\n\n const char selinux_value= \u201csystem_u:object_r:bin_t:s0\u201d;\n if (fsetxattr(fd, \u201csecurity.selinux\u201d, selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {\n perror(\u201cError setting extended attribute\u201d);\n close(fd);\n return 1;\n }\n\n close(fd);\n\n return 0;\n }"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68183",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T13:10:00.187",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
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},
"published": "2025-12-16T14:15:50.880",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-07-30T08:22:46+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2025-68183",
"id": "CVE-2025-68183",
"initial_release_date": "2025-12-16T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:fixed": "1980",
"product_status:known_affected": "33",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "31",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: ima: don\u0027t clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-68183.json",
"version": "3"
},
"suse_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-10-10T01:41:46Z",
"cve": "CVE-2025-68183",
"id": "CVE-2025-68183",
"initial_release_date": "2025-12-17T00:26:04Z",
"product_status:known_affected": "356",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "352",
"product_status:recommended": "726",
"source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
"status": "interim",
"title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2025-68183",
"url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2025-68183.json",
"version": "52"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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